117
“At least one person was killed and two others wounded in exchange of fire that occurred in Ataye town of Eferata Gidem district of North Shoa, in Amhara regional state of Ethiopia.
Eyewitnesses told Ezega that residents of the Ataye town have been told to stay at home as gun shots were going on in the area, including from heavy arms. […]
The individual was said to have been armed with three bombs, one Kalashnikov and walking around in places which are under the control of the command post which was deployed after armed groups claimed lives of several people in April this year. The eyewitness said the security problem is expanding in the neighboring localities as members of the Ethiopian defense forces and the state’s Liyu force launched a counter attack against the attacking force.”(Ezega, 6 October 2019)
Please also see section 7.1.5 for further information on violence in Benishangul-Gumuz.
In September 2019 Ethiopia Insight provides a detailed overview on Tigrayan secessionists and anti-secessionists as well as the position of the TPLF regarding the issue. For further details please access the full-text version of the article (Ethiopia Insight, 28 September 2019):
“While the Tigrayan independence movement has been dormant under ethnic federalism and with the outsized role of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), that changed amid last year’s downgrading of the TPLF, and the accompanying political bitterness. With the infamous Article 39 secession clause and an antagonistic mood towards the federal government growing in Tigray, the specter of secession looms once more. Although peripheral for now, it may soon prove to be a central challenge for Addis Ababa—unless the TPLF and its opponents strike accommodating stances, and Tigrayan nationalists come to their senses. […] In Tigray, his [Abiy Ahmed] leadership was disputed. No party and people have opposed Abiy’s administration as vehemently as the TPLF and Tigrayans. They accuse the federal government of failing to deliver justice regarding crimes committed by previous administrations and criticize allegedly selective arrests of Tigrayans; a concern shared by Human Rights Watch. To many Tigrayans, Abiy is a demagogue, whipping up ethnic-based resentment and tying them to TPLF abuses to shore up his base. […]
The campaigners [for independence] use various political vehicles to advance their cause.
In fact, most regional parties, excluding Arena Tigray and Tigray Democratic Movement, are pro-independence. TPLF kept the option of Tigrayan independence as a last resort, but ultimately settled for an equal share of decision-making in EPRDF and inserting the infamous Article 39 secession clause into the constitution. […] The anti-secession forces in Tigray are scattered and mostly led by voices from opposition groups like Arena Tigray and TPLF dissidents like Aregawi Berhe, one of the liberation front’s founders, who returned from exile in 2018 to re-enter Ethiopian politics. […] The TPLF is generally trying not to get dragged into the independence discussions. Doing so could worsen its already strained relations with federal government. Instead, the party utilizes the independence issue to demonstrate to Addis Ababa that it is still the best available ‘federalist’ party among contenders in the region. This seemed to be the messages that Debretsion Gebremichael, TPLF chairman and acting president of Tigray, tried to convey in a June interview with The Reporter. Yet, Getachew Reda, TPLF politburo member and advisor to Debretsion, downplayed the comments, claiming they were taken out of context. Getachew emphasizes that most Tigrayans still believe in Ethiopia and that there is little appetite for secession.” (Ethiopia Insight, 28 September 2019)
In July 2019 the Central Committee of the TPLF the “declared the current central government in Ethiopia unfit to lead the country and is responsible for all the grave situation the country finds itself currently” (Ezega, 11 July 2019). In particular the TPLF statement accused the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) of being “instrumental in creating a fertile ground for extremist forces” (Ethiopia Insight, 18 August 2019) and called on the ADP to “apologize to the Ethiopian people and correct its way” (Ezega, 11 July 2019). As reported by Ethiopia Insight the ADP in return called TPLF an anti-democratic party and blamed it “for the overall crisis, a viewpoint that has plenty of nationwide support” (Ethiopia Insight, 18 August 2019).
119 In July 2019 ICG mentions a “fault line” between the TPLF and the federal government led by Abiy, and provides the following overview:
“The TPLF’s main sources of grievance are its loss of federal power; what it argues are selective prosecutions of Tigrayan top officials – notably of TPLF Executive Committee member and former national intelligence chief Getachew Assefa – for human-rights abuses and corruption; and opposition to a federal commission that is tasked with assessing interregional boundary disputes, such as the Amhara claims on Wolkait and Raya. The TPLF sees the commission as likely to rule against it and rejects it as unconstitutional because its mandate allegedly clashes with that of the upper house of parliament. The TPLF-run regional authorities apparently refuse to detain Getachew, whose whereabouts are unknown but suspected to be in Tigray, despite the federal authorities issuing his arrest warrant.” (ICG, 19 July 2019)
In October 2019 the TPLF released another statement after a central committee meeting in Mekelle (see also Borkena, 20 October 2019):
“[TPLF] condemned the plan to transform the coalition to a unity party as a move to pose threat in the Federal system and also warned that it could lead to the disintegration of Ethiopia. The statement went further in advising ‘sister organizations’ (they are referred to as agar parties in Amharic) that the move is against their interest. Some ethnic Tigray opposition party leaders tend to think that it is likely TPLF could start a war while claiming that the repression in the region has become worse so much so that they are unable to carry out their functions as an opposition party leaders.” (Borkena, 22 October 2019)
Please also see the following document for further information on the relationship between the Tigray administration and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration:
Ethiopia Insight: Is Tigray really a drop in the bucket for Abiy’s administration?,17 January 2019
https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2019/01/17/is-tigray-really-a-drop-in-the-bucket-for-abiys-administration/
7.3.2 Raya and Wolkait dispute
The “Wolkait and Raya territories that are currently part of Tigray regional state and border Amhara” are disputed between Tigray and the Amhara (ICG, 19 July 2019). In July 2016 a rally was held in Gondar, Amhara region, “over the alleged annexation of the Wolkait area by Tigray state”. Since then unrest has continued (EIP, July 2019, p. 22). A December 2018 article by Ezega notes:
“In the north, the Wolkite and Raya enclaves, currenting in the Tigray regional state, are contested by some activists from the Amhara region, perhaps with some backing from the Amhara regional government behind the scenes. There have been armed clashes in the Wolkite area a few years ago, and clashes in some parts of Amhara, especially in Gondar, related to this issue. There were protests in the Raya area in Tigray in late October this year, where three people were killed.” (Ezega, 20 December 2018)
According to an Ethiopia Insight article, “the Raya and Wolkait disputes appear problematic as they are not readily solved through constitutional means such as referendums”. It is not disputed that the areas are majority Tigrinya-speaking. However, activists allege the resettlement of Tigrayans in the area since the 1980s (Ethiopia Insight, 16 December 2018).
A January 2019 article by Ethiopia Insight also mentions the claim to the Wolkait and Raya territories and reports the following regarding TPLF rule in Tigray:
“For the TPLF, the issue of Wolqait-Tsegede and Raya is a nightmare. As if that is not enough, its officials’ crimes are haunting the party. In addition, an ailing leadership is struggling to keep-up with political developments. Most of the TPLF top guns prospered in the past two decades and they will lose a lot if the situation in the country gets out of control. The location of Tigray, far from the political and geographic center, and the much smaller size of TPLF’s constituency compared with ADP and ODP, puts TPLF at a disadvantage. After it lost federal power, TPLF is no more punching above its weight. But, taking into account the financial, intelligence and military resources it amassed in the last 27 years, it won’t go down without a fight.” (Ethiopia Insight, 9 January 2019)
For further information regarding the Wolkait area, please see the article in the Addis Standard:
Addis Standard: Commentary: What is the price of identity in today’s Ethiopia? The suffering of Yonas Gashaw as an illustration, 30 May 2018
http://addisstandard.com/commentary-what-is-the-price-of-identity-in-todays-ethiopia-the-suffering-of-yonas-gashaw-as-an-illustration/
A detailed overview on the “Raya issue” can be found in an article by Ethiopia Insight:
Ethiopia Insight: After Eritrea thaw, Tigray’s southern border with Amhara heats up, 28 October 2018
https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2018/10/28/after-eritrea-thaw-tigrays-southern-border-with-amhara-heats-up/
For further information on the Raya please also note the following documents:
Ethiopia Insight: Raya: a category error, and a catalog of errors, 24 March 2019
https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2019/03/24/raya-a-category-error-and-a-catalog-of-errors/
Alemu Asfaw Nigusie; Sisay Megersa Dirirsa: The Politics of Self-Representation in Ethiopia:
A Case of the Raya People since the 1930s, 2017
https://aaref.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/44-1.-Alemu-READY-Issue-44.pdf
7.3.3 Treatment of persons of Tigray ethnicity
Please also see section 7.2 for information on conflict in the border areas between Amhara and Tigray regional states.
In Amhara regional state “ethnic Tigray business communities in Bati town were attacked” in June 2018, according to a jewelry store owner. According to the chairman of the political party Arena, one ethnic Tigrayan was reportedly killed, however, this was not confirmed (Borkena, 27 June 2018). The Tigray adminiatration sent an inquiry team to Kemisse and Bati in Amhara
121 regional state “where reports and allegations of attacks against residents from Tigray ethnic group are coming out” (The Reporter Ethiopia, 30 June 2018).
As reported by Reuters in December 2018 many Tigrayans “were worried about a surge in ethnic violence elsewhere in the country”, and further notes:
“Although Tigray has been largely unaffected – unlike other regions, it is not home to significant numbers of people from other ethnic groups – residents told Reuters that Abiy was not doing enough to stop the bloodshed elsewhere. Several said they had family members who abandoned jobs and businesses to return to Tigray for fear of reprisals, though there have been no reports of major attacks against the community.” (Reuters, 16 December 2018)
In October 2018 Ethiopia Insight notes that “Tigray state had been relatively peaceful over the last few years”, however mentions that regional police killed at least three people on 21 October 2018 “in response to protests opposing Tigrayan rule in Alamata town near the border of Amhara region”. The article further notes:
“In scenes familiar from Oromia, and to a lesser extent parts of Amhara and Southern Nations regions, youths frustrated with local Tigrayan administrators in Alamata blocked roads with burning tires, said a teacher, requesting anonymity. Regional police killed five, and then two more, with 20 seriously wounded, he said.” (Ethiopia Insight, 28 October 2018)
A February 2019 article by TNH cites Gebre Weleslase, a Tigrayan law professor at Mekelle University, who “criticised Abiy for not condemning ethnic attacks, which he said had contributed to tens of thousands of Tigrayans leaving Amhara for Tigray in recent years”. The article also cites the chair of the Amhara Association of America, Tewodrose Tirfe, who states the following regarding attitudes of other Ethiopians on Tigrayans:
“[...] the feeling of ‘hate’ that Ethiopians have toward the TPLF ‘doesn’t extend to Tigrayans’. ‘There is resentment toward them when other Ethiopians hear of rallies in Tigray supporting the TPLF, because that seems like they aren’t supporting reform efforts,’
he said. ‘But that doesn’t lead to them being targeted, otherwise there would have been more displacements.’” (TNH, 14 February 2019)
In January 2019 Ethiopia Insight notes that there is a “tendency, particularly strong among those Amhara elites, but pervasive nationwide, to equate the TPLF and the Tigrayan people”
(Ethiopia Insight, 17 January 2019). Another article by Ethiopia Insight, published September 2019 further describes the attitudes regarding Tigrayans:
“Indeed, some recent discourse has implicitly taken aim at Tigrayans. Expressions such as
‘day-time hyenas’ (ye qen jiboch) - alluding to ethnic conflict entrepreneurs trying to sabotage reforms, or corrupt officials in the state apparatus—was initially voiced by the Prime Minister and has become a common euphemism used to defame ordinary Tigrayans.
This, in turn, sharpened their bitterness towards him.” (Ethiopia Insight, 28 September 2019)
Freedom House in February 2019 notes with regard to arrests of military and government officials in November and December 2018:
“In November and December 2018, a number of high-profile military and government officials were arrested and charged with corruption. Notably, 26 high-level employees of the military-run Metals and Engineering Corporation (MeTEC), including its chief executive, were arrested on corruption charges, and were awaiting trial at the end of the year. Some critics have accused the government of selectively prosecuting officials from the Tigray ethnic group, which has dominated the military for decades. However, a number of non-Tigray officials were also arrested in the sweep.” (Freedom House, 4 February 2019, section C2)
In December 2018 residents in Mekelle city protested against “what they called ethnic profiling that targets mainly Tigrayans in the ongoing crackdown on corruption and abuse of power”.
The chairman of TPLF and president of the regional state held a speech in front of the demonstrators in Mekelle Stadium. Already in November 2018 “rallies were held in various towns in Tigray, including in Adwa, Axum, Korem, Abiy Adi, Setit Humera, Alamata, Addisu and Moheni”. (Ezega, 9 December 2018)