Kabul Province

place of origin. IDPs in Kabul do not necessarily live separated from the other urban dwellers and often mingle with other vulnerable groups such as the urban poor, returnees and economic migrants. Most IDPs settle in informal and illegal settlements around the city. Informal settlements are not in accordance with the Kabul City Master Plan, but based on agreements between the owner and the residents. It is estimated that 70 % to 80 % of Kabul is ‘informal’.

As these families pay taxes, they have better access to services. Illegal settlements have sprung up in places where there has not been an agreement with the land owner, often the Afghan state. They are often referred to ‘Kabul Informal Settlements’ or KIS, which include some of the poorest and most vulnerable households in the city (²⁷³). As of January 2016, UNOCHA counted 48 such settlements with almost 55,000 inhabitants (²⁷⁴).

Apart from internal displacement due to the conflict in Afghanistan, Kabul City saw large flows of Afghan refugees returning from neighbouring countries, putting further strain on the city’s services. At the same time, humanitarian aid over recent ears decreased resulting in less support and services, traditionally provided for by NGOs (²⁷⁵).

is made up of flat land (²⁷⁸). Major roads depart from Kabul City north toward Kunduz and Mazar-e Sharif through the districts of Shakardara, Mir Bacha Kot, Kalakan and Qarabagh in the Shomali plain, east to Jalalabad through the districts of Bagrami, Khak-e Jabbar and Surobi and south to Kandahar through Paghman and to Pul-i Alam and Gardez through Bagrami and Chahar Asayab (²⁷⁹).

Major ethnic groups in Kabul Province are Tajik, Pashtun and Hazara. According to UNHCR district profiles dating from 2002, Pashtuns dominate the southern and eastern districts of Surobi, Paghman, Chaharasyab, Bagrami, Deh Sabz, Khake Jabbar and Musayi, and Tajik dominate the northern districts of Istalif, Kalakan, Mir Bacha Kot, Shakardara and Qarabagh. In other districts, no ethnic group is clearly dominant (²⁸⁰). North of Kabul City lies the Shomali plain which stretches for 70 kilometres from the outskirts of the city to the Salang pass. The inhabitants of the Shomali plain are mainly Tajik and, to a lesser extent, Uzbek, Hazara and Pashtun (²⁸¹). It is a fertile and comparatively rich area and, because of its developed agriculture, considered the orchard of Kabul. The area has been a central part in Afghan economy and politics for a long time (²⁸²). The security situation in Kabul City is outlined in the previous chapter.

Background on the conflict and actors in Kabul Province

Surobi or Sarobi district is particularly affected by Taliban infiltration (²⁸³). In Surobi, most of the heavy fighting between AGEs and French military forces happened in the Uzbin valley. Uzbin is a side valley in Surobi on the way to Jalalabad. The valley extends for some 30 kilometres north of the district centre and the highway that crosses it.

Security incidents on the stretch of the highway passing by the mouth of the valley were frequent. Uzbin is nestled among other insecure districts, such as Tagab of Kapisa Province, Qarghayi and Badpakh of Laghman and Hesarak in Nangarhar, to which it connects through relatively easily traversable passes. The broader area is reported as being increasingly controlled by the armed opposition and became an important crossing point and sanctuary for AGEs (²⁸⁴).

Residents of the upper Uzbin valley complained in September 2015 about poor economic circumstances, violence against women and the lack of professional teachers because of the presence of AGEs (²⁸⁵).

Analyst Foschini stated in July 2015 ‘[r]ecently, security on the [Kabul-Jalalabad] highway has deteriorated again, with recurrent attacks against ANSF posts and vehicles even in broad daylight. Most [incidents] happened where the road abuts the mouth of the Uzbin valley’ (²⁸⁶). The rising security risks on that road led to a major offensive by ANSF in September 2015 (²⁸⁷). The operation lasted for several weeks and went all the way up in the Uzbin valley (²⁸⁸). However, according to Foschini, [p]revious military operations to improve security mostly aimed at dislodging insurgent groups from the Tor Ghar massif to the south of the highway (right on the border between Laghman and Nangrahar), and were temporarily effective at reducing attacks on the road. The threat coming from Uzbin, however, in light of the strong position held by AGEs there, will be much more difficult to address (²⁸⁹).

According to Foschini, in July 2015 ‘security observers report declining numbers of ANSF troops and decreased effectiveness of the ANSF operations in Sarobi, due to a lack of resources and poor coordination. […] The government’s sway over the whole of Sarobi had grown weaker in recent years. Not only is all of upper Uzbin completely beyond the control of the ANSF; other areas in the districts do not fare much better’ (²⁹⁰).

Other districts were also infiltrated by AGEs, and to a lesser extent so were Musayi, Chahar Asyab, Khak-e Jabbar and Bagrami (²⁹¹). Musayi and parts of Deh Sabz are described by ISW as ‘high confidence Taliban support zones’, while Paghman and parts of Khak-e Jabbar, Bagrami and Chahar Asayab are described as ‘low confidence Taliban

(²⁷⁸) WFP, Provincial Profile. Kabul, n.d.

(²⁷⁹) UNOCHA, Afghanistan. Kabul Province District Atlas, April 2014.

(²⁸⁰) UNHCR, Kabul District Profiles, 2002.

(²⁸¹) OSI, Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001, 2005, p. 127.

(²⁸²) Foschini, F., Elections 2014 (6): Two types of security in Shomali, 7 April 2014.

(²⁸³) International organisation, e-mail, 15 September 2015. The local contact is an international organisation active in the province. The organisation wished to remain anonymous for security reasons.

(²⁸⁴) Foschini F., Classics of Conflict (2): Reviewing some of Afghanistan’s most notorious hotspots, 9 July 2015; APPRO, Afghanistan: Monitoring Women’s Security in Transition, June 2013, p. 20; Pajhwok Afghan News, Hesarak on the verge of falling to rebels, 12 July 2014.

(²⁸⁵) Tolo News, Security officials take steps to rid Surobi of Taliban, 30 September 2015.

(²⁸⁶) Foschini F., Classics of Conflict (2): Reviewing some of Afghanistan’s most notorious hotspots, 9 July 2015.

(²⁸⁷) Pajhwok Afghan News, Operation begins secure Kabul-Jalalabad highway, 15 September 2015.

(²⁸⁸) Tolo News, Security officials take steps to rid Surobi of Taliban, 30 September 2015.

(²⁸⁹) Foschini F., Classics of Conflict (2): Reviewing some of Afghanistan’s most notorious hotspots, 9 July 2015.

(²⁹⁰) Foschini F., Classics of Conflict (2): Reviewing some of Afghanistan’s most notorious hotspots, 9 July 2015.

(²⁹¹) International organisation, e-mail, 15 September 2015. The local contact is an international organisation active in the province. The organisation wished to remain anonymous for security reasons.

support zones’(²⁹²). Paghman, bordering Wardak, is described as a safe shelter for illegal armed groups and AGEs (²⁹³).

Paghman is, nevertheless, an attractive spot for picnics and weekends out for many Kabulis (²⁹⁴). Taliban presence in Musayi and Guldara go underreported, according to analyst Thomas Ruttig (²⁹⁵).

AGEs active in the province include the Taliban, Haqqani Network and Hezb-e Islam (²⁹⁶). According to analyst Foschini, fighters from Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar) and the Taliban were consistently present in Surobi, although Hezb-e Islami were traditionally stronger in Surobi (²⁹⁷). According to a source in Kabul, it is tensions between Jamiaat and Hezb-e Islami that facilitate insurgent infiltration in Surobi (²⁹⁸). In November 2015, NDS claimed to have arrested four members of the Islamic State, sent to Paghman from Achin, Nangarhar (²⁹⁹).

According to a source in Kabul, 350 ALP are deployed in three districts – Surobi (150 men), Musayi and Paghman (100 men each) (³⁰⁰). In Surobi, according to Foschini, ‘ALP units man a handful of posts besides the district centre bazaar, but are too small (four to five, at most ten, local policemen) to withstand attacks by the insurgents’ (³⁰¹).

Recent security trends

From 1 September 2015 to 31 May 2016, Kabul Province, including the city, counted 312 security incidents. The following table provides an overview of the nature of the security incidents (³⁰²):

Including

Kabul City Excluding Kabul City

Violence targeting individuals 26 5

Armed confrontations and airstrikes 107 89

Explosions 80 30

Security enforcement 67 36

Non-conflict related incidents 29 1

Other incidents 3 0

Total security incidents 312 161

From 1 September 2015 to 31 May 2016, Kabul Province experienced 312 security incidents. These include 151 in Kabul City alone. Excluding the figures for Kabul City, as discussed in the previous chapter, Kabul Province only accounts for 161 incidents. While suicide attacks and IED explosions are much less common in the province than in the city, the majority of armed clashes and stand-off attacks occurred in the province. Another remarkable difference is that almost all of the non-conflict related incidents, mainly crime-related incidents, occurred in the city.

(²⁹²) ISW, Afghanistan partial threat assessment as of April 12, 2016, 12 April 2016; ISW, Afghanistan partial threat assessment as of February 23, 2016, 23 February 2016.

(²⁹³) International organisation, e-mail, 15 September 2015. The local contact is an international organisation active in the province. The organisation wished to remain anonymous for security reasons.

(²⁹⁴) Tolo News, Visitors continue to flock to Paghman, despite deadly attack, 18 September 2015.

(²⁹⁵) Ruttig T., the second Fall of Musa Qala: How the Taleban are expending territorial control, 3 September 2015.

(²⁹⁶) Münch, P. and Ruttig, T., ‘Between Negotiations and Ongoing Resistance. The Situation of the Afghan Insurgency’, 2014, pp. 25-41.

(²⁹⁷) Foschini F., Classics of Conflict (2): Reviewing some of Afghanistan’s most notorious hotspots, 9 July 2015.

(²⁹⁸) International organisation, e-mail, 15 September 2015. The local contact is an international organisation active in the province. The organisation wished to remain anonymous for security reasons.

(²⁹⁹) Pajhwok Afghan News, NDS arrests 4 Daesh affiliates in Paghman, 26 November 2016.

(³⁰⁰) International organisation, e-mail, 15 September 2015. The local contact is an international organisation active in the province. The organisation wished to remain anonymous for security reasons.

(³⁰¹) Foschini F., Classics of Conflict (2): Reviewing some of Afghanistan’s most notorious hotspots, 9 July 2015.

(³⁰²) For more information on the source of the data and the methodology, see introduction.

The following table presents the number of security incidents per district in Kabul Province (³⁰³):

Surobi Paghman Qarabagh Bagrami Deh Sabz Khak-e Jabbar Musayi

86 21 14 11 8 7 6

Chaharasyab Shakardara Kalakan Farza Istalif Mir Bacha Kot Guldara

3 3 2 0 0 0 0

Examples of violent incidents reported in the media point to a similar pattern as in Kabul City: roadside or suicide bombs with high-profile targets. North of Kabul, two soldiers died when their truck hit a landmine in Kalakan district in September 2015 (³⁰⁴). A few days later, a car bomb targeted the car of the son of a member of parliament in Qarabagh district, injuring one bodyguard (³⁰⁵). In Paghman, AGEs also occasionally targeted high profiles. In September 2015, a suicide bomber targeted the police headquarters killing four people, including the head of Criminal Investigation Department, and injuring 41, mostly civilians (³⁰⁶). In November 2015, Khaama Press reported that the Taliban was mobilising in Deh Sabz district while NDS stated the Deh Sabz shadow district governor was killed in fighting in Behsud, Nangarhar (³⁰⁷). In May 2016, a suicide bomber targeted a minibus carrying Wardak court personnel in Paghman, killing 11 people and injuring 10. According to UNAMA, six victims where children (³⁰⁸). In June 2016, a prosecutor was abducted and killed in Qarabagh district (³⁰⁹).

In Khak-e Jabar, a roadside bomb went off in September without an apparent target, killing four civilians and wounding seven; all victims were travelling from Logar to Kabul (³¹⁰).

As of June 2016, the ISW considered a pocket south of the Kabul-Jalalabad highway as under control of the Taliban, and the surrounding areas, including the area through which the highway passes, are considered ‘high confidence Taliban support zones’ (³¹¹).

Displacement

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, reported throughout 2015 ‘a continuous influx’ of families fleeing the intensification of the conflict between the Taliban and Islamic State-affiliated groups in Nangarhar, particularly in Surobi, and a ‘steady pace’ of conflict-induced displacement from neighbouring provinces Kapisa, Wardak and Parwan (³¹²).UNHCR also reported an unknown number of IDPs from unnamed districts in Kabul towards Kabul City (³¹³).

(³⁰³) For more information on the source of the data and the methodology, see introduction.

(³⁰⁴) Khaama Press, Two soldiers martyred in landmine explosion in Kalakan district of Kabul, 9 September 2015.

(³⁰⁵) Khaama Press, Car bomb goes off in Kabul’s Qarabagh district, 12 September 2015.

(³⁰⁶) Khaama Press, Four killed and 41 wounded in Kabul suicide attack, 16 September 2015.

(³⁰⁷) Khaama Press, Taliban shadow governor for Kabul’s Deh Sabz district among five killed, 22 November 2015.

(³⁰⁸) UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), UNAMA condemns attack targeting judicial authorities, 25 May 2016.

(³⁰⁹) UNAMA, Afghanistan Midyear Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 2016, July 2016, p. 61.

(³¹⁰) Khaama Press, Four civilians killed, seven wounded in landmine explosion in Kabul’s Khak-e-Jabar, 19 September 2015.

(³¹¹) ISW, Afghanistan partial threat assessment as of April 12, 2016, 12 April 2016; ISW, Afghanistan partial threat assessment as of February 23, 2016, 23 February 2016; ISW, Afghanistan partial threat assessment as of June 30, 2016, 14 July 2016.

(³¹²) UNHCR, Conflict-induced Internal Displacement in 2015: the Year in Review, 28 April 2016, p. 9.

(³¹³) UNHCR, Afghanistan: Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement Monthly Update, September 2015.