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Impact of the violence on the civilian population

In document Security Situation (Page 32-36)

As UNAMA underlines in its report (160):

‘The current, grinding conflict tragically continued to kill and maim thousands of civilians, destroy livelihoods and property, displace tens of thousands, and restrict freedom of movement of civilians and access to education, health and other services’

In 2015, UNAMA documented the highest number of total civilian casualties since it started recording in 2009:

11,002. This was a 4 % increase compared to 2014. 3,545 of those were civilian deaths, a 4 % decrease compared to 2014 and 7,457 were injured, a 9 % increase (161).

From January to June 2016, UNAMA recorded 5,166 civilian casualties, which was again an overall increase of 4 % compared to the same period in 2015. 1,601 of those were civilians killed (a 1 % decrease) and 3,565 injured (6 % increase). Ground engagements continued to the main cause of civilian victims, followed by suicide, complex and IED attacks. Most civilian casualties were attributed by UNAMA to AGEs (60 %). From January 2009 to June 2016, UNAMA documented 63,934 civilian casualties (22,941 deaths and 40,993 injured) in the Afghan conflict (162).

Landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) continued to pose a threat for civilians. Most victims are children and goat herders. It is estimated that up to one million people may be disabled and 50,000 to 100,000 are limb amputees. Several de-mining organisations are trying to demine some parts of the country Afghanistan but it takes a lot of time (163). UNAMA estimated that, from January to June 2016, 95 were killed and 217 injured because of ERW (164).

1.5.1. Socio-economic life

After decades of conflicts, Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries of the world. Most of the population suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs. After a period of steady increase of investment and economic opportunities due to the international presence, in 2014, the withdrawal of foreign troops caused the economy to collapse and capital to flee the country, while the lack of security, corruption and high rate of criminality were impediments to new investments (165).

In the beginning of 2016, a lack of security in the country contributed to a drop in foreign investment. Foreign aid also decreased, poverty continued to increase and the educated young generation started migrating abroad (166). These developments led to a continuing dire economic situation, significant decrease in jobs and increase in unemployment.

In addition, increasing drought, land erosion, bad management, food insecurity, and chronic energy problems make daily life more difficult for Afghans (167).

(159) HRW, Detention of Children as National Security Threats [interactive map], 28 July 2016; HRW, Afghanistan: Reject Indefinite Detention Without Trial, 15 November 2015.

(160) UNAMA, Afghanistan - Midyear Report 2016, Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict, July 2016, p. 2.

(161) UNAMA, Afghanistan. Annual Report 2015. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2016, p. 1.

(162) UNAMA, Afghanistan - Midyear Report 2016, Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict, July 2016, pp. 1-2.

(163) Daily Mail, The harrowing plight of children maimed in Afghanistan by the thousands of mines, 21 August 2015; Tolo News, Landmines, Explosives Cover 500 000 sq kms in Afghanistan: UN, 7 February 2016; The Diplomat, Digging for Mines in Afghanistan, 22 March 2016; UNAMA, Afghanistan. Annual Report 2015. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2016, pp. 21-22.

(164) UNAMA, Afghanistan - Midyear Report 2016, Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict,July 2016, p. 26.

(165) CIA, Factbook, Afghanistan, Economy, n.d.; Majidi, N., ‘Helping Them Help Themselves Transitioning out of displacement in Afghanistan, from networks to development aid’, Autumn 2015; The Road Ahead: From an “End Date” to an “End State”, 16 March 2016; Asia Foundation (The), A Survey of the Afghan People Afghanistan in 2015, November 2015, p. 55; Tolo News, Afghan Economy Trembles Amid Foreign Investment Decline: ACCI, 12 February 2016; Rahimi F.A.F., ‘The impact of international forces withdrawal on investment in Herat, Afghanistan’, 2016, pp. 44-55.

(166) Tolo News, Afghan Economy Trembles Amid Foreign Investment Decline: ACCI, 12 February 2016; USIP, What Can be done to Revive Afghanistan’s Economy?, February 2016; IRIN, Afghanistan’s surprisingly predictable economic crash, 14 March 2016; Washington Post (The), As the U.S. pulls back, more Afghans descend into joblessness, 17 August 2015.

(167) Washington Post (The), As the U.S. pulls back, more Afghans descend into joblessness, 17 August 2015; Brookings, Afghanistan in 2016: Still vital interests, still reasons for hope, 8 January 2016.

1.5.2. Refugees, IDPs and returnees

As a consequence of demographic pressure (population growth is one of the biggest in the world with 5.4 children per woman) (168) and long-lasting war and insecurity, Afghans became one of the most mobile nations of the world. In a protracted refugee crisis caused by more than 35 years of conflict, at least 10 million Afghans fled the country (169).

75 % of the population live in the countryside(170) which is marred by armed conflicts, land disputes and natural disasters. The direct consequences are declining living conditions, impoverishment and food insecurity in rural areas as well as growing militancy and banditry (see Rural/urban division). This situation caused many people being displaced by the conflict and ending up in urban settlements (171). From an estimated 500,000 inhabitants in early 2001 Kabul’s population has grown to nearly 5 million in 2016. Service delivery has not kept pace with rapid urbanisation and this also causes problems on the labour and housing markets. It also led to rising crime. All of these factors contributed to pushing people into emigration (172).

Therefore, the net emigration rate is high (1.5 migrant per 1,000 population). Still many people look for asylum in neighbouring countries. Pakistan and Iran continue to host the vast majority of the Afghan refugee population, totalling an estimated 2.5 million people. Among all those who applied for asylum in 44 countries in Europe, North America, Oceania and Asia in 2014, asylum seekers from Afghanistan were the third-largest group with an estimated 59,500 claims (173). In 2015, more than 190,000 Afghans applied for asylum in EU+ states, nearly five times as many as 2014 (174).

However, many Afghans decided to return to Afghanistan after 2001 or were deported. From March 2002 to June 2016 UNHCR reported nearly 6 million people returning home of which 4.8 million were assisted by UNHCR and the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation. UNHCR estimated that returnees constitute about 20 % of the population (175).

Internal displacements

Internal displacements affect all areas of the country, although not to the same extent. More than one million people have left their homes due to the conflict in the country since 2002. The number is growing fast. In 2015 UNHCR, reported some 384,000 newly displaced people compared to about 192,000 persons in 2014. The displacement trends in the first months of 2016 were similar: according to UN estimates about 1,000 Afghans flee their homes every day and about 180 000 left their homes during the first seven months of 2016. Some IDPs are not registered if they settle in urban areas and some of them also can get stuck in areas inaccessible to humanitarian aid (176).

(168) CIA, Factbook, Afghanistan, People and Society.

(169) Irinnews, In-depth: From pillar to post - the plight of Afghans abroad, 27 February 2012.

(170) CIA, Factbook, Afghanistan, People and Society.

(171) UNHCR, Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan, 19 April 2016, pp. 28-29.

(172) CIA, Factbook, Afghanistan, People and Society; IRIN, Kabul facing “unregulated” urbanization, 26 November 2007; CIA Factbook; UNHCR, Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan, 19 April 2016.

(173) UNHCR, Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan, 19 April 2016.

(174) EASO, Annual report on the situation of asylum in the EU 2015, n.d., p. 10; EASO, Annual report on the situation of asylum in the EU 2014, n.d., p. 15.

(175) UNHCR, Afghanistan voluntary repatriation and border monitoring monthly update, 1 January-30 June 2016.

(176) UNHCR, Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan, 19 April 2016, pp. 28-30; IDMC Afghanistan, IDP Figures Analysis; IDMC Afghanistan: New and long-term IDPs risk becoming neglected as conflict intensifies, 16 July 2015; UN News Service, Nearly 1,000 Afghans fleeing their homes daily, warns UN relief wing, 17 May 2016; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin Afghanistan, April 2016; AI, “My Children Will Die This Winter” - Afghanistan’s Broken Promise To The Displaced, 31 May 2016; AI, The Millions Left Behind in Afghanistan, 1 June 2016; UNOCHA, Conflict Induced Displacements, 31 July 2016.

32 — EASO Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan – Security Situation

Shomulzay Khashrod 210

88

Lal Wa Sarjangal

Gardez 38

Zaranj 391

Farah 2,870

1,430 Tani

5,052 Reg

Shomulzay Charsadra

Pasaband Shindand

Gosfandi

Gulestan

Reg 621

Ajrestan

Shahjoy

Darwaz

Narang

Saghar

Bakwa

Tagab

Giro

Reg

Reg

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Ja nu ar y Fe br ua ry M ar ch Ap ril M ay Ju ne Ju ly Au gu st Se pt em be r O ct ob er No ve m be r De ce m be r

20 16 20 15 20 14

0K 20K 40K

0K 20K 40K

0K 20K 40K

Individuals displaced (2014 to 2016)

Time Period Past year

Province of displacement Province of origin

Inaccessible areas 22.76%

Accessible areas 77.24%

Percentage of IDPs within accessible and inaccessible areas (2016)

Actual displacements between 1 January 2016 and 26 July 2016

Between 1 January 2016 and 26 July 2016, 182,679 individuals fled their homes due to conflict. 29 of 34 provinces had recorded some level of forced displacement. Constrained humanitarian access hinders assessments, thus preventing verification of the full extent of displacement and undermining the provision of assistance and services. Displacement affects all individuals differently with needs, vulnerabilities and protection risks evolving over time due to exhaustion of coping mechanisms and only basic emergency assistance provided following initial displacement. Inadequate shelter, food insecurity, insufficient access to sanitation and health facilities, as well as a lack of protection, often result in precarious living conditions that jeopardises the well-being and dignity of affected families.

182,679

individuals displaced 26,089

families 23%

41,541 adult male 23%

41,917 adult female 56%

101,462 under 18

ESNFI ESNFI: Blankets ESNFI: Cash ESNFI: Clothing ESNFI: Family kits ESNFI: Food Package ESNFI: Kitchen sets

ESNFI: NFI Kits (Complete) ESNFI: Other

ESNFI: Tents ESNFI: Tools ESNFI: Winter Kit FSAC FSAC: Cash for food

FSAC: Cooked food / bread FSAC: Food Package FSAC: Wheat

Health Health: Basic health care services Health: Immunization

Health: Other

Other Other: Unconditional cash Protection Protection: Dignity kit WASH WASH: Chlorine

WASH: Emergency latrines WASH: Female hygiene kits WASH: Hygiene education WASH: Hygiene kits

WASH: Water provision (bottled or trucking)

131,090 18,206

36,212

1,758 105 924

183,039 7,742

10,136 126

15,624 1,365

Summary of response (Individuals receiving assistance)

Locations hosting IDPs

31 out of 34 provinces

94 out of 399 districts

Data source: Newly displaced population due to conflict 01 January 2016 to 26 July 2016, compiled by OCHA sub offices based on inter- agency

assessment results. Assessmets are ongoing in the field and these numbers are expected to change as new information becomes available. IDPs data for 2015 and earlier from IDP Task Force / UNHCR Population Movement Tracking System (PMT).

Feedback: ocha-afg@un.org

Website: http://afg.humanitarianresponse.info The chart above shows displaced individuals assisted between 1 January 2016 and 31 July 2016. The number of persons assisted may include those displaced before the specified time period.

Locations with displacements

29 out of 34 provinces

149 out of 399 districts

Number of IDPs by district of Displacement

Origin

66 33,243

Number of IDPs by province

7 33,890

Number of IDPs by province

Map 4: Number of IDPs by province of origin, source: UNOCHA (as of 31 July 2016) (177)

According to a UNHCR survey, most people flee their homes due to AGEs’ ground offensives and counteroffensives by ANSF but also because of fighting between the Taliban and IS (178).

Although Afghanistan society is generally very poor, IDPs constitute the most vulnerable group. Some sources report that they are worse off than even low-income city dwellers as they are usually deprived access to basic services such as water and food. They leave their homes and possessions to live without family networks, employment prospects, housing or access to services (179). Some of them living in remote, rural areas are beyond the reach of humanitarian organisations (180). According to an Amnesty International Report, the Afghan government has not done enough to improve the situation of IDPs. The Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation is deeply underfunded and corrupted.

International aid has diminished and humanitarian organisations have difficulty staying operational while needs are growing (181).

Deportations

Between 2007 and 2015, 200,000 to 300,000 Afghans were deported from Iran and Pakistan annually (the vast majority from Iran) (182). In 2015, UNHCR reported 239,992 Afghans without documents who were to be deported from Iran. In addition, it reported 23 registered Afghan refugees (Amayesh holders) to be deported from Iran. UNHCR reported that most deportees were single men who treated Iran as a transit country on their route to Europe. A total of 88,404 Afghans were reportedly deported from Iran via Zaranj and Islam Qala between January and June 2016,

(177) UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Conflict Induced Displacements, 31 July 2016.

(178) UNHCR, Afghanistan conflict-induced internal displacement monthly update, July 2015.

(179) Amnesty International, “My Children Will Die This Winter” - Afghanistan’s Broken Promise To The Displaced, 31 May 2016; IDMC Afghanistan: New and long-term IDPs risk becoming neglected as conflict intensifies, 16 July 2015.

(180) UNHCR, Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan, 19 April 2016, pp 28-30

(181) Amnesty International, “My Children Will Die This Winter” - Afghanistan’s Broken Promise To The Displaced, 31 May 2016; Amnesty International, The Millions Left Behind in Afghanistan, 1 June 2016

(182) UNOCHA, The 2015 Afghanistan Refugee and Returnee Overview, n.d., p. 55.

a 20 % decrease compared to the same period in 2015. The number of deportees from Pakistan is not as high but steadily growing: in 2014, 9,122 Afghans were deported from this country; in 2015 this reached 19,330 and in the first part of the 2016 the figure was 14,786 (183).

There is no systematic research on the situation of rejected and deported asylum seekers from Western countries.

However, certain sources indicate that most of them plan another trip abroad (184). In February 2016, Afghan Minister of Refugees and Repatriations Sayed Hussain Alemi Balkhi stated that Afghanistan would only take back those migrants who were willing to return to their home country voluntarily (185).

Voluntary return

UNHCR reported that in the first six months of 2016, 7,804 Afghans returned from Iran and Pakistan. This is the lowest figure since the start of UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation programme in 2002. UNHCR identified a combination of the following factors for the dip in the returns: high levels of unemployment; lack of livelihood opportunities; limited access to land, shelter and basic services; and continuous security issues. UNHCR believes the number of returns will further decline. In addition, second and third generations of refugees in Pakistan and Iran may not be interested in returning to a country that they virtually do not know. Afghans usually decide to return to Nanghahar, Kabul, Herat, Kunduz and Jawzjan provinces and most people chose to move to provincial capitals (186). Many of the returnees are reported by UNHCR to: ‘have been unable to reintegrate into their home communities, resulting in significant secondary displacement, mostly to urban areas (187).’

Some Afghans decided to voluntarily return from Europe. Where in 2015, about 1,400 Afghans returned home in the framework of IOM programmes, the same number was already reached during the first three months of 2016, mainly from Germany, Austria and Sweden. In these first three months of 2016, the preferred destination of return was Herat (35%), Kabul (19%) and Balkh (12%). In 2015, Kabul was the most popular, followed by Ghazni and Balkh (188).

1.5.3. Children

More than half of the Afghan society are children below 18 (189). They belong to the most vulnerable groups of society suffering from the prolonged conflict. The number of child casualties has been steadily growing since 2009.

In 2015, UNAMA reported 2,829 child casualties (733 killed and 2,096 injured) and during the first six months of 2016 there were 1,509 child casualties (388 killed and 1,121 injured). The main reasons of child casualties were: ground engagements (more than 50 %), landmine explosions (18 %), IED attacks (14 %), and aerial operations. Children were also victims of sexual violence committed by military men, including ALP, as part of a traditional, harmful practice called bacha baazi (190).

The recruitment of children by insurgent groups is a growing problem. Both Taliban and IS but also ALP and PGM use children as soldiers (191). The Taliban claims it does not deploy ‘boys with no beards’. However, there were reports of training and deploying children for various military actions including the production and planting IEDs. Some children recruited from madrasas in Kunduz, Takhar, and Badakhshan provinces were 13 or younger (192). UNAMA documented 48 boys recruited to ALP in 2015, and 4 till July 2016 but the organisation estimates that there are unreported cases (193).

(183) UNHCR, Afghanistan voluntary repatriation and border monitoring monthly update, 1 January-31 March 2016, 31 March 2016, pp. 5-6; UNHCR, Afghanistan voluntary repatriation and border monitoring monthly update, 1 January-30 June 2016.

(184) UNHCR, Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan, 19 April 2016.

(185) Deutsche Welle, Afghanistan’s Minister of Refugees: ‘No agreement on taking back deportees from Germany’, 2 February 2016.

(186) UNHCR, Afghanistan voluntary repatriation and border monitoring monthly update, 1 January-30 June 2016.

(187) UNHCR, Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan, 19 April 2016, pp. 31-32.

(188) IOM, Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Quarterly Statistical Report, 1 January to 31 March 2016.

(189) CIA, Factbook, Afghanistan, People and Society,

(190) UNAMA, Afghanistan. Annual Report 2015. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2016, pp.16-17; UNAMA, Afghanistan - Midyear Report 2016, Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict, July 2016, pp. 17-18, 19; Bacha Baazi are dancing boys: Young boys who dance and are often sexually abused. This practice is often associated with powerful men.

(191) HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban Child Soldier Recruitment Surges, 17 February 2016; Frontline, Why Afghanistan’s Children Are Used as Spies and Suicide Bombers, 17 November 2015; UNAMA, Afghanistan - Midyear Report 2016, Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict, July 2016, p. 119.

(192) HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban Child Soldier Recruitment Surges, 17 February 2016.

(193) Guardian (The), My grandsons’ fight to avenge their father: child soldiers in Afghanistan, 25 May 2016; Guardian (The), US military attacked for complicity in Afghan child soldiers after boy’s murder, 4 February 2016.

Only 50 % of eligible children are enrolled in schools. The status of girls in education is considerably lower than boys with more cases of threats and intimidation for girls. Difficulties accessing school, especially lack of schools and teachers, resulting in long walking distances and general security fears, are reasons for the low enrolment levels (194).

In 2015, 369 schools were closed because of security reasons which affected more than 139,000 students and 600 teachers (195). During the first half of 2016, UNAMA reported 46 conflict-related incidents targeting education and its personnel, a 35 % decrease compared to the same period in 2015, causing 15 civilian casualties (five deaths and 10 injured). Sometimes AGEs also try to influence the schools’ curriculum and school buildings were also used for military purposes, both by ANSF and AGEs (196).

Landmines and IEDs are particularly threatening for children and are the second highest cause of death and injury.

Some of the mines are constructed in such a way that children think they may be toys (197).

1.5.4. Health facilities

In 2015 and at the beginning of 2016 the number of attacks on health service facilities and its personnel increased.

Hospitals and clinics were searched by ANSF and personnel intimidated and threatened, sometimes even abducted and killed. Security forces blocked the medical supplies for Taliban-controlled areas. Threats caused the closure of health facilities and some women doctors had to resign from work. During a US airstrike in Kunduz, the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital was targeted. 42 people were killed and 43 injured, including 49 medical personnel.

Some other attacks on health facilities took place resulting in deaths and injuries (198).

AGEs reportedly attacked polio workers to prevent polio vaccination campaigns in different regions of Afghanistan.

Abductions and harassment of medical staff were frequently reported (199).

In document Security Situation (Page 32-36)