The Reorientation of Borders in the EU: Case studies Sweden, Germany, and France.
Author: Joshua Ndip Ako
Political Science Master’s Thesis Södertörn University
Supervisor: Prof. Peter Strandbrink
June 2021
Table of Content
1. CHAPTER 1. RATIONALE _________________________________________ 2
1.1. 1.1 Introduction ____________________________________________________ 2 1.2. Delimitation ______________________________________________________ 4 1.3. Research Question __________________________________________________ 4 1.4. Literature Review __________________________________________________ 5 1.5. Thesis Outline _____________________________________________________ 92. CHAPTER 2. THEORY ____________________________________________ 9
2.1. Theoretical Framework: Everyday bordering and the politics of belonging ______ 11
3. CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH __ 13
3.1. The cases ________________________________________________________ 14 3.2. EU Migration Policy _______________________________________________ 15 3.3. Sweden Migration Policy ____________________________________________ 18 3.4. Germany Migration Policy __________________________________________ 21 3.5. France Migration Policy ____________________________________________ 24 3.6. The Approach ____________________________________________________ 28 3.7. Philosophical Background ___________________________________________ 29 3.8. Methodological frame: The everyday and situated intersectional perspectives. ____ 29 3.9. Data Collection ___________________________________________________ 30 3.9.1. Operationalisation and coding ____________________________________________ 31
4. CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS __________________________________________ 32
4.1. Construction of Everyday Bordering in EU as an entity _____________________ 32 4.2. Everyday citizenship bordering _______________________________________ 34 4.3. Family Reunion bordering ___________________________________________ 355. CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATION _______________________ 37
6. CONCLUSION _________________________________________________ 40
7. Reference ______________________________________________________ 41
8. APPENDIX ____________________________________________________ 49
Abstract
The paradox of contemporary migration in the EU is that new actors, rules, and institutions have emerged and created internal spaces where there is a gradual reorientation of the character of EU border regime. These spaces have become arenas where EU member states are re-categorizing, re-scaling, expanding, and diversifying their modes of internal migration control and enforcement. To overcome this paradox, this research seeks to explore migration policies in Sweden, Germany, and France to demonstrate that the narratives about EU common border policy is complex, uncertain, polarising, and conflicting. This paper argues that the emergence of the EU common border regime with a multiplicity of actors have created everyday bordering as a rebordering mechanism of control that threatens the idea of a common EU border, especially at the level of nation states. My theoretical approach is based on ‘everyday bordering and the politics of beloninging’. And I applied an interpretative approach in the analysis of official policy documents, academic articles, media reports, advocacy papers, NGO documents, and political speeches.
Key words: Borders; bordering; everyday bordering; migration; politics; policy; migrants;
immigrants; EU; citizenship; imagine communities.
1. CHAPTER 1. RATIONALE
1.1 Introduction
The EU was premised on an idea of a common border control policy with internal free
movement of people between its member states. The paradox that ensued and continue to rise is an emerging trend in which new actors, rules, institutions are reorienting the very character of EU internal border regime. The reorientation is a phenomenon that is evident in
contemporary global relations and in EU migration politics because of significant differences arising from different institutional settings, policy frameworks, and from the highly contested (Horvath et al., 2017) nature of states migration politics perpetuated by both neo- nationalists and radical egalitarians opposing forces ((Eger and Valdez 2015 in Horvath et al., 2017) that have different views on whether to have ‘open borders’, ‘no borders’ or ‘closed borders’
(Bauder 2016 in Horvath et al., 2017). This has created a tension between the desire for states
to maintain their sovereignty on immigration issues and a desire to respect the EU open
border policy. However, according to (Pettersson 2018) these tensions are not new or unique
to the European Community. (Parekh 1994: 91-2) also argues that “different countries follow different immigration policies. They do so because they entertain different ideas about their identity, and different concomitant notions of who should and should not be their members”.
As evident in the EU open border policy, the policy has become increasingly scrutinised by political actors, non-state actors, lobby groups, civil society organisations, and labour unions etcetera from across the EU as a response to different conceptions of national identity. Based on these evolving challenges, the focus on the “study of borders and sovereignty have shifted the discussion from a question of the eventual disappearance of borders to an increased focus on the on-going transformation of borders” (Balogh 2014: 42 in Pettersson 2018: 21)
“accompanied by the need for border theories that acknowledge the potential of borders to act as both bridges and barriers” (Newman 2006b in Pettersson 2018: 22) “as well as an
expanding literature that focuses on how bordering practices take place regardless of where a
‘line’ is” (Peterson 2018: 22).
The historical analysis of the material and circumstances related to this study as mentioned above is important because, “first, that historical actors' practices, activities, and political ideas must be viewed as symbolic systems with their own histories and logics; and second, that these symbolic logics themselves are modalities of politics and power as much as they are cultural expressions” (Somers 1995:127). Hence, everyday bordering in the EU can be
understood in relation to how states use their own migration policy devices based on
differential migration policy’s’ circumstances that are historically different from each other, depending on the policy context, and the challenges faced by the nation-state concern. The idea that the EU has an open border doesn’t cancel the historical context attached to immigration. According to (Pettersson 2018) “it is still interesting to examine the ways in which migration policies function as tools for sovereign construction”.
This study is not about studying migration policies per se, it is specifically focused on
understanding how social and political solidarity as a response to the EU open border policy
influence everyday bordering in EU member states. The study also argues that to enable an in-
depth understanding of the impact of everyday bordering in the EU we need to examine it in a
situated intersectional way, considering the differential epistemological gazes of the different
social actors who are taking part in everyday bordering social encounters (Ibid). Therefore,
this study investigated the implications of EU open border policy on everyday bordering in
EU member states. Open border in this context means the movement of third-country
nationals. I did this by first analysing the major historical material and the circumstances that led to the formation of an EU common border policy, and the evolution of distinctive
symbolic politics of immigration pursued by Sweden, Germany, and France.
To close this research gap, this study draws on and integrate previously disconnected research studies like, border studies, which reveals the fundamental transformations of border spaces in Europe but does not consider the role of nation states and other actors; and entangled borders, which somehow are surprisingly rarely mentioned because it “might be that they are quite difficult to see, since contemporary maps usually only show sovereign state borders” (Sarah Green 2019). Hence, this study is crucial in furthering an understanding of the reorientation of bordering in EU and its consequences on migrant’s mobility. It will shed light and contribute to an understanding of the changing dynamics of borders, and how these dynamics impact the mobility of migrants in a globalised world.
1.1. Delimitation
This study will focus on migration policies developed for ‘Third-Country nationals as opposed to immigrant from EU member states. This is because migration policies in the EU and its member states are mostly design for immigrants from third-country nationals and not for EU member states national as the challenges of immigrant integration at the EU level is always a problem that arises from Third-Country nationals.
Secondly, due to the shortcomings of not having the possibility to interview participants, for example, immigration officials, immigrants and other actors involved in migration policies this paper will focus on EU and its member states immigrants´ integration policies, and not on details of policy implementation. In other words, immigrant integration policies of EU and the member states under examination will be considered based on the perspectives regarding the issue under investigation but will not examine how these integration policies are
implemented.
1.2. Research Question
How can everyday bordering as a response to the EU common border policy be interpreted
nationally, and what are its implications on the EU migration policy?
1.3. Literature Review
Literature review for this research work is within the broader framework of borders and migration. The study will utilize literature from border theories and migration to enable an understanding of borders from the perspective of all the intervening actors, and how borders are linked to migration policies, building on existing border migration research.
Conceptualising borders in migration is not only justified by having physical barriers that divide nation-states. Borders can be loaded with different connotations such as fence, wall, boundary, social status, or stereotype. But what they all share in common is an introduction of some sort of “bifurcation in the world” (Nail 2016).
In the study “Migration and borders: Practices and Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion in Europe from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-first Century” (Margit, Fauser et al., 2019: 483- 484) in which an interdisplinary perspective comprising scholars from history, sociology and anthropology was compiled to critically interrogate the border- migration nexus since the formation, development and transformation of the modern nation-state, the study explicate that there has been conflicting and fluctuating character of borders in cross-border migration in different historical and contemporary settings. Borders, according to this study have always been a subject of negotiations between different actors that includes authorities in both the local, regional, national, imperial, and supra-national levels as well as migrants and other people (ibid). This study shows how borders have been spatially conceptualised historically and contemporarily, which, according to the study were “not only drawn where a nation’s territory stops but can also be constructed and enforced by powerful state or supra-state actors beyond their area of governance or created and contested by municipal actors or migrants at specific places within the territory of a state”.
A study by (John, 2008) also shows that there is a need to reframe borders thinking in
migration because “borders exist for a variety of practical reasons and can be classified
according to the purposes they serve and how they serve them”. From this viewpoint borders
can be considered as “artefacts of dominant discursive processes that have led to the fencing
off of chunks of territory and people from one another” (ibid). In this context the study
explains that the thinking about borders should be changed to acknowledge their “equivocal
character”. In this sense, borders in migration should be seen “not as that which is either fixed
or that as such must be overcome, but as an evolving construction that has both practical
merits and demerits that must be constantly reweighed. Thinking about borders should be
opened up to consider territorial spaces as ‘dwelling’ rather than national spaces and to see political responsibility for pursuit of a ‘decent life’ as extending beyond the borders of any particular state” (ibid).
Another study by (Rumford 2006) that focused on theorising the changing relations between borders and society points out that the significance of borders as an epitome of sovereignty of nation-states is eroding because the way the world is currently perceived is removed from the facts and consciousness of the world. This is because of the “complex relationship between borders and society, and the impossibility of reducing the question of borders to a tension between open borders and securitized borders” (ibid:157). The study illustrates that border are now shifting from the traditional conceptualization and becoming deterministic. They are not to be conceived only as the edges of territory, zones of connectivity, or even spaces of governance (ibid: 166).
(de Haas, Hein 2014) also shows that the process of migration is now embedded into the resources would-be migrants can muster. Consequently, migration is determined today by migrant ́s capability to mobilise enough resources. According to this study, migration and its outcomes are now shaped by the resources that would-be migrants can muster and that in turn the capacity to mobilise such resources is largely determined by socio- economic background or class. Socio-economic status and class have now become the deterministic factor in
migration. For example, recent laws in Sweden (see migrationsverket.se) and some other European countries like Denmark and Sweden requires that migrants who want to bring their spouses to from their home countries must be able to have an apartment, a job and a minimum amount of income that is enough to sustain their living until the wife or husband is able to have a job. According to the study this exemplifies the extension of the meaning of borders in migration beyond the traditional meaning.
Other studies such as (Grillo 2008) contents that the intersection of family and migration,
especially nuclear families have become a point of reference for European countries to
disguisedly enforce abstract borders in migration. Immigrants who come from countries with
nuclear families are always expected and bounded by immigration policies of their host
countries, forcing them to abide by their host countries cultures. These policies range from
age limits for marriage, size of the family, to family reunification policies that exclude
extended families, for example, grandparents, thereby depriving immigrants’ families of
existing care arrangements (ibid). Even within the nuclear families, some countries are now
using restrictive immigration policies to implement biomedical techniques as important tools that serves to control migration (Marlou and Moloney (eds.) 2013: 36).
Also, to understand the complexity of borders in migration it is worth referring to “Exploring the Critical Potential of the Borderscapes Concept” by (Chiara Brambilla 2015). According to Chiara Brambilla it requires a continuous “need to think about alternative geopolitical visions in which novel approaches to borders are mobilised in the contemporary era of globalisation and transnational flows”. These novel approaches are based on ‘borderscapes concepts’ that reflects on the three axes called the ‘epistemological’, ‘ontological’, ‘and methodological’
approaches of borders. In this context the study elucidates that reflecting upon borderscapes concept using the three axis of reflection “gives us the chance to relate the somewhat abstract level of conceptual change in border studies to actual borderscaping as practices through which fluctuating borders are imagined, materially established, experienced, lived as well as reinforced and blocked but also crossed, traversed and inhabited” (Ibid: 30). Conceptualizing borders in migration therefore requires piecing together the phenomena of contemporary political and social life through the analysis of the three axes of ‘epistemological’,
‘ontological’, ‘and methodological’ approaches of borders.
Also, to further an understanding of borders in migration a study done by (Vacchiano, F.
2019) to examine asylum seekers’ relocation scheme laid down in the framework of the European Agenda on Migration, and its implementation in Portugal shows that “In the contemporary framework of mobility control, asylum operates in strict liaison with other devices of border-enforcing”. According to Vacchiano asylum seekers´ relocation scheme is a means to institutionalized and managed people movements. In this context the study points out that asylum seekers´ relocation is a form of human ‘containment’ that limit human mobility to specific locations consistent with expected effects of border regimes.
Containment in this case means that asylum seekers mobility is curtailed by using ‘relocation’
as a specific technique to control their mobility purposely aimed at deterring “new arrivals
and define specific pathways of conditional mobility for those who do manage to reach
Europe” (Ibid: 276). The study concludes that asylum seekers “relocation and reception
represent further tools of a wider project of border-making, one which has at its core the
production of citizenship in its stratified forms” (Ibid: 287).
Also, the shift in the understanding of borders as territorial boundaries “to a ubiquitous, technosocial, de-territorialized apparatus or regime producing geographically stretched border spaces described as ‘border zones’, ‘borderlands’, or ‘borderscapes’,” (Sabine, H. & Bernd, K. 2019) has “not only induced a geographical refocusing away from the level of the nation state, but also a methodological reorientation with a focus on bordering processes and
practices, on doing border” (Ibid), as opposed only to “border per se” (Newman, 2006, p. 144;
van Hou- tum & van Naerssen, 2002, p. 126 in Sabine, H. & Bernd, K. 2019). According to Sabine and Bernd “the border is now being conceptualized as an effect of a multiplicity of agents and practices” based on (Rumford, 2008) concept of “border work”. In this context Sabine and Bernd assets that “the concept of border work in particular draws attention to the everyday micropractices of a wide range of actors” (p. 59). Based on this perspective, “to border is to be understood as a performative act”. This is supported by an edited book,
“Anthropology in the Margins of the State” by (Veena Das and Deborah Poole 2004), in which they elucidate that a novel approach to rethink borders is to understand them as
“continually performed and (re)composed by a set of performances, revealing the dynamic character of borders beyond simply being regarded as static divisive lines on modern political maps” (Brambilla, 2019: 2).
Sarah Green work on “entangled borders” also shed light on how contemporary understanding of borders is shifting away from the traditional understanding of borders to an analysis of borders as complex border entanglements, crosscuttings and overlapping (Green 2019).
According to Green border entanglements are rarely articulated in border studies even though
its existence is found in many borders and bordering processes in migration. As succinctly
explained by (Bramilla, 2019) in the context of Green´s own analysis, there is “trouble with
overlapping borders because it is something not supposed to happen within the political-
juridical order of the Western nation-state sovereign power in the modern era. Indeed,
entangled borders cannot be described with the ‘language of sovereignty’ and the help of
modern political maps, which are designed to ‘naturalize’ such power-laden processes of
bordering and the purview of the sovereign power of the state”. Based on this analysis,
Bramilla elucidate that Green´s article shed more light and “understanding of complex
entanglements and crosscuttings within contemporary border dynamics, thereby tracing
possible pathways to highlight that the co-existence of border arrangements that crosscut and
overlap with sovereign political borders is a normal feature of contemporary border dynamics
– it is part of the spatial, political, legal, financial and infrastructural environment in which people live these days”
Although the literature review explored the different perspectives in which borders can be conceptualised or constructed in migration processes, an attempt was made to link the concept of ‘borders’ in migration studies to the changing migration policies.
1.4. Thesis Outline
The study is divided into 6 chapters. Chapter 1 includes the introduction, research
delimitation, research question and literature review. Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical approach that guide this research paper. Chapter 3 explores the transformation of migration policies in the EU, more especially that of the Schengen zone, focusing on Sweden, France, and Germany. Chapter 4 gives a detail analysis of the methods used, and chapter 5 focuses on the discussion and implication of the research findings and chapter 6 is the conclusion.
2. CHAPTER 2. THEORY
The EU migration politics is complex and challenging because of the convergences and divergences in the discourses and narratives about EU open border policy. Member states, political actors, lobby groups, civil society etcetera seem to have an unfavourable view about the EU migration policy due to the changing dynamics of EU open border policy influenced by the everyday politics of belonging taking place both at the local, national, and EU level.
With the current migration politics in the EU, national and other intervening actors’ interests seem to be at the forefront of determining an EU migration policy. This confluence of actors and actions in determining EU migration policy is changing the very concept of open borders as espoused by the EU. EU open borders perspective seems to be delving from debordering to rebordering because of everyday politics of belonging. Therefore, coming up with a
theoretical framework that defines everyday bordering in the context of the EU is complex because of differential “epistemological gazes of the different social actors who are taking part in everyday bordering social encounters” (Yuval-Davis et al, 2017) at the EU.
As pointed out by (Newman 2006b: 145; Kolossov 2005: 612) “border studies remain a
composite of many disciplines and has yet to yield a unified theoretical framework generally
accepted by the diverse community of border scholars”. As elucidated by (chavez, 2012),
there is work in progress to develop a single border theory as there is still additional
elaboration, conceptualization and formulation taking place. For the most part, according to Chavez “border research is a collection of theories that have application to certain
geographical regions, but not on others; and similar phenomena can be explained by two different and opposing perspectives depending on the discipline. Secondly, as forces of global interaction evolve and mature, borders have direct or indirect impacts that provoke constant changes. To arrive at a border paradigm will depend on the stability of political and
international forces and processes, but those again have a high degree of variance”. Also, as argued by (Pettersson 2018), “it is easy to see the construction of walls and or the
enforcement of Stricker border controls in reaction to border challenges as ways to
strengthened sovereignty, but what about when states actively pursue open borders?” Does it mean in this case that there no obscured borders instituted by nation-states?
However, there are different theoretical concepts that have been put forth by different
theorists to define or conceptualise borders. These theoretical concepts have either been focus on specific border regimes or on ideological understanding of borders. For instance, borders have been theorised and analysed using the concept ‘border regime’ through an external governance of migration control or the empowerment of third countries using migration issues in international negotiations (Inken, Bartels 2017: 406 in K. Horvath 2017). Other theoretical perspectives, for example (G. Engbersen et al., 2017: 335) focuses on ‘mobility regime’ as a framework to understand the regulation of movements of labour migrants within the European union; ‘deportation regime’ theory by (De Genova and Peutz 2010) focusing on how migrants experience and struggle over detention in their migratory social spaces; and “social theorists have also been concerned with the meaning and role of borders in the context of societal transformations and a new spatiality of politics” ((Rumford 2006: 158).
For this study, to understand everyday bordering from the perspective of multifaceted
interests in the EU based on different ideologies, cultural mediation, discourses, political
institutions, attitudes, and everyday forms of transnationalism, I chosed a theoretical
framework where bordering is conceptualised not through physical walls and fences. This
theoretical framework shapes everyday construction of borders through an understanding of
the ‘politics of belonging’. It suits the contemporary conceptualisation of borders in the EU
because everyday politics of belonging occurring at the EU shape the re-construction and
reproduction of the concept of bordering.
2.1. Theoretical Framework: Everyday bordering and the politics of belonging This research will be guided by ‘everyday bordering and the politics of belonging’ theory as elucidated in the EUBorderscapes research project
1. In this project bordering is defined as ‘the everyday construction of borders through ideology, cultural mediation, discourses, political institutions, attitudes and everyday forms of transnationalism’. This incorporates (Van Houtum et al’s 2005)) use of the term ‘b/ordering’ to refer to the interplay between social ordering and border-making (see also Yuval-Davis et. al, 2017). The everyday ‘bordering and ordering’ practices give an understanding of the social and practical reality of migration control from the “perspective of border people and crossers, and border sites, capturing the complex socio-cultural texture and arenas of life at, in, and across the border” (Vila 2003).
And create and recreate new social-cultural boundaries and borders which are also spatial in nature (Yuval-Davis et. al, 2017).
In the case of bordering in the EU where the process of European integration is
operationalized to support what (Ohmae, 1999) claims to be the emergence of a ‘borderless world’, there is also an emergence of counter-narratives highlighting the proliferation of borders in EU member states. “Within this context, borders can be read in terms of 1) a politics of identity (who is in, who is out), 2) a geographical definition of difference (defining who is a neighbour, a partner, a friend, or rival) and 3) a politics of interests (in which issues of economic self-interest, political stability and security play a prominent role)” (Yuval-Davis 2013). As such, debordering and reordering processes are simultaneously taking place where borders and border controls are, in principle, being carried out by a multiplicity of different actors ranging from local to supranational level, including individual citizens.
The EU and its member states immigration policies discussed below expand and potentially criminalize failures in border control as well as promotes free movement. Therefore,
according to (Yuval-Davis et. al, 2017) “borderings are conceptualised as practices that are situated and constituted in the specificity of political negotiations as well as the everyday life performance of them, being shifting and contested between individuals, groupings and states as well as in the constructions of individual subjectivities. Such bordering constructions are intimately linked to specific political projects of belonging, which are at the heart of
contemporary political agendas. Their contestations are closely related to different
1 https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/290775/reporting
constructions of identity, belonging and citizenship”. Hence, borders must be considered as
“historically and politically contingent”; they “are continuously remade based on concrete political, cultural, and economic practices” (Stetter 2008a).
As regards to the politics of belonging, it “involves not only the maintenance and
reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers but also their contestation and challenge by other political agents” (ibid: 205). In the case of EU as a supranational and hegemonic political power comprising of a collectivity of member states that are trying to maintain and reproduce a common EU border, political agents, for example member states or political parties represented in the EU parliament and other actors with specific political projects can contest and challenge the hegemonic political power of the EU. This is because political agents and other actors have “specific political projects aimed at constructing ‘belonging’ to particular collectivities, which are themselves being assembled in these projects, within specified boundaries. These boundaries are often spatial and relate to a specific locality or territoriality and not just to constructions of social collectivities” (Antonisch, 2010). This, according to (Yuval-Davis et. al, 2017) is true in the case where it is related to the most common political project of ‘belonging’ which is that of state citizenship.
So, as rightly articulated by (Yuval-Davis et. al, 2017), it is important to recognize, however, that political agents like nation states, political parties and other actors at the supranational level constantly struggle both for the promotion of their national specific projects in the construction of their collectivity and its boundaries and, at the same time, use these ideologies and projects to promote their own power positions within and outside the collectivity. This brings into play the concepts of ‘belonging’ and ‘politics of belonging’. What this means in the context of EU member states is that ‘belonging’ gives them a sense of emotional
attachment about feeling at home (see Yuval-Davis 2011), while ‘home is a material and an
affective space, shaped by everyday practices, lived experiences, social relations, memories,
and emotions’ (Blunt, 2005: 506 in Yuval-Davis et. al, 2017). And “the politics of belonging
includes also struggles around the determination of what is involved in ‘belonging’, in being a
member of a community, and of what roles specific social locations and specific narratives of
identity play in this. As such, it encompasses contestations both in relation to the participatory
dimension of citizenship as well as in relation to issues of the status and entitlements such
membership entails” (Ibid).
Thus, everyday bordering and the politics of belonging is “at the center of human existence, the essence of who we are and our location in the world’ (Sarah Pink 2012: 143). This drives the incentives for political agents in supranational organisations like the EU to create and recreate bordering processes that are consistent with their political projects of belonging and affected by the specific social agents taking part in these ‘everyday’ social dynamics (Yuval- Davis et. al, 2017). Hence, “bordering offers a framework for addressing bordering practices as a project of both politics and political belonging. This framework benefits the analysis and understanding of the various expressions of bordering from the peripheries of the state and grey zones, where bordering is enacted by border materiality’s and guards, to the everyday life in cities where it is performed by regular citizens” (Yuval-Davis et. al, 2019).
Therefore this constructivist strand of border theories will help to deconstruct everyday bordering practices in the EU member states, specifically in Sweden, Germany and France, as it looks at borders beyond the traditional conceptualisation of borders as physical boundaries (Anderson 1983), to looking at borders as “social practices and discourses in which
boundaries are produced and reproduced” (Paasi 2005: 18). This will unravel the complexity of borders to give an understanding of borders as “dynamic cultural processes” (Paasi 2003:
464) that can be analyzed as “social practice[s] of spatial differentiation” (van Houtum/van Naerssen 2002: 126) “established by political decisions and regulated by legal texts”
(Anderson 1996: 1). The underlying factors based on the analysis of the theories has thus informed my methodology and research methods.
3. CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
To answer the research question for this study, I design the study to capture the distinct visions of immigration policies both at the EU level where the common border policy is made, and at the national level where the impact of the common border policies is experienced everyday. Since the point of contention for this study is to understand how everyday bordering as a response to an EU open border policy can be interpreted nationally, I focused my study on analysing national migration policies to show how everyday bordering is manifested in nation states migration policies. This chapter outline how the study was
designed, how the data was identified and collected, and the approach used to analyse the
data. It comprised of four main sections: in the first section I describe the reason why I
specifically chose to focus on the EU common border policy, why it is vital to study it, and
discussed the emergence of the EU migration policy from the 1950s, and the evolution of Sweden, Germany, and France immigration policies, emphasising on their distinctive visions of immigration. The second section is dedicated to the discussion of the approach used for the selection and collection of empirical data, in conjunction with the analysis of the data in relation to what the data is used for and represents. The third section deals with the way the empirical analysis is conducted and how the data collected and interpreted, and the final chapter is the conclusion.
3.1. The cases
Historically and in current EU member states party politics, immigration issues have been a challenge to the EU common border policy. Most parties in the EU member states, in the past and in the present are eventually gaining political support because they focus their election campaigns on immigration issues that advocates for exclusionary policies against immigrants.
However, this phenomenon differs from one EU member state to another. Based on this reasoning, it is reasonable to contend that both an unfavourable and favourable political context towards immigration at nation-states level determine everyday bordering in the EU member states. So, it is fair to say that everyday bordering in the EU should be looked at in the context of the ‘politics of belonging’ and symbolic logics of ‘in’ or ‘out’.
Based on the above analysis, this section gives a histrical analysis of the evolution of EU,
Sweden, Germany, and France migration policies from the 1950s to the current stage where
EU migration politics is dominated by the open border policy. This is meant at broadly
analysing the changing historical circumstances that influenced an amalgamation of the EU
migration policy, and of Sweden, Germany, and France major societal and cultural factors
that have influenced the formation of distinct visions of immigration in each of this member
states according to (Somers 1995:127) reasoning. According to this reasoning, "first, that
historical actors' practices, activities, and political ideas must be viewed as symbolic systems
with their own histories and logics; and second, that these symbolic logics themselves are
modalities of politics and power as much as they are cultural expressions." Hence, the
circumstances that ensued in the formation of an EU open border policy and the divergent
symbolic politics embedded in migration policy as encountered by EU member states in the
open border policy is the cause of member states’ struggle over their representation in
migration politics. This symbolic politics is the narrative embedded in EU migration politics
historically and through space and time. Therefore, for a better understanding of the different
immigration policy approaches pursued by EU Schengen member states vis-à-vis the EU, the symbolic contexts that have a significant influence on migration politics historically should be understood because it is only through this that the divergence and convergence of EU
immigrant-identity politics through what (Keogan 2002) called “established narratives and cultural images of immigrants, narratives and images that are embedded in these distinct urban landscapes” can be understood.
This case is important to study because the very concept of open border is conflicting, contradictory, and polarising. The reason being that in the context of a supranational organisation like the EU where sovereignty of nation states is binded by their security, political dynamics, identity, cultures etcetera, there is always going be an intersection of interest on sensitive policies, especially those related to immigration. Thus, I decided to study this case because there is a conflict between EU common border policy and member states distinctive visions of immigration. This distinctive vision of immigration affects social and political solidarity because of the politics of belonging, resulting to everyday bordering processes.
3.2. EU Migration Policy
The EU came into being through a series of efforts spanning as far back as after World War 11. Between 1951 when the leaders of six countries, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany signed the Treaty of Paris, until the Maastricht Treaty of November 1, 1993, 1993, EU was formalised
2, a series of other EU treaties were also signed.
For instance, the Treaties of Rome on March 25, 1957, that created the European Economic Community (EEC) meant to eliminate most barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital, and labour, the prohibition of most public policies or private agreements that inhibit market competition, a common agricultural policy, and a common external trade policy (Ibid).
The Maastricht Treaty agreement gave EU a broader authority on policies that concerned, for example, education, community policies on development, health environment, and on an establishment of a common EU citizenship. A common EU currency was adopted only in 1999 after a thorough deliberation on the modalities that allowed any member state to be part of the common currency for member states. However, the period prior to Maastricht Treaty
2 Gabel, M. J. (2020, January 31). European Union. Encyclopedia Britannica.
agreement in 1993, that is, from 1957 to 1986, was “characterized by minimal immigration policy involvement in national immigration policies. Immigration policies fell under national control, and initiatives by the European Commission towards closer EU cooperation within the traditional Community method of decision- making were regularly declined”
3.
Nevertheless, according to (Ette, A. & Faist, T. 2007) this period witnessed significant cooperation in immigration policy area outside the EU's traditional structures.
The idea of a common EU migration policy had been in existence “even before the European Communities (EC) were formed in the 1950s (Turack 1972: 81–100). According Turack, the Benelux countries, as well as Northern European countries, had already established passport unions permitting free movement in these states’ combined territories”. It was only in the 1980s that the idea of free movement as a policy in Europe concretised as “Europe was stuck inside an everlasting debate of two opposing fragments: the one that was supporting the idea of free Europe with no internal border checks amongst countries, and the other part that was absolutely against it”
4. As a result, on June 17, 1984, the initiators of the idea of free
movement, France and Germany brought the topic within the framework of the European Council in Fontainebleau where they all approved to define required conditions for the free movement of citizens (Ibid). It was not until the 14 June 1985 that the “Schengen Agreement covering the gradual abolishment of the internal borders between countries and extended control of the external borders was signed by France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands, in Schengen, a small village in Southern Luxemburg on the river Moselle”
(Ibid). Despite the signing of the agreement in conjunction with other treaties and rules that followed, it was after the 26 March 1995 that the internal border checks of the first EU Schengen area member states: France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain were abolished (Ibid).
What defined the Schengen Agreement according to (Christof Roos 2013) was cooperation between European countries in terms of a single market that was “envisioned as a space in which not only should goods, capital, and services be traded without restrictions, but also people should be able to move and establish themselves anywhere in the EU”. However, free
3 Ette, A. & Faist, T. (2007). The Europeanization of national policies and politics of immigration:
Research, question and concepts. In Faist, T. & Ette, A. (Eds.). The Europeanization of national policies and politics of immigration. Between autonomy and the European Union. Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3–31.
4See the website search function of the Swedish parliament, available in appendix
movement was only for citizens of EU countries that signed the agreement, which implies that from the 1985 when the Schengen agreement was signed until 1995 when the real
implementation began, the Schengen member states at that time still had control over their borders in terms of the regulation of cross-border mobility of third country nationals. With the step-by-step creation of a common internal and external border control as per the
Schengen agreement of 1995, member states internal borders were gradually abolished (Ugur 1995a; Geddes 2000a) alongside a gradual increase in the number of EU states that joined the Schengen zone.
The abolition of internal borders and the creation of a common external border because of the implementation of EU Schengen visa policy meant that member states ceded their unilateral powers to decide which third country person could be permitted to enter their territory. These powers were shifted to EU institutions with considerable and vested discretion to coordinate cooperation on these policies among member states (Monar 2005; Lavenex 2010: 467).
However, the abolition of internal borders and the implementation of a common external Schengen visa did not mean that member states fundamentally gave away all their rights to manage internal immigration matters to EU institutions. Instead, member states still had a role to play in determining migrants’ mobility into their states because according to (Hammar 1994) “border control policy is different from immigration control policy. The conditions that must be met to access a territory are only one of multiple barriers that states put up for
migrants who want to reside in their country”. In this context member states still had a major role to play in immigration policies because “immigration control policies affect many more issues which have proved to be salient in political and public discourse” (Christof Roos 2013), which in this sense is important for nation states. For example, the refugee crisis in 2015 showed that irrespective of the supranational powers of EU on refugee policies, some members state like Denmark threatened to close their borders. And even in the current global pandemic some EU Schengen member states closed their borders in defiance of the EU Schengen open free movement policy.
Notwithstanding the role of Schengen member states in immigration policies, after the
establishment of Schengen immigration policy in 1995 EU institutions such as the “European Commission, the European Parliament (EP), and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have been gradually empowered by member states to promote integration” (Ibid: 5) of this policy.
Since then, Schengen member states immigration policies have been shaped by EU
institutions and their interactions with each other. But to what extent this assertion is true is still contested because of the different actors involved in immigration decisions both at the national level and the EU level.
It can be ascertained that with the complexity of a supranational organization like the EU consisting of different actors at different levels of operational roles, the identification or alignment of individuals’ and participating actor’ interests away from the major organisation can create a distabilisation of the major organisation policy priorities (March & Olsen, 2006).
This is what seems to be happening with the EU open border policy because member states have tended to align with their national immigration priorities rather than abiding by the EU migration policy as the EU is expanding.
3.3. Sweden Migration Policy
Sweden's migration policy comprises of refugee and immigration policy, return policy, support for repatriation and the link between migration and development. It also includes global cooperation on these issues. This area also covers issues related to Swedish
citizenship
5. Historically Sweden is an immigrant friendly country despite the passage of its first restrictive Alien Acts in 1927 which has remained the key piece of legislation for all aspects of migration (Skodo 2018). In this context Skodo assets that “Migration is
inextricably intertwined with the development of the Swedish state and society”. In the earlier years of the post-war period of the 1950s Sweden benefited from guest workers from other Nordic countries because of the formation of the Common Nordic Labor Market in 1954 and the abolition of border controls within the Nordic area in 1957 (Ibid). In actual terms during this period Sweden didn´t have an official guest-worker policy except for the law passed in 1968 that allowed guest-workers benefit from the same welfare provisions as Swedish citizens. But as time went on Sweden migration policies became more restrictive because of the changing realities in labour demand in Sweden. This in effect forced Swedish government to pass a restrictive law in 1967 that seeked to regulate the entry of “non-Nordic labor
immigration to curb the arrival of guest workers and encourage those already present to leave Sweden (Ibid).
5See the website search function of the Swedish parliament, available in appendix
Notwithstanding the beginning of restrictive immigration policies in 1967, (Skodo 2018) points out that Sweden still went further in 1975 to be one of the first countries to officially adopt a policy of multiculturalism that embraced ethnic and religious diversity and state support to safeguard minorities’ identity and culture. Despite this, the so-called “Lucia Decision of 13 December 1989”
6ratcheted up even more restrictive immigration policies, especially on refugee applications (Ibid: 49). This was the last year that all asylum
applications in principle got approved. As elucidated by (Brochmann, G. & Hagelund, A.
2019: 49) about Lucia Decision, the idea was to send a signal to the outside world that Swedish immigration policy was no longer as generous as its reputation might suggest.
In 1996 Swedish government put forth an announcement that stipulated a change from immigration policy to integration policy. This law became formerly approved in 1997 by the Swedish parliament as ‘‘Sweden, the future and diversity – from immigration politics to integration politics’’ (Sverige, framtiden och mångfalden - från invandrarpolitik till
integrationspolitik) (Prop. 1997 ⁄ 98:16). As pointed out by (Wiesbrock, 2011) “the objectives of the new policy were equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for everyone,
irrespective of their ethnic and cultural background, social cohesion built on diversity and social development characterised by mutual respect within the boundaries of a democratic society, in which everyone should take an active and responsible part”. From this period onward, there were no major changes in the integration policy except some reforms. For instance, in 2008 labour immigration reform was enacted. In this reform the government, according to (Skodo 2018) significantly overhauled labor migration regulations to encourage companies to hire more workers, low-skilled and high-skilled alike, from outside the
European Union. Further, the Bill (Prop. 2009 ⁄ 10:60) was presented by the government to the Swedish parliament in November 2009 to reform the national integration policy. This Bill called (om etableringsinsatser for visa nyanlända invandrare), that is “establishment of initiatives for certain newly arrived immigrant” was put into law as (Lag (2010:197) in December 2010. The reform was meant at speeding up the introduction of newly arrived immigrants into working and social life by encouraging them to become actively employed,
6 Brochmann, G. & Hagelund, A. (2019). Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State 1945-2010
clarifying the division of responsibilities between governmental agencies, and improving the use of skills of new arrivals (Ibid).
As public discourse about the EU refugee crisis escalated in 2015, (Skodo 2018) points out that this “let to a number of dramatic shifts in Swedish immigration law and policy”,
eventually culminating in “the temporary asylum and family reunification law of 2016”. This culmination, according to a “Report from EMN Sweden 2017”7 let to the Swedish Parliament enacting a temporary law in 2016 that introduced temporary residence permits for
beneficiaries of international protection (instead of permanent ones) and restricting the right to family reunification. This required that asylum seekers be granted temporary resident permits based on the concept of “EU-acquis”8 for three years instead of permanent resident permit which is the main rule under the Swedish Aliens Act. In this context refugees who were eligible for protection under this temporary law and who were deemed to have well- grounded prospects of obtaining a permanent residence permit continued to have a right to family reunification with their spouse, cohabitant and/or minor children, and children who were refugees had a right to reunification with their parents. In the contrary, a beneficiary of subsidiary protection who submitted an asylum application after 24 November 2015 had no right to family reunification under the temporary act (Ibid). The Act also required persons applying for family reunification to show proof of economic self-sufficiency to support him or herself and the family member. Only in some cases, for example if the sponsor is a child or if the family member applies for family reunification within three months of the date when the beneficiary of protection obtained his/her residence permit (see Report from EMN Sweden 2017; Country Factsheet: Sweden 2016, European Migration Network) could the application be approved. Also, the Act restricted asylum seekers’ rights to social and economic
provisions. As a result, since 2016, access to benefits such as free housing and a daily allowance have been eliminated for failed asylum seekers or those who have received an expulsion order, as well as those who have ignored the deadline for voluntary return (Skodo 2018).
7 Report from EMN Sweden (2017). Annual Report on Migration and Asylum 2016 Sweden
8See the website search function of the Swedish parliament, available in appendix
Sweden experience of managing immigration seemed to reflect what (Freeman 1986) calls
“the nature of the welfare state”. Freeman elucidates this by arguing that the nature of European welfare states is based on fundamental principles of being closed systems. What this means is that allowing a person to become a member of the welfare system automatically entitles that person to social welfare goods on equal terms with members of that society. This, according to the argument exerts pressure on the economic viability of welfare provisions.
Therefore, according to Freeman, tight immigration legislation or excludability are seen as necessary to adequately sustain these provisions in case new members of society are
economic liabilities rather than assets (Ibid). To maintain this close system Sweden all along have been trying to balance the principles of the welfare system against the provision of welfare services to immigrants. This is seen in the so-called “Lucia Decision of 13 December 1989” as earlier explained, and especially after 1997 when the immigration policy was changed to integration policy, culminating in restrictive immigration policies such as family reunification that required immigrants to be economically viable to be allowed bring their immediate family members to Sweden.
3.4. Germany Migration Policy
For the sake of this research paper, I will analyse Germany immigration policy from the 1990 after the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989. This is important because before this time Germany did not have a unified and coherent immigration policy. “Though immigrants began arriving in Germany in 1955 under the German government's labor recruitment program, it wasn't until the late 1990s that a national policy on immigrant integration was enacted. Until that time immigrant integration was not considered a legitimate national public policy topic because foreigners were not recognized as part of German society” (see Faist, 1994 in Anil, M. 2006).
As a result, “national policies lacked coherence and failed to provide a long-term rationale or legal framework either to match the country´s immigration needs or to maintain social cohesion”
9. Further, the Federal Republic of Germany was not considered as a country of immigration because it did not strive to increase the number of German citizens by way of naturalization.
The granting of German citizenship could only be considered if a public interest in the naturalization existed, the personal desires and economic interests of the applicant could not be decisive (Hailbronner & Renner, 1998: 865f., quoted in Koopmans, 1999). It was not until
9 Süssmuth, R. (2009). The Future of Migration and Integration Policy in Germany: Migration Policy
2005 that the German government formally recognized that Germany had indeed became an immigration country
10.
However, Germany has been one of the leading countries to support the idea of EU with a common border since after the post-war of 1945. From then on Germany used its available resources to promote EU integration at all levels and “became the de-facto leader of not just the EU, but the Northern bloc of EU states that includes France, Sweden, and the UK”
11. Irrespective of Germany´s stands for deeper EU integration, Germany still harbored strict immigration policies that were stemmed from the Alien Act of 1965 that granted no rights to guest workers (Joppke 2000, p. 45). As (Brubaker, 1992; Joppke, 1999) assets, the process of naturalization was purely at the discretion of the German authorities until 1990, 1993 and 1999 when laws liberating Alien Act were passed. According to (Neuman, 1997) these new provisions were aimed at limiting the discretionary power of officials and to provide
foreigners with legal rights to claim entitlement to naturalization, which eventually curtailed official´s discretion to deny immigrants naturalization. As a result, the previously minimum residency requirement of 15 years before immigrants naturalised was shifted to 8 years of residency without age restrictions. On the other hand, the provision still maintained strict requirements to be met by immigrants before they could naturalise as German citizens. These requirements were for immigrants to express loyalty to German constitution, be able to support themselves and their families without social security and unemployment benefits, no criminal convictions, adequate command of German Language, and renunciation of previous citizenship
12. This provision was basically meant to provide legal certainty to migrants who were legally residing in Germany and to place limits on immigration from outside the EU
13. From 2005 Germany immigration policy became “completely overhauled” (Ibid) to be governed by the Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz)
14which replaced the Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz) of 1990. This package of reforms that was adopted impacted ‘Residence Law’, ‘Right of Asylum’, ‘employment Ordinance’, and ‘Integration Course Ordinance’
1510 Gesley, Jenny. (2017). Germany: The Development of Migration and Citizenship Law in Postwar Germany. The law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research center.
11 Blair, M. (2016). An Analysis of the Migration Policies of the European Union and Their Effectiveness in Managing the Current Migration Crisis.
12 Anil, M. (2006). The New German Citizenship Law and Its Impact on German Demographics:
Research Notes. Population Research and Policy Review, 25(5/6), 443-463.
13
14 See the website search function of the Swedish parliament, available in Appendix
15 Süssmuth, R. (2009). The Future of Migration and Integration Policy in Germany: Migration Policy
because the rules on migration that were spread out over several Acts and regulations were consolidated in the new Residence Act with only two simplified titles, that is, the temporary residence permit and a permanent settlement permit and introduced the principle of “support and challenge including the integration of German classes for migrants to learn German language and culture
16.
The fact that these reforms were adopted in 2005 showed that Germany recognised the
importance of taking responsibility to confront and address immigrant’s integration. This was evidence when Germany amended the new legal migration framework that was introduced in the Migration Act several times over the years after 2005. For instance, the Act to Implement Migration and Asylum Directives of the EU in 2007, the Work Migration Control Act of 2008, the Second Act to Implement Migration and Asylum Directives of the EU in 2011, and the Act to Implement the Highly Qualified Professionals Directive of the EU in 2012 (Jenny, 2017). The latest change in the German migration framework according to (Gesley, 2017) was the “Integration Act and Regulation on Integration Act” that entered into force on August 6, 2016 to facilitate the integration of refugees into German society
17. According to (Gesley, 2016) the basic idea behind the legislation was to continue with the policy of ‘support and challenge’ (Fördern und Fordern), which had been introduced in 2005 in the Migration Act.
to allow refugees who showed the potential to integrate and had a good chance of staying permanently in Germany to be provided with easier and faster access to integration classes and employment opportunities, while refugees who refused to cooperate faced a reduction in benefits.
However, the 2015 EU refugee crisis was a test for Germany on its staunch support of EU migration policy. As pointed out by (Blair 2016: 72), before summer 2015 Germany was a staunch supporter of all aspects of EU legislative policies but Germany ideology changed after the summer of 2015 when Europe was overwhelmed by migrants entering Europe
through the Balkans, and an increase in secondary movements of migrants into Germany from countries like Hungary and Austria. As a result of the uncontrolled movement of migrants during this period, Germany reversed its staunch support for EU legislative policies and
16 Jenny, Gesley (2017). Germany: The Development of Migration and Citizenship Law in Postwar Germany. The law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research center.
17 Integrationsgesetz [Integration Act], July 31, 2016, BGBL. I at 1939,
suspended its participation in the Dublin Convention in August 2015 (Pastore, 2015 in Blair, 2016), resulting to Germany’s Federal Office for Migration and Refugees momentarily stopping the checking of where refugees were entering Europe. This goes to support
(Süssmuth, 2009) assertion that despite immigration reforms “policymakers in Germany have not yet created a forward-looking framework for migration and integration that would bolster social cohesion and attract skilled labour migrants. Current policies are not capable of keeping pace with rapidly changing social realities and future social challenges. What is called for now is the development of a more comprehensive long-term framework for achieving social cohesion, equal opportunity, and a policy for managed migration that will allow Germany to compete for international talent in the medium and long-term”.
3.5. France Migration Policy
France immigration policy is unique because it was not shaped by legislative acts but developed largely through administrative decisions, and over a century there was very little legislation on the entry of immigrants in France. The framework for French immigration policy was developed largely through administrative decisions and France was able to use its already considerable administrative capacity to shape and control immigration before World War II and to control large-scale immigration after the war
18. In the decades that followed the post-war, there were important changes in how immigration policy was framed and how it was developed institutionally in France (Ibid). Nevertheless, France was considered an immigration country (Noiriel 1988) “in the sense that France has generally welcomed immigrants and has taken a certain pride in its ability to integrate immigrant populations”
(Patrick Weil 1938 in Schain, 2008). According to (INSEE 2008: 46) the 2006 French census shows that 25% of the population of France have at least one parent or grandparent who immigrated to France.
Despite France being the first country in Europe to encourage permanent immigration in the immediate post-war period
19, and considered as an immigration country, until the 1980s France had not enacted any immigration legislative Act even though France has been confronted with different waves of immigration. Rather, each wave of immigration that
18 Schain M.A. (2008). The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain, and the United States.
Perspectives in Comparative Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230616660_2
19 Virginie Guiraudon (2001). Immigration Policy in France.
