Scandinavian
Intelligence Services and Threat Perceptions of
Russia
Bachelor thesis
Author: Gabriel Forsberg Supervisor: Manuela Nilsson Examiner: Susanne Alldén Term: VT20
Abstract
Russia has since the beginning of the Cold War been a security problem and a threat to the Scandinavian countries, this considered by the countries' respective intelligence service, actors that are analysing Russia and the threat to the countries. However, information about Russia as a threat from the intelligence services' own perspective has so far been limited to information related to the Cold War period. This study thus aims to fill the research gap that exists on how intelligence services currently view Russia and contribute to more knowledge about how they view the threat from Russia, through their annual reports concerning the years 2012-2019. These annual reports are published by the intelligence services and describe their focus areas. This thesis uses a qualitative method to study the annual reports. To analyse what emerged from the annual reports, three different analytical frameworks are used: Buzan’s expanded security concept, the regional security complex theory and the balance of threat theory. What has emerged from examining these annual reports is that the threat from Russia has become increasingly complex and that Russia today and in contrast to the Cold War period, operates not only in the traditional military and political sector, but also in the economic and the societal sector. Based on the intelligence services' annual reports, Russia has increased as a threat and affects more regions concerning the security than its own. In order to be able to fully understand Scandinavia's region and security, Russia as a threat to the countries must be included.
Sweden has not chosen to respond to the threat from Russia by joining NATO, where both Denmark and Norway are already members. The three Scandinavian countries have responded to the threat from Russia by increasing their focus on the national defence.
Key words: Intelligence services, Scandinavia, Danish Defence Intelligence Service, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, The Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service, Russia, Threat, Crimea.
Table of Content
1. Introduction ... 1
1.1 Research Problem ... 2
1.2 Relevance ... 3
1.3 Objective and Research Questions ... 5
1.4 Disposition ... 6
2. Literature Review ... 6
3. Analytical Framework ... 8
3.1 Use of Frameworks ... 8
3.2 Buzan’s Expended Security Concept ... 9
3.3 Regional Security Complex Theory ... 13
3.4 Balance of Threat Theory ... 16
4. Methodological Framework ... 18
4.1 Methodology ... 18
4.2 Qualitative Method ... 18
4.3 Abductive Reasoning ... 19
4.4 Process-Tracing Method ... 20
4.5 Structured Focused Comparison ... 21
4.6 Sources ... 21
4.7 Limitations and Delimitations ... 23
4.8 Ethical Consideration ... 24
5. Findings ... 25
5.1 The Intelligence Services Organization ... 25
5.2 Perception of Russia During the Cold War ... 25
5.3 The Annual Reports Concerning the Years 2012-2019 ... 26
5.4 The Perception of Russia as a Threat 2012-2019 ... 27
5.4.1 NATO and Russia’s Relation ... 28
5.4.2 Russia's Actions in Their Vicinity ... 29
5.4.3 Actions in the Cyber Environment and Non-Military Actions ... 29
5.4.4 Russia's Defence Upgrading ... 31
5.4.5 Russia's Actions in the Arctic ... 31
5.5 Russia's Actions in Ukraine ... 32
6. Analysis ... 34
6.1 The Complexity of Russia as a Threat ... 34
6.2 The Regional Relation between Russia and Scandinavia ... 38
6.3 How the Scandinavian Countries Acted on the Russian Threat ... 41
7. Conclusions ... 45
Bibliography ... 48
List of Abbreviations
DDIS - Danish Defence Intelligence Service
MUST – Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIS - Norwegian Intelligence Service RSC – Regional Security Complex
1. Introduction
In peace and development studies, the focus is often on the bottom billion, which consist of the world's poorest societies and where conflict patterns in these societies are important to solve (Collier, 2007: 3; 17). However, security problems in developed countries have to be paid attention to as well. This can affect the developing countries and the bottom billion, as a conflict between developed countries could affect the security situation in the developing countries. Also, increased tensions between the developed countries could affect if the developing countries receive help in the form of peace-keeping operations and security.
Due to their geographical proximity with Russia and previous history, the Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Norway and Denmark have long been in a relationship with Russia characterized by a high military threat level, which has affected how these countries have shaped their politics and defence strategy (Åkerström, 2008: 16). When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union dissolved, it meant that the immediate military threat from the Soviet Union and then Russia was no longer as obvious and a change became visible in the defence strategies of the Scandinavian countries (Åkerström, 2008: 15;
Diesen, 2015: 395-396; Edmunds, 2005: 35). The countries changed their military strategy, from having a defence that focused on national defence, to instead focus on international operations and on contributing to peace around the world (Britz & Westberg, 2015: 424; Diesen, 2015: 395-396; Edmunds, 2005: 35). The threat was now within disintegrating states and international terrorism, challenges that were not directly linked to a direct military attack against the country (Britz & Westberg, 2015: 424).
However, a change in security policy occurred because of Russia’s military actions in Ukraine (Britz & Westberg, 2015: 423). This led to renewed fears and a focus on Russia. Since the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014,
the focus of the defence has returned to focusing on national security due to the fact that Russia has acted more aggressively towards countries outside their borders and fears have returned that Russia can be a threat through a military attack against the countries (Britz & Westberg, 2015: 424-425; Diesen, 2015:
400-401; Frederiksen, 2018: 32).
The actor that is conducting analyses of how the world is looking and the threat posed to the nation-states, is the intelligence service. The threats can be from different actors and include different threats but for this thesis, Russia as the actor is the focus. When looking at a country as a potential threat, the major threat consists of a military attack on their own country (forsvaret, 2015).
However, the threat is getting more complex and a threat can also consist of subversion, sabotage and intelligence gathering that is carried out by another country (Försvarsmakten, n.d). As noted, the intelligence service must be well informed on the threat situation around the world, as one conflict can cause the country to be involved unintendedly. The intelligence service provides information and thus support the policy linked to foreign, security and defence issues, including information on developments in countries and areas that may affect the countries security and the security in the world (Försvarsmakten, n.d.). Because the intelligence services are working with bringing information to the decision-makers in their country, it is possible that the intelligence services saw an increasing threat from Russia when the defence was focused on international operations and before the politicians decided to change the military strategy to focus on the national defence.
1.1 Research Problem
Regarding the research problem, there are several gaps in Scandinavian intelligence research concerning the threat from Russia. Each of these will be explained individually. Firstly, there is information available concerning the Cold War and how the intelligence services viewed the threat from Russia, because the classified status of documents relating to that period has been
withdrawn and the information is available for research. Therefore, it is a research gap regarding information on how the intelligence services view the threat from Russia through information that comes from themselves, between the end of the Cold War and to this date. Therefore, research concerning if the threat has changed from what the threat was during the Cold War is lacking.
It, therefore, makes it important to research what the intelligence services position is regarding the threat from Russia in recent years.
Secondly, most information on intelligence services is classified that concerns the present time. There is, however, a source of information that has not been used to bring clarity to how the intelligence services view the threat from Russia over time and that is the annual reports that are published by the intelligence services. The reports are made by the intelligence services and they are released with open information without confidentiality, they are therefore open to the public to read and aim to inform about areas affecting the countries security. Although these reports are open, these reports can still provide important information, because they evaluate how Russia in general acts and thus what the threat looks like from Russia. Thereby, filling the research gap to how the intelligence services view the threat from Russia in recent time, as crucial actions have been made by Russia as the actions in Ukraine.
Finally, the reason for comparing Sweden, Norway and Denmark's intelligence services in the recent years is because of the research gap concerning if and how these intelligence services view the threat from Russia differently or if they view it as similar. Therefore, the intelligence services will be compared to how they view the threat from Russia.
1.2 Relevance
This research is relevant as the intelligence services provide information to decision-makers of each nation-state. Thereby the information is used by
countries to evaluate the threat to their countries, causing certain reactions in terms of strategic decisions. The strategic decisions can be how the politicians decide their military strategy to be. The intelligence services threat perception can contribute to if the military budget is increasing or decreasing. The information can be used to decide if the military should focus on international operations such as the Afghanistan and Mali operations or if the military should focus on their national defence. The information can also be used to evaluate if Russia is a threat so eminent to convince a country to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By examining how the intelligence service views the threat from Russia, this can help understanding how politicians have thought when they changed the military policy, how the military budget is changing and whether the focus is on contributing to international operations or if the military should focus on the national defence.
Furthermore, the information that the intelligence services contribute with can contribute to a closer alliance and defence cooperation with the Scandinavian countries and other countries in close proximity. It is relevant to compare how the intelligence services regard the threat from Russia as this can help to explain if and why the countries choose to collaborate against the perceived threat from Russia.
The relevance of this research also goes beyond the borders of the Scandinavian countries, as a conflict between countries such as Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Russia would affect the whole world and a conflict between these countries could be accompanied by a conflict between military superpowers such as the United States, China and Russia, which in the end could affect developing countries in their aim to develop. Also, the threat perception of Russia can affect what the military focuses on, for example international operations or the national defence. If there is a focus on national defence, there is the possibility that peace operations in developing countries such as Mali would be affected, the security can be affected in the country if
peace operations are stopped or gets decreased in relation to contribution size of the military resources.
By studying their annual reports, it is possible to see if the intelligence service saw a threat that Russia could act militarily against another country like Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea before it happened. This can be important information as to if and how the intelligence services can foresee threats before they happen. By examining this, it can help to elucidate what the threat is from Russia at this time and how the situation in the world can change linked to Russia's possible military actions.
1.3 Objective and Research Questions
The aim of this study is thus to analyse how the intelligence services in the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) in the recent years 2012-2019, see the military threat from Russia and to investigate and explain if there is any difference between how the different Scandinavian countries see the military threat from Russia.
The research questions are:
• How has the perception of Russia as a threat to the security of the Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway and Sweden developed from an intelligence service perspective between 2012-2019?
• What impact did Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula have on the development of the threat perception?
• How do the Scandinavian intelligence services compare in terms of their perception of Russia as a security threat?
1.4 Disposition
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Following the first chapter the introduction, the second chapter concerns the literature review. The third chapter provides the analytical framework used in this thesis, the framework Buzan’s expended security concept will be explained, then the regional security complex theory and lastly the theory balance of threat. After that comes chapter four, which is the methodological framework and where the chosen method will be explained. In the fifth chapter, findings will be presented, which begins with a brief background on the intelligence services and how these have viewed the threat from Russia. Then, what emerges from the intelligence services' annual reports will be presented and where the research questions are answered. In the sixth chapter, the information in the findings chapter will be analysed based on the analytical framework. Finally, in chapter seven, the conclusions will be presented, which summarize the thesis and in what way the findings can be used. It also provides suggestions for future research.
2. Literature Review
The research has previously described how the Scandinavian countries have dealt with the threat from Russia since the end of the Second World War, concerning how they should relate to the Russian threat and by that choose the side between West and East (German, 1982: 57-58). The literature also describes how different events have occurred during the Cold War that has made the relationship with Russia tense, but also how relations between Sweden and Russia has improved at times (Kragh, 2018: 58).
Research has also been conducted on how the decision-makers in the Scandinavian countries considered Russia a threat after the Cold War. The literature brings up how political leaders within the Scandinavian countries changed their military strategy and reacted to the threat from Russia after the
Cold War (Petersson, 2011: 708-709). The research has shown how Russian involvement in other countries have affected the Scandinavian military focus and how events have changed whether the countries focus on the domestic security or international military contribution, thereby describing how the political leaders saw the threat from Russia (Britz & Westberg, 2015: 424-425;
Diesen, 2015: 400-401; Frederiksen, 2018: 32).
In the field of Scandinavian intelligence services, there are difficulties in obtaining information describing their focus area in present time, because the information is still classified. What has been written so far is largely based on how the intelligence service in Scandinavian saw the threat from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This is because the information has been declassified. The research has largely been based on material that is no longer confidential, because it is judged that this information is no longer harmful if it is released. This is done by using work-diaries from for example the former chief of Swedish intelligence service and with the help of other documents (Agrell, 2017: 10).
In previous research, it has been explained where the Swedish intelligence services focus laid during the Cold War as to how the intelligence services saw the threat from Russia. Also, how the intelligence service was working to obtain information and how judgments about how the future of the Soviet Union looked linked to combat forces capacity (Agrell, 2017: 297-299). Thus, there is an information gap if there is a change in their focus area. There is also previous research regarding how the intelligence services worked to inform decisions-makers in Sweden and to what extent their intelligence was used by the politicians to plan the military strategy during the Cold War (Petersson, 2006: 621-622). The intelligence service is an organization that works with sensitive information, therefore, what is known about what information they provide to the decision-makers and other actors are relatively small concerning the present time.
When it comes to what has been written about what the threat picture looked like, it is explained where the Norwegian intelligence service saw the threat coming from, if a possible military invasion were supposed to happen (Riste, 1999: 52). There is thereby a research gap as to how the Norwegian intelligence service see a possible military invasion would be carried out in the present time, and how the intelligence gathering is carried out by Russia.
Thereby, understanding how a conflict can arise that can affect all the Scandinavian countries.
What the research has not brought up and explained satisfactorily, is how these Scandinavian intelligence services viewed the threat from Russia during the time frame of 2012-2019. This interesting as the political decisions and thoughts can differ from that of the intelligence services. Was Russia from the intelligence services perspective, before the annexation of Crimea, therefore, an actor with the ability and willingness to act with military means to another country when the politicians in the Scandinavian countries had the focus on international military operations, instead of focusing on the national defence.
Also, what is not sufficiently explained is how the intelligence service viewed Russia’s actions and how serious the intelligence services viewed the threat from Russia when they annexed Crimea. Also, what is not sufficiently explained in previous research, is if the intelligence service has seen a greater threat to the Scandinavian countries after Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Therefore, the intelligence services annual report can bring clarity to this research gap.
3. Analytical Framework
3.1 Use of Frameworks
Buzan’s expanded security concept framework gives an understanding of the complexity of threats and will, therefore, be used to understand the Russian
threats to the Scandinavian countries. The regional security complex theory is useful for understanding different regions in the world and how they interact with each other. Therefore, it will be used to understand the relation between Russia and Scandinavia. The balance of threat theory is useful to understand how countries react to threats and by that to understand how the Scandinavian countries react to the threats from Russia.
3.2 Buzan’s Expended Security Concept
This framework is designed to develop the analysis of security. The framework is described in the book "Security: a new framework for analysis" written by Buzan, Wæver and Wilde (2008) and they are known from what is known as the Copenhagen school. This approach to security issues has been extended from the military and political sectors. There have previously been two camps within the phenomenon of security, where the early definitions were that the area was linked to the military and the threat the state was facing. There was later criticism of what the critics thought was a simplified view of security and where there were other sectors that affected security than just the military and political sectors. This framework thus aims to merge these two different camps and thus include both the military and political sectors as well as other sectors that are said to affect what is termed security (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998:
1-2). The framework assumes that security has become more complex than during the Cold War, when the focus was mainly on the military and political threat, after the end of the Cold War, there was also a focus on economic and environmental issues (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 2). At present, there are threats linked to sectors other than the military and political sectors, these are the economic, environmental and social sectors (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 1).
To analyse these new sectors, there are two different ways of doing this. This can be achieved through what is called the homogeneous complexes, which look at the sectors as individual objects. Within this complex it is necessary to
find what characterizes each sector, what can be a disadvantage is that it can be more difficult to form a holistic view (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 16- 17). It can also be done through heterogeneous complexes, which means that actors can influence two or more sectors simultaneously. Both of these complexes can be found within reality (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 16).
A sector can be explained as something that can be looked at to understand how something interacts. What these sectors look like can be explained as the military sector looks at how states are acting offensively or defensively and how this can be perceived by other states. In existential threats in the military sector, the referent object is usually declared as the state but can also include the defence itself. In this time, the military is also used for purposes other than just for the national defence of its own country, for example through peacekeeping efforts and this cannot be seen as a reaction to a threat against the country according to theory (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 7-8; 22; 51).
The political sector refers to a state's political system and their ideology, existential threats are explained as threats to the legitimacy of the state, including the ideology within the state (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 7-8;
22). The economic sector includes a state's market, trade, production and financial status. It is harder to see existential threats to the economy because it can be said that business companies must have a perception that companies are exposed to the global market (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 7-8; 95). The social sector includes, among other things, national identity and religion, thus threats that can cause the national identity to play a reduced role in society.
With the environmental sector, it is the environment in which we all live and the status of it. The existential threat in the environmental sector can vary from the threat to the climate, to the extinction of species and also to the extinction of humans (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 7-8; 22- 23). These sectors will be used as a theoretical framework to analyse the annual reports and also to
compare the Scandinavian intelligence services, looking at similarities and differences as to how they view the threat from Russia.
When security is studied, the levels at which security appears are included, which means that there are levels that affect international relations as well as each other. There are different levels, there is the international system, this is the highest of levels and which includes the analysis of the world as a linked entity. International subsystems, this level integrate several units in a particularly distinctive way by influencing each other and their relationship to each other. Units, this level means that there is an actor that is distinctive and is a unit within the international system. These units, for example, are countries and states. Subunits, this level of analysis describes, as the name implies, groups within the level of units and who try to influence the unit level.
Individuals, this is the level that covers the individual and is thus the lowest level when it comes to analysis. Some actors can affect several levels, which can include international companies (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 5-6).
Since this analysis aims to study how the intelligence service views the threat from Russia, the level of international subsystems will be linked to the countries Sweden, Norway and Denmark and their relationship with Russia.
Units and subunits will also be included because the intelligence service can be seen as a subunit that affects how the unit, meaning the countries Sweden, Norway and Denmark relate to Russia. The region to be studied can be explained by being included in the subsystem level (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 9).
Buzan, Wæver & Wilde also explain what is needed for a question to be linked to securitization, this is done by the fact that a referent object is considered threatened by a so-called existential threat that is presented by the securitizing actors, the securitizing actor sees a threat to the referent object. There is also what is called the functional actors. The functional actor can affect the military, political, economic, environmental and societal sectors, however,
they are not the referent object nor the securitizing actor (Buzan, Wæver &
Wilde, 1998: 36). For something to become securitized, this theory takes a full out social constructivist approach (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 19). For something to be called securitization, it is not that there is any general threat that is common on the political agenda, but that it is a threat to the referent object highlighted by the securitizing actor (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 5).
Because a referent object may feel threatened, it can take measures to counter the threat, called emergency measures, which may be to increase its military capabilities. Existential threats can vary between the sectors (Buzan, Wæver
& Wilde, 1998: 21-24). This theory aims to include military and non-military threats to a referent object and the securitization that is linked to the threat (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 4). The referent object, in this case, is Sweden as a country, the securitizing actor, in this case, will be the intelligence service.
To explain how an issue becomes securitized, it is clear that an issue can be nonpoliticized, which means that an issue is not on the political agenda and not present in a political debate. An issue can be politicized, which is when an issue is on the political agenda and there is a political debate around the issue.
When it is securitized, there is as an existential threat that is presented as immediate and requires emergency measures to stop the threat. How a question is judged depends on how a state assesses the threat and which can vary between different states and it need not be just one state and can also occur in other social entities (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 23-24).
For something to become an existential threat, it means that a question is so important that by not acting on the threat, the remaining issues will become unimportant because a threat can affect all other issues. What is important is how a threat is presented as significant, this is because a threat presented as significant does not have to be an objective threat (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 24). The definition of securitization is that something is presented as a threat which has political consequences. Thus, it is not enough that something
is presented as a threat to the referent object, but it must also receive political measures, if it has only been presented as a threat, this is called a securitizing move. There is no grading between referent objects and the sectors, but every referent object and sector can be equally important (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998: 25-26).
3.3 Regional Security Complex Theory
The theory arose because the authors considered that earlier in the analysis of the security situation in the world, a lot of focus was focused on the global level and the national (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 43). Thus, this theory considers that looking only at the global and national levels when it comes to relations between countries can mean that the regional level is overlooked (Buzan &
Wæver, 2003: 41; 43). It is important to include the regional part in the analysis, because only looking at the national perspectives means that only the nation-state is in focus and that if you look at the global approach, there is a risk of looking only at nations with great power or superpowers (Buzan &
Wæver, 2003: 43). The regional approach thus explains the important part of regions when it comes to security. The theory also explains that in the regional security complex (RSC) there are fears and aspirations in every state that affect regional security (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 43). The theory derives from a constructivist approach because it considers that reality can be viewed in different ways, however, the theory also works with a realistic and liberalist approach (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 40). The theory is based on regional relations, that is, threats and possible partners are in close proximity to the country itself (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 40-41).
In this theory, the actor is in focus, that is, how an actor assesses the security situation and shapes their security, that will affect other actors in the area. This means that the region can be changed linked to the actor’s actions (Buzan &
Wæver, 2003: 48). There are several different levels of analysis, these can be unit, region, inter-regional and the global level (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 29).
There are superpowers and who have the opportunity to act in all parts of the world and thus influence regional levels without the country itself being located within the region geographically (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 46). The country seen as a superpower is the United States (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 31).
Even countries referred to as great powers can act outside their regional affiliation but not to the same extent as superpowers (Buzan & Wæver, 2003:
46). Countries such as Russia, China, the EU and Japan belong to great powers (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 3). These two powers can thus penetrate the regional level, that is, act within another region (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 47).
Within RSC, there are two different ways to define the complex. First, a complex can be standard and can be unipolar or multipolar. When it is unipolar it is meant that there is only one regional power in the region, but that security is dependent on the region. Multipolar means that several countries in the region play a significant role in security (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 55). If it is not standard, it is instead centred, and it can be unipolar in that the power is centred on a superpower or a great power. An example of this is through the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It can also be linked to an institution rather than a country, it can be institutions like the EU (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 55- 56).
There are also what are called great powers, and which means that great powers can affect one or more neighbouring regions (Buzan & Wæver, 2003:
59-60). This may develop into super-complexes, that several different regions coincide and influence each other and can, but do not need to be developed to the extent that they form a new security complex. This occurs at an interregional level (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 60-61). If a relationship between some individual states within a complex becomes tangible and the interaction increases in security, it is referred to as a subcomplex, however, these actors still act within the regional complex (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 51-52).
The theory develops three different ways of looking at how different states interact with each other concerning their relationship. These are conflict formation, security communities and security regimes. Security communities mean that countries no longer see the other countries as a threat linked to security, however, there can still be a rivalry between the countries. However, disagreement can be resolved in a peaceful way, through well-developed institutions or a culture shared between the countries (Buzan & Wæver, 2003:
56; 173). Conflict formation means that countries see each other as a threat and security is important to protect against each other's possible threats, it may be past conflicts that have contributed to this or that countries have had a long and serious rivalry. Contributing to this rivalry and conflict may be that there is no shared culture (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 174-175). The security regime means that there is a conflict between the countries, however, it is possible to resolve the conflicts without resorting to violence, through that the countries have established contact with each other (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 175).
The reason why countries see other countries as threats or friends depends on politics and history between countries as well as material status (Buzan &
Wæver, 2003: 47). RSC also consists of polarity, which means to see the power that exists between these units in the region and amity and enmity, looking at the history that exists between the units and by that how they view each other (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 49-50; 53). When looking at amity or enmity the history can determine whether countries in the region are friends or enemies. Looking back at their relationship, how they have acted against each other in the past, friendly or acted as an enemy to each other (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 50).
RSC can look and change in different ways, the maintenance of the status quo can be found, which means that there is no crucial change in the region. A change can take place through internal transformation, which means that changes occur within the region linked to polarity or amity and enmity. It can
also be changed linked to external transformation, which means that the change takes place from the outside rather than from within the region (Buzan
& Wæver, 2003: 53).
This theory can be used to study the development linked to security in a particular region, by for example linking past events that occurred during the Cold War to the present situation. The theory can be used to analyse and explain events in regions (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 40). This theory will thus be used to see how the region that includes the Scandinavian countries, the European regional security complex and Russia in post-Soviet regional security complex interact and how the interaction is classified concerning conflict formation, security communities or security regimes. The European regional security complex and the post-Soviet regional security complex act in a super-complex (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). Also, to investigate whether there has been any change or not linked to maintenance of the status quo, internal transformation, external transformation. Also, how the countries Russia and Ukraine interacts in the post-Soviet regional security complex and how the interaction isclassified.
3.4 Balance of Threat Theory
Balance of threat theory is based on the theory balance of power but can be seen as a refinement of the balance of power theory (Walt, 1987: 263). The Balance of Power theory explains that countries act by looking at which country or coalitions is the most powerful and then try to balance that country's or coalition's power (Walt, 1987: 18). Unlike the balance of power, the balance of threat theory state that countries balance the threat and not power from another country. Thus, a country does not need to balance itself with the country that has the most power, but instead the country that poses the greatest threat (Walt, 1987: 263). This theory tries to describe why some countries join together and cooperate to avoid a threat from another country (Dagi, 2018:
144). A country can either choose to try to build up its own country to resist
that threat or choose to ally with others (Walt, 1987: 263). A state can also choose to either bandwagon, which means trying to ally with the opponent to protect themselves or to choose to ally with other countries that may also see the other country as a threat, meaning balancing (Dagi, 2018: 145). However, weak states are more likely to bandwagon, meaning ally with the threat (Walt, 1987: 263).
The theory will be used to describe how the intelligence service views the threat from Russia. There are four different attributes to how nation-states perceive and evaluate a country's threat, these being the aggregate power of a state, offensive power, geographical proximity, and aggressive intentions (Dagi, 2018: 144). Aggregate power of a state means looking at different parts within a country's resources to see if that country is powerful, these parts can have military capabilities and population (Dagi, 2018: 144). Geographical proximity means that a country that is in close proximity to the threat is experiencing a greater threat than a country that is far away geographically (Dagi, 2018: 144). Since the Soviet Union was large and close to many countries, the Soviet Union was a threat to many countries (Walt, 1987: 276).
Offensive power means the country's opportunity and possible decisions to threaten another country's territorial integrity (Dagi, 2018: 144). The Soviet Union spent a lot of money on its military and had an offensive capability.
This led to the country being seen as a threat from other countries, even though the Soviet Union wanted to balance that the Soviet Union had no strong allies (Walt, 1987: 277-278). Aggressive intentions mean how aggressively the country is perceived and is based on threatening intentions (Dagi, 2018: 144- 145; Walt, 1987: 25-26).
4. Methodological Framework
4.1 Methodology
The study will be conducted as a qualitative comparative case (multi case) study working with an abductive approach. It is an abductive approach because the case is in the centre and the theory will be used to help explain the phenomenon. The study is based on materials not used before to study intelligence services in the Scandinavian countries over a longer period. That meaning the intelligence services' annual reports, through this, it will be a desk study and where the process-tracing and structured focused comparison methods will be used.
4.2 Qualitative Method
Quantitative and qualitative methods can be used to conduct research.
Quantitative research is based on the use of numerical data and producing numerical data, to investigate a phenomenon more closely (Bryman, 2016:
149; 375). Because this investigation will not be based on numbers and instead based on texts from the Scandinavian intelligence service, this research will be based on a qualitative method.
A qualitative method is well suited when texts are to be examined carefully to gain a deeper insight into a phenomenon, because it provides the opportunity to study details in texts in order to explain events related to the phenomenon (Bryman, 2016: 378; 394-395). The method is also well suited for explaining the social world and can be used to see how actors view the outside world (Bryman, 2016: 375). Thus, using a qualitative method is suitable in this study because the intelligence service's annual reports will be used to explain how Russia as a threat has changed. Thus, contribute to a greater insight into how the intelligence service view the threat from Russia. Qualitative research is used to over a certain period, describe how patterns and events have changed and as this study will be based on annual reports concerning the years from
2012 till 2019 a qualitative method is appropriate (Bryman, 2016: 395). Since this study aims to get information about the intelligence service specifically, a case study design is preferred. This is because it can be advantageous to get in-depth information about an actor (Bryman, 2016: 60).
After the research has clarified how the intelligence services individually view the threat from Russia, a comparative method will be used to investigate how the Scandinavian countries view the threat from Russia linked to differences and similarities. A comparative method is useful as comparing two or more cases can contribute to a greater understanding of what is being investigated (Bryman, 2016: 64-65). When choosing cases to investigate and compare, this can be done by choosing cases based on whether they are similar or different (Bryman, 2016: 68). In this case, these three intelligence services are all located in Scandinavia, the reason for choosing to investigate these three intelligence services in Denmark, Norway and Sweden is based on the fact that they are located in close proximity to each other and that the Scandinavian countries are similar to each other in regards to culture, religion and the political system. The countries also belong to the same regional security complex. It, therefore, makes it interesting to investigate the differences and similarities concerning the threat perceived from Russia when the countries share similarities.
4.3 Abductive Reasoning
In research, theories can be used in different ways. A theory can be used to test a specific theory, this is called deductive reasoning. This means that the study is based on a theory and then distinguish if it can explain something empirically, or if the theory does not work empirically (Bryman, 2016: 21).
Another way is to use empiricism to create a theory, meaning to use empiricism and then try to create a theory that explains what has emerged from the empirical material, and that is inductive reasoning (Bryman, 2016: 22-23).
Since this study aims to use materials that have not previously been used to
see the change in how the intelligence services view Russia within the timeframe of 2012 till 2019, therefore, the material is in focus. Therefore, this study will use abductive reasoning. This means that the theory will be used as a lens to explain the material and thus be used as an analytical tool when the material is to be analysed (Bryman, 2016: 394). In summary, it is, therefore, an abductive study as a theory will be used as an analytical framework to help to explain how intelligence services interpret the relationship with Russia.
4.4 Process-Tracing Method
To have the opportunity to investigate the development of the intelligence services threat perception of Russia and how this has evolved between the years 2012- 2019 and to use a material that goes back in time, the method that is called the process-tracing method will be used. The point of the method is to go back in time to understand how something has developed over time (Falleti, 2006: 2; 5). The method is used to detect important events or processes (Falleti, 2006: 5). This method has different starting points and can be conducted in different ways, either to test theories, generate theories or to explaining outcome (Beach & Brun Pedersen, 2013: 3). One feature that all these variants contain is finding out causal mechanisms, that is, how different factors affect a phenomenon (Beach & Brun Pedersen, 2013: 13; 29). Because this study will not test a theory or generate a theory, the explaining outcome method will be used because in this case, as the material is in focus. This aims to explain a specific case by investigating something over long a period of time (Beach & Brun Pedersen, 2013: 3). Thus, to investigate which mechanisms explain the specific phenomenon, that is, what events can explain the result (Beach & Brun Pedersen, 2013: 12; 22). This essay examines if and how the annexation of Crimea changed how the intelligence services are looking at the threat from Russia. The theories will, therefore, be used to help contribute to explaining how the intelligence services view the threat from Russia. This
method can be used with what is called structured focused comparison (Falleti, 2006: 7).
4.5 Structured Focused Comparison
Structured focus comparison is the method that will be used to compare the Scandinavian intelligence services, to provide further knowledge of the subject. This method is useful when there are a small number of cases and can be used to further analyse and compare (Drozdova & Gaubatz, 2009: 18). The method was used to obtain information about foreign policies, this by examining the history behind them, since this study concerns foreign policy issues, it is an adequate method to use (George & Bennett, 2005: 215). Since the method is structured, the same questions will be asked for all of the cases and which will answer to the objective of the research. In this study, it is structured as the questions will be how the Scandinavian intelligence services perception of Russia changed from 2012 to 2019 and how the annexation of Crimea 2014 affected that threat perception (George & Bennett, 2005: 215).
These questions will thus be asked for each intelligence service and then compare how these actors perceive the threat from Russia. It is focused because it addresses certain parts of what is to be investigated, in this study focusing on what the intelligence services view as a threat to their countries from Russia (George & Bennett, 2005: 215).
4.6 Sources
The main source of information that will be used are the annual reports published by the intelligence services. These reports are produced by the intelligence services and aim to inform about the situation in the world, bringing up how the intelligence services work and how they evaluate the threat to their own countries. Because the reports are published and aimed at informing ordinary people, the information is not confidential.
By the fact that the intelligence services have published the annual reports and information themselves, it is, therefore, information from a primary source.
The information provided from their annual reports can highlight Russia as a threat to a greater or lesser extent than is the actual case. This means that the intelligence services can describe Russia as a threat based on their own thoughts and thereby show a different picture of Russia than what is the objective reality. However, since this research aim is to investigate the intelligence service's view of Russia, it is still a reliable source. It provides reliability because it is still based on their own reports and the information is not interpreted by a previous researcher before the analysis is performed. The validity is good because the annual reports will contribute to measuring how the intelligence themselves view the threat from Russia.
The annual reports are retrieved from the intelligence services websites and the information is open to all. The Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) started producing and publishing annual reports in 2004.
However, these reports concern the security service, which can be distinguished from intelligence services. As the security service is interested in that important and sensitive information regarding Sweden will not land in the hands of the enemy (Försvarsmakten, n.d). In the annual reports concerning the security service, there is a cessation of published reports, there are no reports for 2009 and 2010. In 2012, MUST annual reports begin to be released that does not only concern the security service, but also include the intelligence service and there describing how Russia is assessed as a threat to Sweden. Thus, there are annual reports from MUST regarding the threat from Russia and which have been issued from 2012 to the latest reports, concerning the 2019 development. The reports are written in the Swedish language.
The Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) has annual reports that cover the years from 2004 to 2019. From 2004 to 2009, the reports are written in Danish, it is only in 2010 that the annual reports are published in English. It
describes what the Russian development looks like politically and what changes are happening and how Russia can be seen as a threat to Denmark.
When it comes to the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS), there are annual reports from 2011 to 2020. It varies between the years in which the annual reports were published in English and which years it was only published in Norwegian. The years in which the English edition is available are 2013, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020. The remaining years the reports are written in the Norwegian language. It also describes the development of Russia and the possible threat that Norway faces. The reports that NIS releases annually describe the previous year's development. That meaning that the 2020 report deals with the year 2019. This means that the report for 2020 will be included in the survey. It differs from the other two intelligence services in that the report titled 2019 actually deals with the year 2019.
Other sources that will be used in this essay will consist of academic literature that will be used when the background will be given to the intelligence services and also how the threat from Russia has looked in the earlier years. As to how the intelligence services saw the threat from Russia during the timeframe of the Cold War.
4.7 Limitations and Delimitations
A limitation in getting more knowledge concerning the intelligence services view of the threat from Russia in recent years is due to the confidentiality concerning the intelligence services. That means the information needs to be classified so that people that are not supposed to take part of the information do not take part of it, only the addressed people receive the information.
However, the information that is released by the annual reports is declassified.
This study aims to get more information about the Scandinavian countries relationship with Russia based on the intelligence services annual reports. It would have been interesting to include Finland in the research. A limitation is,
however, that Finland only has annual reports from 2015, which means that it is not possible to investigate how the intelligence service viewed Russia before the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. It is too short of a time period to form an idea of how the threat has changed.
Another limitation is that the intelligence services started releasing reports in different years, therefore the analysis will be based on the year in which all the intelligence services started releasing their annual reports, which in this case is information concerning the year 2012 onwards. However, the information that concerns the years 2012 to 2019 cover the event that has changed how politicians in the Scandinavian country’s views Russia and also the security issue that affected the world security situation, that is, the annexation of Crimea in 2014. It also provides an opportunity to investigate how the intelligence service looked at the threat from Russia in the years before 2014.
A delimitation is to not use annual reports from other actors that also work with assessing threats to the country. To get a broader picture than just from the military intelligence service. These actors are in Sweden the National Defence Radio Establishment that works with signal intelligence and Swedish Security Service that works with counter-espionage (National Defence Radio Establishment, n.d; Swedish Security Service, n.d). However, because this study will focus on the military intelligence services, the military intelligence annual reports will only be used. In further research, the reports from the other actors can be used to compare how these actors view the threat from Russia.
4.8 Ethical Consideration
Since this study will be based solely on a desk study and no sensitive information will be used, there are no ethical aspects to consider. The information is open and not confidential, which means that there is nothing that needs to be considered from an ethical point of view.
5. Findings
5.1 The Intelligence Services Organization
The Scandinavian intelligence services started at different years. The Swedish military intelligence service starting point is said to be 1905. After a reorganization occurred, the present organization titled The Swedish intelligence and security service (Militära underrätelse- och säkerhetstjänsten (MUST)) was established in 1994 (MUST, 2012: 19). Norway's intelligence service was established after the country was surprised by the invasion by Germany in 1940, and in 1942 an intelligence service was created to provide information to the government (NIS, 2013: 3). The Danish intelligence Service can be traced back to 1911 (Nilsson, 2013: 138). Danish intelligence service established their present organization in 1967, as an independent authority, called the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) (Forsvarets efterreningstjeneste) (Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste, 2015).
The intelligence services all work with assessing the threat to their countries and provide information that is aimed at helping with policies regarding security, foreign and defence issues. Intelligence service also provides support for military operations abroad (Försvarsmakten, n.d; NIS, 2015; DDIS, 2012).
The Security Service within MUST works to counter security threats to the armed forces and their interests and to prevent and detect threats (Försvarsmakten, n.d).
5.2 Perception of Russia During the Cold War
During the Cold War, the three intelligence services focused on the Soviet Union. The Danish intelligence service started focusing on the Soviet Union after the second world war (Nilsson, 2013: 139). The Danish intelligence service had intelligence regarding among other things, the Soviet Union's activities in the Baltic Sea and the areas in the East that were occupied by the Soviet Union (Nilsson, 2013: 243).
Russia has been a security challenge for a long time to Sweden, due to, among others, the disclosure of a Swedish spy who worked for the Soviet Union in 1963, the Soviet lowering of a Swedish passenger ship by a Soviet submarine in 1944, aviation incidents in 1952 and the incidents of submarine violations in the 1980s (Kragh, 2018: 54; 58; 71; Agrell, 2017: 297).
Norwegian intelligence service interest for the Soviet Union became more evident after the Second World War (Riste, 1999: 21). Areas around Norway were considered to be important points for a possible Soviet attack on Western countries by submarines (Riste, 1999: 171). It was also considered that attacks against the Scandinavian countries would occur in connection with an attack on the West at large (Riste, 1999: 253).
The Scandinavian countries, since the end of the Second World War, had to decide on how they should relate to Russia and thus also choose side between the West and East. Norway and Denmark chose West and thus joined NATO (German, 1982: 57). On the other hand, neither Sweden nor Finland joined NATO. Sweden wanted to continue to be neutral and continue its nonalignment (German, 1982: 58).
5.3 The Annual Reports Concerning the Years 2012-2019
When it comes to how much has been written about Russia in DDIS annual reports, Russia have since the annexation been the country that the intelligence services have focused on the most and is a recurring topic in the annual reports.
Chapters that just concerns Russia have seen a change from before and after the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Because the chapter that just concerns Russia had four pages out of 57 total pages in the 2013 report before the annexation and in the 2014 report after the annexation, the Russian chapter had six pages were written out of 52 pages. Since then, the Russian chapter has had a similar number of pages written about it, around six till eight out of 57 pages at most. When it comes to how much that has been written about the
Russian chapter in NIS annual reports, Russia’s chapter have since the annexation of Crimea been the country that has most written about it and is a recurring topic. It was before the annexation of Crimea about four till five pages written about Russia out of 60 pages at most. After the annexation, twice as many pages were written. After this, Russia’s chapter has had about 20 pages in the annual reports out of 126 pages at most. MUST have during the years described Russia and the country is a recurring topic. When it comes to how much has been written about Russia in MUST annual reports, it is before the annexation about two pages written about Russia out of 41 pages at most.
After the annexation it is two to four pages out of 79 at most. It is thus a relatively variance of how much the intelligence services focus on describing Russia. NIS is seen writing the most, followed by DDIS and lastly MUST.
However, there is an increase in how much is described linked to Russia before and after the events in Ukraine by all three intelligence services. However, it is clear that NIS has the largest chapters concerning Russia after the annexation of Crimea, more than DDIS and MUST have.
Apart from Russia, the Scandinavian intelligence services also indicate other areas of interest in their annual reports. The intelligence services all have similar areas of interest. All three intelligence agencies are interested in and describe the terrorist threat (DDIS, 2017: 7; NIS, 2017: 4; MUST, 2012: 7).
They are also interested in weapons of mass destruction and the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. All three intelligence services have described the situation in Afghanistan (DDIS, 2017: 7; NIS, 2017: 4; MUST, 2012: 16). All three are also interested in China (DDIS, 2015: 7; NIS, 2017: 4;
MUST, 2019: 42; 44; 48).
5.4 The Perception of Russia as a Threat 2012-2019
The intelligence services in Denmark, Norway and Sweden view the threat from Russia through mainly some specific areas when looking through the annual reports, these are: NATO and Russia’s relations, Russia's actions in
their vicinity/neighbourhood, actions in the cyber-environment and non- military actions, Russia's defence upgrading and finally Russia's actions in the Arctic. These areas will thus be used to compare how intelligence services view the threat posed by Russia.
5.4.1 NATO and Russia’s Relation
Linked to the threat posed by the relation between NATO and Russia, the three intelligence services see a deteriorating situation between NATO and Russia.
DDIS argues that Russia is conducting military exercises around NATO countries (DDIS) 2015: 17). DDIS state that by Russia’s military build-up, Russia is now able to meet NATO to a greater extent in a possible conflict (DDIS, 2019: 25). NIS argues that the relationship between Russia and NATO has changed because in the 2015 annual report, it has been described that the relationship between NATO and Russia will be characterized by a more offensive foreign policy (NIS, 2015: 6). NIS also underlines that in 2014, Russian military activity was the highest since the Cold War in the world overall, through their activity in Ukraine, major exercises, several readiness tests and a presence in the Mediterranean (NIS, 2015: 16). NIS thinks that the increased Russian ability means that Norway and its allies will have less freedom of action in the Norwegian Sea, the Black Sea, the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea (NIS, 2016: 21). MUST state that the relation between Russia and the United States has gotten worse during 2018 and a possible increasing tension between Russia and NATO is present in the Swedish vicinity (MUST, 2018: 26).
The three intelligence services see that a conflict can arise by the actors misjudging each other and an escalation can be a reality (DDIS, 2019: 25; NIS, 2019: 22; MUST, 2015: 5). The difference between them is that Denmark and Norway are part of NATO and will be directly involved in a potential conflict involving NATO, while Sweden is not a member of NATO but may also be affected in a potential conflict between NATO and Russia (MUST, 2019: 37).
5.4.2 Russia's Actions in Their Vicinity
When it comes to Russia's actions in the vicinity of Scandinavian countries, it can be seen that Russia acts in the vicinity of the countries through air forces and ships. NIS and MUST have seen an increased presence in their vicinity for a long time, while DDIS has seen both reductions and increases. DDIS and NIS have also seen and emphasized behaviours with increased aggressiveness from Russia.
In Denmark’s vicinity, this activity has both increased and decreased over the years, but in recent years there have sometimes been more aggressive flights from Russia, is the statement by DDIS (DDIS, 2014: 15; DDIS, 2016: 16;
DDIS, 2018: 24; DDIS, 2019: 26). NIS sees a changed normal picture in its immediate area, through Russia's activity and elements of more provocative behaviour (NIS, 2018: 12). Over the years, NIS state that Russia has continued to act in the vicinity of Norway with aviation activity and some areas have seen increased activity some years, through intelligence flights (NIS, 2013: 13;
NIS, 2015: 15; NIS, 2015: 24). Russia conducted its largest exercise in the area near the Norwegian border since the Cold War (NIS, 2020: 10).
MUST reports state that Russia continues to have a high level of activity in Sweden's immediate area and that Russia is increasing its presence. The military activity consists of aircrafts, ships and units. This military activity can lead to incidents and confrontations (MUST, 2013: 14; MUST, 2015: 5;
MUST, 2017: 4). Many challenges shift in a verge between peace and war, even in Sweden's immediate area, MUST underlines (MUST, 2019: 32).
5.4.3 Actions in the Cyber Environment and Non-Military Actions
When it comes to actions in the cyber environment and non-military means, DDIS and NIS highlight specifically Russia's increased ability to act in the cyber environment (DDIS, 2018: 12; DDIS, 2019: 32; NIS, 2017: 34). The three intelligence services also see the threat of influence campaigns and
thereby attempts to influence public opinion in western countries (DDIS, 2018:
19; NIS, 2017: 34; NIS, 2018: 32; MUST, 2015: 11). DDIS do not see any influence attempts against the country's own elections and NIS does not specifically mention that their elections have been affected (DDIS, 2019: 24).
However, DDIS considers that there is still a threat that Denmark may be exposed to an influence operation and this threat is likely to increase (DDIS, 2018: 20; DDIS, 2019: 24). NIS state that Russia continues its influence operations in countries by influencing politics and people's views to their advantage and creating distrust in society (NIS, 2017: 34; NIS, 2018: 32).
MUST state that there are more attempts to influence public opinion and decision-making in Sweden (MUST, 2015: 11).
All three intelligence services argue that there is a serious threat to their countries linked to the cyber environment, as state actors are trying to get information from the cyber environment. DDIS and NIS explicitly cite Russia as an actor in this, while MUST mentions that the threat comes from state actors and foreign intelligence services (MUST, 2013: 25). DDIS state that Russia has large resources and is one of the most active actors linked to the cyber environment (DDIS, 2018: 12; DDIS, 2019: 32). NIS state that Russia has continued to act in the cyber environment towards Norway (NIS, 2019:
12). The three intelligence services are convinced that Russia’s actions aim to find out information about companies and institutions in all countries, with the objective to obtain information on technology, political information and defence information (DDIS, 2015: 23; DDIS, 2018: 11-12; NIS, 2019: 12;
MUST, 2012: 12; MUST, 2015: 11; MUST, 2016: 29). In contrast to the other intelligence services, MUST describes that the threat that exists is to obtain information regarding Swedish protection values and information from Swedish personnel. MUST also point out that Swedish staff abroad are subject to pressure and retrieval attempts (MUST, 2014: 21; MUST, 2015: 11).
Swedish defence personnel who make travels to Russia have a risk of being
contacted by Russia or being subject to information gathering according to MUST (MUST, 2019: 62).
5.4.4 Russia's Defence Upgrading
The three intelligence services all see that Russia's defence upgrading means that the country is building up the capacity to act with their military (DDIS, 2016: 9; NIS, 2015: 8; MUST, 2013: 14). The intelligence services also see a threat linked to Russia's focus on nuclear weapons (DDIS, 2019: 22; NIS, 2015: 15; MUST, 2019: 32). The intelligence services also see the slightly reduced budget for the defence but emphasize that Russia will continue to develop its military capabilities (DDIS, 2019: 22; NIS, 2020: 21; MUST, 2019: 40). DDIS emphasise that Russia's upgrading is a priority as this is part of Russia being able to be a great power and by that control the post-Soviet area (DDIS, 2018: 17). The three intelligence services also highlight the change that has taken place within the Russian defence linked to focusing on being able to act with shorter response time (DDIS, 2012: 54; NIS, 2015: 14- 15; MUST, 2013: 14). DDIS emphasises that Russia is able to act in their vicinity (DDIS, 2012: 54). The three intelligence services emphasize Russia's focus on missiles, DDIS and NIS also specifically describe that they can reach their countries in the event of a possible attack (DDIS, 2016: 15; NIS, 2017:
14; MUST, 2012: 4). DDIS also states that these missiles can reach parts of Sweden (DDIS, 2016: 15).
5.4.5 Russia's Actions in the Arctic
All three intelligence services see that Russia has built up its infrastructure and military capabilities in the Arctic (DDIS, 2019: 13-14; NIS, 2019: 22; MUST, 2019: 38). DDIS points out that the area can be used by Russia to attack other countries with nuclear weapons, MUST points out that it is an important area for their nuclear weapons and NIS points out that Russia conducts strategic submarines patrols in the high north area (DDIS, 2012: 11- 12; NIS, 2018: 23;
MUST, 2019: 38). DDIS also believes that if the tension between the United
