Kabul City

2� Regional description of the security

Background on the conflict and actors in Kabul City

In April 2016, UNHCR stated in its Eligibility Guidelines that ‘the ANSF have proved generally adept in defending provincial capitals and major urban centres, with the chief exception of the brief capture by the Taliban of Kunduz in September 2015’ (²³³). This obviously includes Kabul (²³⁴). Nevertheless Kabul regularly witnesses violence. The main tactics in Kabul are either ’high-profile attacks’ (²³⁵), ’complex attacks’ (²³⁶) or ’suicide attacks’ (²³⁷). UNAMA defines a complex attack as ‘a deliberate and coordinated attack which includes a suicide device, more than one attacker and more than one type of device’ (²³⁸). The pattern of a complex attack is almost always the same: an explosion, often a bomb, placed in a vehicle, which creates an entrance. Then insurgent combatants rush in and provoke an often hour-long firefight with the ANSF (²³⁹).

The targets of these attacks have been high-profile international institutions, both military and civil – including diplomatic personnel and western NGOs, in addition to Afghan authorities and security forces (²⁴⁰). The objectives of such high-profile attacks include, apart from striking the opponent, grabbing the international media headlines in a show of strength and sending a message to the population telling them that the Afghan government cannot protect them (²⁴¹). The weaponry used by AGEs in these attacks are generally not very sophisticated, such as assault rifles, grenades and pistols (²⁴²). Highprofile locations are targeted with suicide bombs and IEDs (²⁴³). Also, the AGEs occasionally target the city with rockets or grenades (²⁴⁴).

In Kabul, certain analysts refer to a Kabul Attack Network involved in many of the highprofile attacks. This is a network of combatants from the Haqqani Network, Hezb-e Islami, Taliban, Al Qaeda and LeT (²⁴⁵).

According to the ISW in March 2015 (²⁴⁶):

‘[t]he Haqqani Network’s ratlines to Kabul lead from its sanctuaries in Pakistan’s tribal areas, where the senior leadership plays an important role in selecting targets and creating an overall strategy for spectacular attacks in Kabul. Interviews with captured insurgents in Kabul in early 2015 indicate that many of them have been radicalized and trained in the tribal areas, allegedly by Haqqani operatives. Haqqani commanders serve as the key figures in the “network of networks” that the Kabul Attack Network uses to move suicide attackers, weapons, and bombmaking materials into the capital from the surrounding provinces’

Another source refers to the ‘martyrdom battalion’, a sort of special forces unit, carefully screened for physical ability and religious devotion. On many occasions in Kabul these attacks are traced back to the Haqqani network (²⁴⁷).

According to the ISW in March 2015 (²⁴⁸):

‘[t]he escalation of violence in Kabul is likely linked to the increase of Taliban activity in the periphery. As ISAF troops closed their forward operating bases and pulled back to provincial capitals in the transition to Resolute Support, the insurgency was able to operate with greater freedom of movement and consolidate pre-existing strongholds in areas around Kabul. The insurgency maintains safe-havens in areas abutting three major highways leading into Kabul. The Taliban can funnel weapons, funds, and fighters from these areas and along the highways

(²³³) UNHCR, UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, 19 April 2016, p. 11.

(²³⁴) Landinfo, Temanotat Afghanistan: Taliban – organisasjon, kommunikasjon og sanksjoner (del I), 13 May 2016, p. 25; US Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2015, p. 17.

(²³⁵) US Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2015; Osman, Borhan, The Fall of Kunduz: What does it tell us about the strength of the post-Omar Taleban?, 30 September 2015.

(²³⁶) NY Times (the), Taliban Step Up Urban Assaults, Testing the Mettle of Afghan Forces, 9 January 2016.

(²³⁷) UNAMA, Afghanistan Annual Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 2015, February 2016, p. 6.

(²³⁸) UNAMA, Afghanistan Midyear Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 2016, July 2016, p. 4.

(²³⁹) NY Times (the), Taliban Step Up Urban Assaults, Testing the Mettle of Afghan Forces, 9 January 2016.

(²⁴⁰) Landinfo, Temanotat Afghanistan: Generell sikkerhet og veisikkerhet, 20 November 2015, p. 14; ISW, The Taliban Resurgent: Threats to Afghanistan’s Security, March 2015, pp. 17-18.

(²⁴¹) NY Times (the), Taliban Step Up Urban Assaults, Testing the Mettle of Afghan Forces, 9 January 2016; New Yorker (the), Not Even Kabul is Safe from the Taliban, 19 April 2016; Van Bijlert, M., A Shaken City: On the Taleban’s truck-bomb attack in Kabul, 21 April 2016.

(²⁴²) NY Times (the), Taliban Step Up Urban Assaults, Testing the Mettle of Afghan Forces, 9 January 2016.

(²⁴³) UNGASC, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security; Report of the Secretary-General, 10 June 2015, p. 4.

(²⁴⁴) Landinfo, Temanotat Afghanistan: Generell sikkerhet og veisikkerhet, 20 November 2015, p. 14.

(²⁴⁵) Roggio, B., Taliban continue to launch suicide assaults in Kabul, 29 March 2014; ISW, The Taliban Resurgent: Threats to Afghanistan’s Security, March 2015, p. 18; Roggio, B., US military searches for Kabul Attack Network members, 27 April 2016.

(²⁴⁶) ISW, The Taliban Resurgent: Threats to Afghanistan’s Security, March 2015, p. 18.

(²⁴⁷) NY Times (the), Taliban Step Up Urban Assaults, Testing the Mettle of Afghan Forces, 9 January 2016.

(²⁴⁸) ISW, The Taliban Resurgent: Threats to Afghanistan’s Security, March 2015, p. 18.

in order to support operations in Kabul. The Taliban’s ability to reinforce the Kabul Attack Network is made easier by an ineffective ANSF presence around the capital. With their limited capabilities, Afghan forces are reportedly struggling to maintain an adequate level of security on the roadways leading into Kabul’

One attack on a Shi’ite religious congregation in October 2015 was claimed by the Islamic State (²⁴⁹).

Apart from conflict-related violence, Kabul City sees a high and rising crime rate. Regularly, the Afghan police parade hundreds of criminals in one month in Kabul, involved in, for example, murder, armed robbery and car jackings (²⁵⁰).

Recent security trends

From 1 September 2015 to 31 May 2016, Kabul City counted 151 security incidents. The following table provides an overview of the nature of the security incidents (²⁵¹):

Violence targeting individuals 21 Armed confrontations and airstrikes 18

Explosions 50

Security enforcement 31

Non-conflict related incidents 28

Other incidents 3

Total security incidents 151

The Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) compiled all major incidents that happened in Kabul for the last few years (²⁵²). Here follows a non-exhaustive listing of incidents for the reporting period September 2015 to August 2016 according to this ACCORD-compilation and, where referenced differently, completed with other sources. In September 2015, a police officer was killed by a MIED attached to his car. The same month, the head of the ALP in Logar was shot. In October 2015, at least seven policemen were injured in an attack on the adjacent houses of a tribal elder and the former governor of Helmand (²⁵³). One civilian was killed and three wounded in an attack on a religious congregation site in the Chendawol area. In the same month, an attack on a restaurant was thwarted by the security forces killing two suicide bombers. A convoy of UK military vehicles was targeted with an IED causing seven victims but not hitting the intended target. In November 2015, a former diplomat and political analyst was shot. In the same month, an election commission official was targeted by a suicide attack which killed a security guard and injured his driver. In December 2015, a complex attack on an international guesthouse near the Spanish embassy killed four Afghan policemen and two Spanish guards and injured seven others. A suicide car bomber targeted a convoy of IMF near the airport but instead killed at least one civilian. At the start of 2016, a suicide bomber targeted the French restaurant, Le Jardin, killing two Afghan civilians, including a child, and injuring 18 more (²⁵⁴). The next day a compound for foreign contractors near the airport was targeted with a truck bomb, killing one civilian and wounding 22. A magnetic bomb was attached to a car in Wazir Abkar Khan, and a driver exploded his suicide vest when stopped at a checkpoint near the airport but failed to detonate his car bomb (²⁵⁵). In January 2016, a minibus carrying personnel of Tolo News TV station was targeted by a suicide bomber after the Taliban declared Tolo News a military target for reporting the events in Kunduz in September 2015. In this incident at least seven people wer killed and 25 injured. In February 2016, the headquarters of the ANCOP were targeted by a suicide bomber, killing 20 police officers and injuring 29. The same month, another suicide bomber targeted the ministry of Defense, killing 12 people and wounding eight others including many civilians. In March 2016, a bomb targeted a former senator in the Panjshir Watt area, but instead killed a man, woman and two children, all pedestrians, and wounded 15 (²⁵⁶). Security forces thwarted an attack on the house of the head of the NDS and

(²⁴⁹) Khaama Press, ISIS claims responsibility for the attack on a religious hall in Kabul, 10 October 2015.

(²⁵⁰) Pajhwok Afghan News, 569 criminals detained in one month in Kabul, 12 September 2015; Pajhwok Afghan News, Kabul police parade 400 crime suspects, weapons, 10 January 2016; Pajhwok Afghan News, 277 detained in Kabul over various crime, 11 May 2016.

(²⁵¹) For more information on the source of the data and the methodology, see introduction.

(²⁵²) ACCORD, ecoi.net featured topic on Afghanistan: General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, last update 11 May 2016; ACCORD, ecoi.net featured topic on Afghanistan: General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, last update 5 July 2016.

(²⁵³) Khaama Press, Suicide attack rocks capital Kabul, 5 October 2015.

(²⁵⁴) UNAMA, UNAMA condemns Taliban attacks in Kabul city that kill five and injure 56, 6 January 2016.

(²⁵⁵) Tolo News, 1 killed, 30 wounded in Kabul car bomb, 4 January 2016; NY Times (The), Bombings near Kabul Airport add to String of Attacks around Afghan Capital, 4 January 2016; UNAMA, UNAMA condemns Taliban attacks in Kabul city that kill five and injure 56, 6 January 2016.

(²⁵⁶) Pajhwok Afghan News, 4 killed, 15 wounded in bomb attack on ex-senator, 29 March 2016.

against the Ministry of Interior in May 2016 (²⁵⁷). In April 2016, a magnetic bomb was attached to a bus carrying Ministry of Education personnel, killing one person and wounding five (²⁵⁸). On 19 April 2016, a truck bomb exploded and targeted a former NDS building housing a unit tasked with the close protection of senior government officials and VIPs. The attack resulted in at least 68 dead and 347 wounded. As the explosion took place in a civilian area, next to a bus stop, the vast majority of the dead and wounded were civilians. This attack recalls in magnitude and method the attack in the Shah Shahid neighborhood in August 2015 (²⁵⁹). In May 2016, NDS shot a suicide bomber before he could reach his target (²⁶⁰). A retired judge was gunned down in Kart-e Naw (²⁶¹). In June 2016, an Afghan MP was killed in an explosion near his house (²⁶²). In June 2016, 14 Nepali security guards were killed after a suicide bomber hit a minibus in Kabul (²⁶³). In August 2016, AGEs conducted a complex attack against the American university of Kabul, killing 13 people, including students and a professor, and injuring dozens of others (²⁶⁴).

The most deadly attack happened on 23 July 2016, when two explosions targeted a demonstration by members of the mainly Shi’ite Hazara minority in Kabul. This attack resulted in at least 80 dead and 230 wounded. Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack. This was one of the worst attacks in many years in terms of casualties in Kabul (²⁶⁵).

In January 2016, the Italian embassy was targeted by a rocket and in March 2016 three rockets were fired at the Parliament building, both incidents without casualties (²⁶⁶). During a visit of US Secretary of State in April, several rockets exploded outside the Presidential Palace and outside the US Embassy. This attack led to no casualties, but a girls’ school was hit (²⁶⁷). Another girls’ school was torched after the guard was killed in Kabul. This is reportedly the first such incident in Kabul (²⁶⁸).

Displacement

Kabul City continues to attract significant numbers of displaced persons, with at least 3,000 families requiring assistance in the first quarter of 2016 (²⁶⁹). In the first three months of 2016, 2,800 IDPs were registered in Kabul (²⁷⁰).

In the UNHCR Monthly Updates on Conflict Induced Displacement from September 2015 to November 2015, Kabul is not mentioned as a province of origin for conflict induced IDPs, only as province of arrival of certain IDP movements from other provinces. IDPs choose Kabul largely due to the perception of a better security situation and the hope to find better coping mechanisms (²⁷¹).

IDPs in Kabul City originate from neighbouring districts and other provinces from the central region such as Kapisa, Wardak and Logar, but also from Kunduz and Nangarhar. During the crisis in Kunduz, Kabul saw a major influx of IDPs from that province. Most found refuge with family or friends, but many did not and were scattered around the city.

Most of the IDPs from Kunduz returned quickly after the city was retaken by government forces (²⁷²).

The total number of IDPs in Kabul is unknown. There are different categories of IDPs: those fleeing armed conflict and security problems, returnees who could not return to their place of origin and live in secondary displacement, people fleeing natural disaster and nomads such as Kuchi and Jogi. 40 % of returnees do not or cannot return to their

(²⁵⁷) Pajhwok Afghan News, Explosives laden car seized near Interior ministry in Kabul, 17 May 2016.

(²⁵⁸) ACCORD, ecoi.net featured topic on Afghanistan: General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, last update 11 May 2016.

(²⁵⁹) Van Bijlert, M., A Shaken City: On the Taleban’s truck-bomb attack in Kabul, 21 April 2016; Graham-Harrison, E., Kabul car bomb reminds us this bloody conflict is no nearer an ending, 19 April 2016.

(²⁶⁰) Pajhwok Afghan News, Suicide bomber shot dead in Kabul, NDS, 28 May 2016.

(²⁶¹) Pajhwok Afghan News, Judge gunned down by unidentified assailants in Kabul, 20 May 2016.

(²⁶²) ACCORD, ecoi.net featured topic on Afghanistan: General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, last update 7 July 2016.

(²⁶³) ACCORD, ecoi.net featured topic on Afghanistan: General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, last update 7 July 2016.

(²⁶⁴) CNN, Kabul university attack: 13 killed as gunmen open fire on campus, 25 August 2016; Fox News, At least 13 killed, 36 wounded in attack on American University in Afghanistan, 25 August 2016.

(²⁶⁵) Reuters, Islamic State claims responsibility for Kabul attack, 80 dead, 24 July 2016.

(²⁶⁶) ACCORD, ecoi.net featured topic on Afghanistan: General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, last update 11 May 2016.

(²⁶⁷) Al Jazeera, Rockets hit Afghan capital after Kerry visit, 9 April 2016; Tolo News, Rocket attack targets girls school in Kabul, 10 April 2016.

(²⁶⁸) Tolo News, Gunmen kill security guard, torch girls school in Kabul, 18 January 2016.

(²⁶⁹) UNGASC, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security; Report of the Secretary-General, 10 December 2015, p. 13.

(²⁷⁰) UNOCHA, AFGHANISTAN: Conflict Induced Displacements - Snapshot (1 January - 31 March 2016), 16 May 2016; UNOCHA, AFGHANISTAN: Conflict Induced Displacements - Snapshot (1 January – 30 April 2016), 16 May 2016.

(²⁷¹) UNHCR, Conflict-induced Internal Displacement in 2015: the Year in Review, 28 April 2016, p. 9.

(²⁷²) UNHCR, Afghanistan: Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement Monthly Update, September 2015; UNHCR, Afghanistan: Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement Monthly Update, October 2015; UNHCR, Afghanistan: Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement Monthly Update, November 2015; UNHCR, Conflict-induced Internal Displacement in 2015: the Year in Review [map], 28 April 2016, p. 9.

place of origin. IDPs in Kabul do not necessarily live separated from the other urban dwellers and often mingle with other vulnerable groups such as the urban poor, returnees and economic migrants. Most IDPs settle in informal and illegal settlements around the city. Informal settlements are not in accordance with the Kabul City Master Plan, but based on agreements between the owner and the residents. It is estimated that 70 % to 80 % of Kabul is ‘informal’.

As these families pay taxes, they have better access to services. Illegal settlements have sprung up in places where there has not been an agreement with the land owner, often the Afghan state. They are often referred to ‘Kabul Informal Settlements’ or KIS, which include some of the poorest and most vulnerable households in the city (²⁷³). As of January 2016, UNOCHA counted 48 such settlements with almost 55,000 inhabitants (²⁷⁴).

Apart from internal displacement due to the conflict in Afghanistan, Kabul City saw large flows of Afghan refugees returning from neighbouring countries, putting further strain on the city’s services. At the same time, humanitarian aid over recent ears decreased resulting in less support and services, traditionally provided for by NGOs (²⁷⁵).