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Geographical overview of the security situation

In document Security Situation (Page 36-41)

Only 50 % of eligible children are enrolled in schools. The status of girls in education is considerably lower than boys with more cases of threats and intimidation for girls. Difficulties accessing school, especially lack of schools and teachers, resulting in long walking distances and general security fears, are reasons for the low enrolment levels (194).

In 2015, 369 schools were closed because of security reasons which affected more than 139,000 students and 600 teachers (195). During the first half of 2016, UNAMA reported 46 conflict-related incidents targeting education and its personnel, a 35 % decrease compared to the same period in 2015, causing 15 civilian casualties (five deaths and 10 injured). Sometimes AGEs also try to influence the schools’ curriculum and school buildings were also used for military purposes, both by ANSF and AGEs (196).

Landmines and IEDs are particularly threatening for children and are the second highest cause of death and injury.

Some of the mines are constructed in such a way that children think they may be toys (197).

1.5.4. Health facilities

In 2015 and at the beginning of 2016 the number of attacks on health service facilities and its personnel increased.

Hospitals and clinics were searched by ANSF and personnel intimidated and threatened, sometimes even abducted and killed. Security forces blocked the medical supplies for Taliban-controlled areas. Threats caused the closure of health facilities and some women doctors had to resign from work. During a US airstrike in Kunduz, the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital was targeted. 42 people were killed and 43 injured, including 49 medical personnel.

Some other attacks on health facilities took place resulting in deaths and injuries (198).

AGEs reportedly attacked polio workers to prevent polio vaccination campaigns in different regions of Afghanistan.

Abductions and harassment of medical staff were frequently reported (199).

The main security problems in big cities are high-profile attacks, target killings and kidnappings. In spite of the visible military presence in Kabul and other big cities, government, police and army are not able to prevent insurgent infiltration. Kabul, which experiences high-profile attacks on a regular basis, is now divided by security walls and road barriers but still AGEs can move through the city (204).

Some urban centres suffer more security problems than others, including administrative centres in Kunduz, Helmand but also in Ghazni, Uruzgan and Baghlan Province. Others including Mazar-e Sharif (Balkh Province) and Herat counted the lowest numbers of civilian victims in their city centres. However, in 2015 and 2016 some high-profile attacks were conducted in Mazar-e Sharif too (205).

The security situation in rural areas, where the vast majority of people live, is even more complicated. The Taliban, as well as other AGE groups, maintain their power bases in rural areas where government power is more decentralised than major cities. In rural areas, civilians may be victims caught in a cross-fire, aerial operations and land-mines or IED explosions. They may suffer also attacks from ALP and PGM (206). Afghans living in rural areas were significantly more likely (30.4 %) to express support for AGEs compared to residents of urban areas (18.6 %) (207).

1�6�2� Regional differences

There are differences in the security situation in various regions of Afghanistan. At least 29 of 34 Afghan provinces are affected by the conflict(208) and, according to Tolo News, this was especially the case for Nangarhar, Kunduz, Kandahar, Helmand and Baghlan in the first half of 2016 (209).

According to a 2015 survey by the Asia Foundation, more than two-thirds of Afghans (67.4 %) report that they ‘always, often, or sometimes fear for their personal safety’. The percentage of Afghans who fear for their personal safety has risen significantly since 2006. The provinces in which the population most often reports some level of fear for personal safety are: Wardak (96.2 %), Logar (90.6 %), and Uruzgan (90.4 %). For several years, these provinces have faced significantly higher levels of violence and armed insurgency than other areas. Provinces in which the people were least likely to report some level of fear are: Panjshir (7.2 %), Bamyan (18.4 %), and Badakhshan (21.7 %) (210).

From 2009 until 2014, UNAMA reported a steady increase in numbers of civilian victims in the central, eastern, south-eastern, northern, north-eastern and western regions. The South was already very violent from 2009-2010 and, in 2015, the increase in civilian casualties was most significant in the regions North-East and Centre (211).

In Figure 3, an overview of the security incidents from September 2015 to May 2016 per province is shown on a map (212).

(204) US Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afganistan, December 2015, pp. 17-21; Tolo News, Increasing Security Walls Irks Kabul Residents, 26 March 2016; Wytrykowska M., Afganistan sytuacja ludności cywilnej na terenach kontrolowanych przez Talibów, May 2013; UNAMA, Afghanistan - Midyear Report 2016, Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict, July 2016, pp. 6.

(205) Khaama Press, Attack on Indian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif was planned abroad, 7 January 2016; UNAMA, Afghanistan - Midyear Report 2016, Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict, July 2016, p. 6; Frontier Post (The), MoD rejects fears of Lashkargah collapse, 30 May 2016; AL Jazeera, Afghanistan: More than 50 police killed in Helmand, 30 May 2016; UNAMA, Afghanistan - Midyear Report 2016, Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict, July 2016, p. 6; Diplomat (The), The Battle for Helmand: Afghanistan’s Largest Province May Fall Entirely to the Taliban, 11 August 2016.

(206) UNAMA, Afghanistan - Midyear Report 2016, Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict, July 2016, p. 37, 40, 41, 77, 85, 87.

(207) Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People Afghanistan in 2015, November 2015; US Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afganistan, December 2015, p. 17; USIP, Addressing Land Conflict in Afghanistan, 27 May 2015; US Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afganistan, June 2016, p. 25.

(208) Afghan o line Press, Nearly 150,000 Afghans displaced in first six months of 2016: UN, 16 July 2016.

(209) Tolo News, Terror Attacks Down, Casualties Up in First Six Months of 2016: Report, 17 July 2016.

(210) Asia Foundation, A Survey of Afghan People Afghanistan in 2015, 17 November 2015, pp. 23-24, 34-40.

(211) UNAMA, Afghanistan. Annual Report 2015. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2016 pp. 8-9 (212) Map created by EASO: data on incidents provided by Western security official (see introduction).

Map 5: Afghanistan: Security incidents per province (Sep 2015 – May 2016)

In figure 4, an overview is given per province of how the number of violent incidents relates to the number of inhabitants, which can be used as one indicator in the assessment of the “real risk” of civilians suffering harm due to violent incidents. The reference period for security incidents is also 1 September 2015 to 31 May 2016. However, this is only one possible indicator among others. The risk for an individual in a province is very complex to estimate and depends on a combination of elements, such as detailed information on the nature and target of the violent incidents, the locations where they take place, the extent of civilian casualties, etc. Further information on the violent incidents taken into account in this quantitative calculation and more information on relevant indicators can be found in each provincial part of this report under Regional description of the security situation (213).

(213) Map created by EASO, sources: UNOCHA, AFGHANISTAN: Population Estimate for 2015, 26 August 2015; data on incidents provided by Western security official (see introduction).

Map 6: Afghanistan: Number of security incidents compared to population (1 Sep 2015 - 31 May 2016)

1�6�3� Road security

Since 2013, AGEs became more successful in cutting off major roads (214). It was reported that, since early 2014, AGEs increasingly controlled main transport and access routes. In October 2015, the Taliban blocked the major highway from Kabul to Kandahar. The road has a history of security problems and fighting, but at that time the entire road was blocked causing all traffic to be stopped (215). In May 2016, the Taliban blocked the road from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif and kept it under control, systematically searching for government officials or sympathisers (216). Residents of Jawzjan Province have also expressed concerns over growing security threats on Shiberghan-Sar-e Pul highway (217).

Only the short stretch between Kabul and Wardak Province is passable regularly (218). In August 2016, the Taliban had been blocking the Helmand-Kandahar highway for several weeks (219).

Due to the increased Taliban control over rural areas (see section on armed clashes and assaults under recent security trends) also smaller roads are less safe and people from some districts are cut off from the cities. Sometimes the Taliban closes roads as a military strategy because it knows that this will quickly end a siege leaving the local population with no alternative. The AGEs have closed roads in four districts of Uruzgan for this reason (220).

Kidnappings, hostage-taking and summary executions of civilians on roads are a serious and growing threat. For example, nearly 200 men, women and children were forcibly removed from three civilian buses on 30 May 2016 in

(214) Münch, P. and Ruttig, T., ‘Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance. The Situation of the Afghan Insurgency’, 2014; New York Times, Taliban Cut Off Afghan Highway Linking Kabul to Northern Gateways, 14 May 2016.

(215) Osman, B., The Road to Ghazni: Bombs, battles and blockades, 13 July 2013; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Kabul Kandahar highway remains closed off, 12 October 2015; Al Jazeera, Afghan travellers stranded after Taliban blocks highway, 14 October 2015.

(216) New York Times, Taliban Cut Off Afghan Highway Linking Kabul to Northern Gateways, 14 May 2016.

(217) Afghanistan Times, Reopening roads, 12 May 2016; Pajhwok Afghan News, Khas Uruzgan road reopens after 3 months, 9 July 2015; Van Bijlert, M., Trouble in Khas Uruzgan: Insults, assaults, a siege and an airlift, 2 September 2015.

(218) NY Times, Taliban Cut Off Afghan Highway Linking Kabul to Northern Gateways, 14 May 2016.

(219) New Afghan Press, Helmand-Kandahar Highway Still Remained Blocked, 21 August 2016.

(220) Afghanistan Times, Reopening roads, 12 May 2016; Pajhwok Afghan News, Khas Uruzgan road reopens after 3 months, 9 July 2015; Van Bijlert, M., Trouble in Khas Uruzgan: Insults, assaults, a siege and an airlift, 2 September 2015.

Kunduz Province, and some of them were executed. In a separate incident on 1 June 2016, armed attackers abducted 25 civilian men and women who were travelling in two buses in Sar-i Pul Province. A large part of abductions concerned Hazara people (221).

IEDs and landmines explosions are also a serious problems on Afghan roads (222).

(221) UN News Service, Afghanistan: UN mission concerned by civilian abductions and hostage-taking, 2 June 2016; UNAMA, Afghanistan - Midyear Report 2016, Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict, July 2016, pp. 64-66.

(222) UNAMA, Afghanistan - Midyear Report 2016, Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict,July 2016, pp. 48-50; Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Smartraveller – Afghanistan, 23 May 2015.

2� Regional description of the security

In document Security Situation (Page 36-41)