CORRELATES OF
CORRUPTION
BO ROTHSTEIN
SÖREN HOLMBERG
WORKING PAPER SERIES 2019:
9
QOG THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE
Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg
Box 711, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG June 2019
ISSN 1653-8919
Correlates of Corruption
Bo Rothstein
S¨oren Holmberg
QoG Working Paper Series 2019:9
June 2019
ISSN 1653-8919
Bo Rothstein
The Quality of Government Institute Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg bo.rothstein@pol.gu.se
S¨oren Holmberg
The Quality of Government Institute Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg soren.holmberg@pol.gu.se
3
Contents
Control of Corruption
Economy 4
GDP per Capita . . . 4
Economic Equality (GINI Index) . . . 5
Economic Freedom Index . . . 6
GDP Growth per Capita . . . 7
Ease of Doing Business . . . 8
Welfare 9 Human Development Index . . . 9
Good Society Index . . . 10
Government Revenue . . . 11
Tax Revenue . . . 12
Average Schooling Years . . . 13
School Enrolment . . . 14
Health 15 Life Expectancy . . . 15
Healthy Life Expectancy . . . 16
Infant Mortality Rate . . . 17
Risk of Maternal Death . . . 18
Public Health Expenditure . . . 19
Private Health Expenditure . . . 20
Alcohol Consumption . . . 21
Environment 22 CO2 Emmissions per Capita . . . 22
Access to Drinking Water . . . 23
Unsafe Sanitation . . . 24
Gender 25 Gender Equality Index . . . 25
Female School Enrolment . . . 26
Violence/Crime 27 Total Police Personnel . . . 27
Homicide Rate . . . 28
Organized Crime . . . 29
Road Traffic Death Rate . . . 30
Trust 31 Trust in People . . . 31
Confidence in Parliament . . . 32
Confidence in Parliament in Democracies . . . 33
Happiness 34 Feeling of Happiness . . . 34
Life Satisfaction . . . 35
Change in Control of Corruption 36
Control of Corruption 2007 vs. Control of Corruption 2017 . . . 36
Quality of Government 37 Government Effectiveness . . . 37
Electoral Democracy . . . 38
Freedom on the Net . . . 39
Description of Variables by Source 40 Barro & Lee . . . 40
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime . . . 41
Ease of Doing Business Report . . . 42
Environmental Performance Index . . . 43
Freedom House . . . 44
United Nations Development Programme . . . 45
Heritage Foundation . . . 46
International Monetary Fund . . . 47
S¨oren Holmberg . . . 48
United Nations Development Program . . . 49
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project . . . 50
The World Bank Group . . . 50
The World Bank Group . . . 52
World Economic Forum . . . 54
World Health Organization . . . 55
World Values Survey / European Values Survey . . . 56
References 57
Control of Corruption
The ”Control of Corruption” estimate measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of ”additional payments to get things done”, to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring ”grand corruption” in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in ”state capture”.
Clarifications:
The estimate goes from -2.5 to 2.5, where lower values indicate less control of corruption, and higher values a better control.
Source: The World Bank Group
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (Downloaded on 2018-09-24)
Dataset: The Worldwide Governance Indicators These indicators are based on several
hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 31 separate data sources constructed by 25 different organizations. These individual measures of governance are assigned to categories capturing key dimensions of governance. An unobserved component model is used to construct six aggregate governance indicators. Point estimates of the dimensions of governance, the margins of error as well as the number of sources are presented for each country. The governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one each year of measurement. This implies that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.
WARNING: Since the estimates are standardized (with a mean of zero and a standard devia-tion of one) each year of measurement, they are not directly suitable for over-time comparisons within countries. Kaufmann et al. (2006) however find no systematic time-trends in a selection of indicators that do allow for comparisons over time, which suggests that time-series information in the WBGI scores can be used if interpreted with caution.
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United Arab Emirates
Tunisia Turkey U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Uruguay Venezuela Yemen High Low High Low 0 30000 60000 90000 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption
GDP per Capita (constant 2010 US Dollar)
GDP per Capita (constant 2010 US Dollar) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 184 R−Squared: 0.59
Sources: The World Bank Group (2014 − 2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
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El Salvador Ethiopia Estonia Finland France Gabon Georgia Gambia Germany Greece Guatemala Honduras Hungary Iceland Iran Ireland Italy Cote d'Ivoire Kazakhstan Kenya Kyrgyzstan Latvia Liberia Lithuania Luxembourg Malaysia Malta Mauritania Mexico Mongolia Moldova Montenegro Mozambique Namibia Netherlands Nicaragua Niger Norway Pakistan Panama Paraguay Peru Portugal Timor−Leste Romania Russia Slovakia Vietnam Slovenia South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland Tajikistan Thailand Togo Turkey Uganda Ukraine Macedonia Egypt U.K. U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Yemen Zambia High economic inequality Low economic inequality High Low 30 40 50 60 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption GINI Inde x (W
orld Bank Estimate)
GINI Index (World Bank Estimate) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 91 R−Squared: 0.12
Sources: The World Bank Group (2014 − 2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
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Brazil Solomon Islands Brunei Burundi Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Chad Chile China Taiwan Colombia Comoros Congo DR Congo Croatia Cuba Benin Denmark Dominica Ecuador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Fiji France Georgia Germany Kiribati Guinea Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Ireland Israel Italy Japan Kazakhstan Kenya North Korea South Korea Kuwait Lebanon Lesotho Lithuania Luxembourg Malaysia Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mexico
Morocco Oman Namibia Vanuatu New Zealand Nigeria Norway Micronesia Paraguay Peru Philippines Portugal Guinea−Bissau Timor−Leste Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Singapore Slovenia South Africa Zimbabwe Spain Sudan Suriname Sweden Switzerland Tajikistan U.A.E. Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Uruguay Venezuela Samoa Yemen High Low High Low 25 50 75 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption
Economic Freedom Inde
x
Economic Freedom Index vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 178 R−Squared: 0.51
Sources: Heritage Foundation (2015 − 2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
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Eswatini SwitzerlandSweden
Tajikistan
Togo
United Arab Emirates Uganda Egypt U.K. U.S.A. Uruguay Yemen High Low High Low −20 0 20 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption GDP per Capita Gr o wth (ann ual %)
GDP per Capita Growth (annual %) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 186 R−Squared: 0.02
Sources: The World Bank Group (2014 − 2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
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Central African Republic Sri Lanka Chad Chile China Taiwan Colombia Comoros Congo DR Congo Costa Rica Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Dominica Ecuador El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Eritrea Estonia Fiji Finland France Djibouti Gabon Georgia Gambia Germany Kiribati Greece Grenada Guinea Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Cote d'Ivoire Japan Kazakhstan Jordan Kenya South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Lebanon Lesotho Latvia Liberia Libya Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Moldova Montenegro Morocco Oman Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Micronesia Marshall Islands Pakistan Panama Paraguay Peru Poland Portugal Guinea−Bissau Timor−Leste Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda
St Kitts and Nevis St Lucia
St Vincent and the Grenadines
Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Singapore Slovakia Vietnam Slovenia Somalia South Africa Zimbabwe Spain South Sudan Sudan Suriname Eswatini Sweden Switzerland Syria Tajikistan Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
United Arab Emirates
Turkey Uganda Macedonia Egypt U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Samoa Yemen Easy Not Easy High Low 20 40 60 80 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption
Ease of Doing Business
Ease of Doing Business vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 185 R−Squared: 0.51
Sources: Ease of Doing Business Report (DB17−19 methodology) (2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
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Central African Republic Chad Chile China Comoros Congo DR Congo Costa Rica Croatia Cuba Cyprus Benin Denmark El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Eritrea Estonia Fiji France Georgia Gambia Germany Ghana Kiribati Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Cote d'Ivoire Jamaica Japan Jordan Kenya South Korea Kyrgyzstan Laos Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar Maldives Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Moldova Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Oman Namibia Nepal Netherlands Vanuatu New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Micronesia Pakistan Panama Paraguay Philippines Poland Portugal Guinea−Bissau Timor−Leste Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda St Lucia
St Vincent and the Grenadines
Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Slovakia Vietnam Slovenia South Africa Zimbabwe Spain South Sudan Sudan Suriname Eswatini Sweden Switzerland Syria Tajikistan Thailand Togo Tonga U.A.E. Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine Egypt U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Samoa Yemen Zambia High Low High Low 0.4 0.6 0.8 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Human De velopment Inde x
Human Development Index vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 187 R−Squared: 0.51
Sources: United Nations Development Program (2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
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Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Ukraine U.S.A. Uruguay Uzbekistan Yemen Zimbabwe High Low High Low 10 20 30 40 50 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption
Good Society Inde
x
Good Society Index vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 57 R−Squared: 0.52
Sources: Holmberg, 2007. Made with data from: World Value Survey (Happiness) and World Development Indicators (Life Expectancy and Infant Mortality) (2014 − 2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
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Antigua and Barbuda Azerbaijan Argentina Australia Austria Bahamas Bahrain Armenia Barbados Belgium Bhutan Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana Brazil Brunei Bulgaria Burundi Belarus Cameroon Canada Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Sri Lanka Chad Chile China Taiwan Colombia DR Congo Costa Rica Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Benin Denmark Ecuador Equatorial Guinea Estonia Fiji Finland France Djibouti Gabon Georgia Gambia Germany Ghana Greece Guatemala Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Jordan Kenya South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lebanon Lesotho Latvia Liberia Libya Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Moldova Montenegro Mozambique Oman Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Niger Nigeria Norway Micronesia Marshall Islands Palau Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Guinea−Bissau Timor−Leste Qatar Romania Russia St Lucia Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia South Africa Spain South Sudan Sudan Sweden Tajikistan Thailand Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine U.K. U.S.A. Uruguay Samoa High Low High Low 20 40 60 80 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Go vernment Re ven ue (per cent of GDP)
Government Revenue (percent of GDP) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 164 R−Squared: 0.19
Sources: International Monetary Fund (2014 − 2015) & The World Bank Group (2017)
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Antigua and Barbuda
Australia Austria Bahamas Bangladesh Armenia Barbados Belgium Bhutan Botswana Brazil Belize Solomon Islands Bulgaria Myanmar Belarus Cambodia Canada Sri Lanka Chile China
Colombia Costa Rica Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Dominica Dominican Republic El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Estonia Fiji Finland France Georgia Germany Kiribati Greece Grenada Guatemala Hungary Iceland Indonesia Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Cote d'Ivoire Jamaica Japan South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Lesotho Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malawi Malaysia Malta Mauritius Mexico Moldova Mozambique Namibia Nepal Netherlands Vanuatu New Zealand Nicaragua Norway Micronesia Marshall Islands Palau Paraguay Peru Poland Portugal Timor−Leste Romania Russia Rwanda St Kitts and Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent and the Grenadines
Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia
South Africa Sweden
Switzerland Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
United Arab Emirates Turkey Ukraine Macedonia Egypt U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Uzbekistan Zambia High Low High Low 0 10 20 30 40 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption T ax Re ven ue (% of GDP)
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 129 R−Squared: 0.13
Sources: The World Bank Group (2014 − 2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Afghanistan Albania Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belgium Belize Benin Bolivia Botswana Brazil Brunei Bulgaria Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada
Central African Republic
Chile China Colombia Congo DR Congo Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark
Dominican Republic Ecuador
Egypt Estonia Eswatini Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Germany Ghana Greece Guatemala Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Latvia Lesotho Liberia Libya Lithuania Luxembourg Malaysia Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Moldova Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Norway Pakistan Panama
Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Switzerland Syria Taiwan Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
U.K. U.S.A. Uruguay Venezuela Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe High Low High Low 5 10 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption A vera g e Sc hooling Y ear s
Average Schooling Years vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 142 R−Squared: 0.40
Sources: Barro & Lee (2010) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Afghanistan Albania Algeria Azerbaijan Argentina Australia Austria Bahrain Armenia Belgium Botswana Brazil Belize Brunei Bulgaria Myanmar Burundi Belarus Cambodia
Cameroon Sri Lanka Cape Verde
Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Costa Rica Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Benin Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Ethiopia Eritrea Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Jordan North Korea South Korea Kyrgyzstan Laos Lebanon Lesotho Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Moldova Montenegro Morocco Oman Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Norway Pakistan Panama Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda St Lucia Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Slovakia Vietnam Slovenia South Africa Spain Sudan Sweden Switzerland Syria Tajikistan Thailand Togo
United Arab Emirates Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine Macedonia Egypt U.K. Tanzania Burkina Faso Uruguay Uzbekistan High Low High Low 0 25 50 75 100 125 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Sc hool Enr olment (T er tiar y)
School Enrolment (Tertiary) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 134 R−Squared: 0.31
Sources: The World Bank Group (Ratio of total enrolment) (2014 − 2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Australia Austria Bahamas Bahrain Armenia Barbados Belgium Bhutan Bolivia Botswana Brazil Belize Solomon Islands Brunei Bulgaria Myanmar Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada
Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo DR Congo Costa Rica Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Benin Denmark Dominican Republic Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Eritrea Estonia Fiji Finland France Djibouti Gabon Georgia Gambia Germany Ghana Kiribati Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Cote d'Ivoire Japan Jordan Kenya North Korea South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Lebanon Lesotho Latvia Liberia Libya Liechtenstein Lithuania Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritania Mexico Mongolia Moldova Morocco Mozambique Oman Namibia Nepal Netherlands Vanuatu Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Micronesia Pakistan Panama Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Guinea−Bissau Timor−Leste Russia Rwanda St Lucia
St Vincent and the Grenadines
Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Slovakia Vietnam Somalia South Africa Zimbabwe Spain South Sudan Sudan Eswatini Sweden Syria Tajikistan Thailand Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago
United Arab Emirates Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine Egypt U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Samoa Yemen Zambia High Low High Low 60 70 80 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Lif e Expectanc y at Bir th, T otal (y ear s)
Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (years) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 184 R−Squared: 0.45
Sources: The World Bank Group (2016) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Afghanistan Algeria Angola Azerbaijan Australia Austria Bahamas Bahrain Armenia Barbados Belgium Bhutan Botswana Brazil Solomon Islands Brunei Bulgaria Myanmar Burundi Belarus Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde
Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo DR Congo Costa Rica Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Benin Denmark Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Eritrea Estonia Finland France Djibouti Gabon Georgia Gambia Germany Ghana Kiribati Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guyana Haiti Honduras Iceland India Indonesia Iran Iraq Israel Italy Cote d'Ivoire Japan Jordan Kenya North Korea South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Lebanon Lesotho Latvia Liberia Libya Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Moldova Morocco Mozambique Namibia Nepal Vanuatu New Zealand Nicaragua Nigeria Norway Micronesia Panama Paraguay Philippines Poland Guinea−Bissau Qatar Russia Rwanda St Vincent and the Grenadines
Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Somalia South Africa Zimbabwe Spain South Sudan Sudan Suriname Eswatini Sweden Switzerland Syria Tajikistan Togo
United Arab Emirates Tunisia Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine Macedonia Egypt U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Samoa Yemen Zambia High Low High Low 50 60 70 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Health y Lif e Expectanc y
Healthy Life Expectancy vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 183 R−Squared: 0.45
Sources: World Health Organization (2016) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Afghanistan Algeria Angola Austria Bahamas Bangladesh Barbados Belgium Bhutan Bolivia Botswana Brazil Belize Brunei Bulgaria Myanmar Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad Chile China Comoros Congo DR Congo Cuba Benin Dominica Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Eritrea Estonia Finland France Djibouti Gabon Georgia Gambia Germany Ghana Kiribati Guatemala Guinea Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Italy Cote d'Ivoire Japan Kazakhstan Jordan North Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Lesotho Latvia Liberia Libya Lithuania Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Oman Namibia Nauru New Zealand Niger Nigeria Norway Micronesia Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea
Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Guinea−Bissau Timor−Leste Qatar Russia Rwanda St Lucia Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Vietnam Slovenia Somalia South Africa Zimbabwe Spain South Sudan Sudan Eswatini Sweden Syria Tajikistan Togo Turkey Turkmenistan Tuvalu Uganda Macedonia Egypt U.K. U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Samoa Yemen Zambia High Low High Low 0 25 50 75 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Mor tality Rate
, Infant (per 1,000 Live Bir
ths)
Mortality Rate, Infant (per 1,000 Live Births) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 190 R−Squared: 0.36
Sources: The World Bank Group (2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Afghanistan Algeria Angola Belgium Bhutan Botswana Brazil Belize Brunei Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo DR Congo Cuba Benin Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Finland France Djibouti Gabon Georgia Gambia Germany Ghana Kiribati Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guyana Haiti India Iran Iraq Italy Cote d'Ivoire Jordan Kenya North Korea Kyrgyzstan Laos Lesotho Liberia Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mexico Morocco Mozambique Namibia Nepal Vanuatu Niger Nigeria Norway Panama Peru Portugal Guinea−Bissau Timor−Leste Russia Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Zimbabwe South Sudan Sudan Eswatini Sweden Syria Togo Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Uzbekistan Yemen Zambia High Low High Low 0 2 4 6 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption
Risk of Maternal Death (%)
Risk of Maternal Death (%) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 181 R−Squared: 0.22
Sources: The World Bank Group (2015) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Algeria Andorra Angola Australia Austria Bahamas Bangladesh Armenia Barbados Belgium Bhutan Bosnia and Herzegovina
Brazil Brunei Bulgaria Burundi Belarus Canada Cape Verde Chile China Colombia Congo Costa Rica Croatia Cyprus Denmark Dominica Equatorial Guinea Estonia Fiji Finland France Djibouti Gambia Germany Ghana Kiribati Greece Guyana Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Ireland Italy Japan Jordan Kenya South Korea Kyrgyzstan Laos Lesotho Latvia Luxembourg Madagascar Malaysia Maldives Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Moldova Morocco Oman Namibia Nepal Netherlands Nicaragua Nigeria Norway Micronesia Marshall Islands Pakistan Panama Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda St Lucia Saudi Arabia Serbia Seychelles Singapore Slovenia South Africa Spain South Sudan Sudan Eswatini Sweden Switzerland Tajikistan Togo
United Arab Emirates Turkey Tuvalu Uganda Ukraine Egypt U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Yemen Zambia High Low High Low 0 5 10 15 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Pub
lic Health Expenditure (% of GDP)
Public Health Expenditure (% of GDP) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 183 R−Squared: 0.42
Sources: The World Bank Group (2014 − 2015) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Afghanistan Albania Algeria Andorra Angola
Antigua and Barbuda Azerbaijan Argentina Australia Austria Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Armenia Barbados Belgium Bhutan Bolivia Botswana Brazil Belize Solomon Islands Brunei Bulgaria Myanmar Burundi Belarus Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Sri Lanka Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo DR Congo Costa Rica Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Benin Denmark Dominica Ecuador El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Eritrea Estonia Fiji Finland France Djibouti Gabon Georgia Gambia Germany Ghana Kiribati Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Italy Cote d'Ivoire Jamaica Japan Jordan Kenya South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lesotho Latvia Liberia Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Moldova Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Oman Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands Vanuatu Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Micronesia Marshall Islands Palau Pakistan Panama
Papua New Guinea
Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Guinea−Bissau Timor−Leste Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda St Kitts and Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent and the Grenadines
Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Seychelles Singapore Slovakia Vietnam Slovenia South Africa Zimbabwe Spain South Sudan Sudan Eswatini Sweden Switzerland Tajikistan Thailand Togo Tonga
United Arab Emirates Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Tuvalu Uganda Ukraine Egypt U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Samoa Yemen Zambia High Low High Low 0 20 40 60 80 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Priv
ate Health Expenditure (% of health e
xp.)
Private Health Expenditure (% of health exp.) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 183 R−Squared: 0.24
Sources: The World Bank Group (2014 − 2015) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Albania Algeria Andorra Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Azerbaijan Argentina Australia Austria Bahamas Bahrain Armenia Barbados Belgium Bolivia Botswana Brazil Belize Solomon Islands Brunei Bulgaria Belarus Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Chile China Colombia Congo DR Congo Costa Rica Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Benin Denmark El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Estonia Fiji Finland France Djibouti Gabon Georgia Gambia Germany Kiribati Greece Grenada Guyana Haiti Hungary Iceland India Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Cote d'Ivoire Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Jordan Kenya North Korea South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Lebanon Lesotho Latvia Liberia Lithuania Luxembourg Maldives Malta Mauritius Mexico Moldova Montenegro Morocco Oman Namibia Nepal Netherlands Vanuatu New Zealand Niger Nigeria Norway Micronesia Panama Paraguay Peru Poland Portugal Guinea−Bissau Timor−Leste Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda
St Kitts and Nevis St Lucia
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Somalia South Africa Zimbabwe Spain Suriname Eswatini Sweden Switzerland Syria Tajikistan Thailand Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
United Arab Emirates Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine Egypt U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Samoa Yemen Zambia High Low High Low 0 5 10 15 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption
Alcohol Consumption per Capita
Alcohol Consumption per Capita vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 177 R−Squared: 0.28
Sources: World Health Organization (2015 − 2016) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Andorra Azerbaijan Australia Austria Bahamas Bahrain Armenia Belgium Bhutan BoliviaBrazil Brunei Bulgaria Burundi Cambodia Canada Cape Verde Chile China Comoros Congo Cuba Czech Republic Denmark Equatorial Guinea Estonia Fiji Finland France Gabon Germany Grenada Guyana Iceland India Iran Iraq Italy Japan Kazakhstan South Korea Kuwait Laos Lebanon Lesotho Libya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malaysia Malta Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Oman Netherlands New Zealand Norway Micronesia Palau Poland Qatar Russia Rwanda St Kitts and Nevis
St Lucia Saudi Arabia Serbia Singapore Slovakia Vietnam Slovenia Somalia South Africa Spain Suriname Sweden Switzerland Syria Tajikistan
Trinidad and Tobago
United Arab Emirates
Turkey Turkmenistan Tuvalu Ukraine Macedonia Egypt U.K. U.S.A. Uruguay Venezuela Yemen High Low High Low 0 10 20 30 40 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption
CO2 Emissions (metric tons per Capita)
CO2 Emissions (metric tons per Capita) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 190 R−Squared: 0.13
Sources: The World Bank Group (2014) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Bangladesh Armenia Belgium Bhutan Bolivia Botswana Brazil Solomon Islands Brunei Bulgaria Myanmar Burundi Belarus Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo DR Congo Costa Rica Croatia Cuba Cyprus Benin Denmark Dominica Ecuador El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Eritrea Estonia Fiji Finland France Gabon Georgia Germany Ghana Kiribati Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Haiti Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Cote d'Ivoire Kazakhstan Jordan Kenya South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Lebanon Lesotho Latvia Liberia Libya Lithuania Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Oman Namibia Vanuatu Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Poland Guinea−Bissau Timor−Leste Qatar Russia Rwanda Saudi Arabia Senegal Sierra Leone Vietnam Somalia South Africa Zimbabwe Spain Sudan Suriname Eswatini Sweden Syria Tajikistan Thailand Togo Tunisia Turkmenistan Uganda Egypt U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Uzbekistan Venezuela Yemen Zambia High Low High Low 0 30 60 90 120 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Access T o Drinking W ater
Access To Drinking Water vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 180 R−Squared: 0.40
Sources: Environmental Performance Index (2015) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Afghanistan Angola Australia Austria Bahamas Bangladesh Armenia Bhutan Bolivia Botswana Brazil Belize Solomon Islands Brunei Bulgaria Myanmar Burundi Belarus Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad China Taiwan Colombia Comoros Congo DR Congo Costa Rica Croatia Cuba Benin Denmark Dominica Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Eritrea Estonia Fiji France Gabon Georgia Gambia Germany Ghana Kiribati Greece Guatemala Guinea Haiti Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Italy Cote d'Ivoire Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Jordan Kenya Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Lesotho Latvia Liberia Libya Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Oman Namibia Vanuatu New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Peru Poland Portugal Guinea−Bissau Timor−Leste Romania Russia Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Vietnam Slovenia Somalia South Africa Zimbabwe Spain Sudan Eswatini Sweden Switzerland Syria Tajikistan Thailand Togo Tonga Tunisia Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine Egypt U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Samoa Yemen Zambia Safe Not Safe High Low 0 25 50 75 100 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Unsaf e Sanitation
Unsafe Sanitation vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 180 R−Squared: 0.28
Sources: Environmental Performance Index (2015) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Afghanistan Albania Andorra Angola Argentina Austria Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belgium Bhutan Botswana Brazil Solomon Islands Brunei Bulgaria Myanmar Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde
Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo DR Congo Costa Rica Croatia Cuba Denmark Dominican Republic El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Eritrea Estonia Fiji Finland France Djibouti Gabon Georgia Germany Ghana Kiribati Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Cote d'Ivoire Japan Jordan Kenya South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Lithuania Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Moldova Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Oman Namibia Nepal Netherlands Vanuatu Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Micronesia Palau Pakistan Panama Peru Philippines Portugal Guinea−Bissau Timor−Leste Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda
St Vincent and the Grenadines
Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Slovakia Vietnam Slovenia South Africa Zimbabwe Spain South Sudan Sudan Eswatini Sweden Switzerland Syria Tajikistan Togo Tonga U.A.E. Tunisia Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine Macedonia Egypt U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Samoa Yemen Zambia High Low High Low 0.4 0.6 0.8 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption
Gender Equality Inde
x
Gender Equality Index vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 186 R−Squared: 0.49
Sources: United Nations Development Programme (2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Afghanistan Albania Argentina Australia Austria Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Armenia Barbados Belgium Bhutan Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria Myanmar Burundi Cameroon Canada Cape Verde
Central African Republic Chad Chile Colombia Comoros DR Congo Costa Rica Cuba Benin Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Ethiopia Eritrea Estonia Finland France Djibouti Georgia Germany Ghana Grenada Guatemala Guinea Honduras Iceland India Indonesia Iran Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Jordan North Korea South Korea Kyrgyzstan Laos Lebanon Lesotho Latvia Liberia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Mali Malta Mexico Moldova Montenegro Mozambique Nepal Netherlands Vanuatu New Zealand Niger Norway Marshall Islands Palau Pakistan Panama Peru Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda St Lucia Saudi Arabia Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia South Africa Spain South Sudan Sudan Suriname Eswatini Sweden Switzerland Thailand Tonga Turkmenistan Tuvalu Ukraine Egypt U.K. U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uzbekistan Venezuela Yemen High Low High Low 0 50 100 150 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Female Sc hool Enr olment (Secondar y)
Female School Enrolment (Secondary) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 150 R−Squared: 0.43
Sources: The World Bank Group (Ratio of total enrolment) (2014 − 2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Albania Algeria Andorra Argentina Australia Austria Barbados Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina
Belize Bulgaria Myanmar Burundi Canada Cape Verde Chile Colombia Costa Rica Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Ecuador El Salvador Estonia Finland France Georgia Greece Grenada Guatemala Guyana Honduras Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Kenya Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar Malta Mexico Moldova Montenegro Netherlands Norway Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russia Serbia Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Thailand Trinidad and Tobago
Uganda Macedonia Tanzania U.S.A. Uruguay High Low High Low 0 250 500 750 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption T otal P olice P er sonnel (per 100,000 P op.)
Total Police Personnel (per 100,000 Pop.) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 74 R−Squared: 0.01
Sources: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014 − 2015) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Andorra Angola Argentina Australia Austria Barbados Bhutan Brazil Belize Bulgaria Myanmar Cape Verde Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros DR Congo Costa Rica Dominican Republic El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Eritrea France Djibouti Gabon Georgia Germany Grenada Guatemala Guyana Honduras India Iran Israel Italy Jamaica Japan North Korea South Korea Laos Libya Mexico Nigeria Norway Panama Portugal Guinea−Bissau Qatar Russia Saudi Arabia Senegal Sierra Leone Singapore Somalia South Africa Sudan Suriname Sweden Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
U.A.E. Turkmenistan U.K. U.S.A. Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela High Low High Low 0 30 60 90 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption
Homicide Rate (per 100,000 P
op.)
Homicide Rate (per 100,000 Pop.) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 133 R−Squared: 0.08
Sources: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014 − 2015) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Albania Algeria Angola Azerbaijan Argentina Australia Austria Bahrain Armenia Belgium Bolivia Botswana Brazil Brunei Bulgaria Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Chad Chile China Taiwan Colombia DR Congo Costa Rica Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Benin Denmark Ecuador El Salvador Estonia Finland France Georgia Gambia Germany Ghana Greece Guatemala Guinea Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Iran Ireland Israel Italy Cote d'Ivoire Jamaica Japan Kazakhstan Jordan Kenya South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Lebanon Lesotho Latvia Liberia Lithuania Luxembourg Malawi Malaysia Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Oman Namibia Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Nigeria Norway Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Vietnam Slovenia South Africa
Zimbabwe Eswatini Spain
Sweden Switzerland Tajikistan Thailand U.A.E. Uganda Ukraine Macedonia Egypt U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Venezuela Yemen Zambia High Low High Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Or ganiz ed Crime
Organized Crime vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 139 R−Squared: 0.43
Sources: World Economic Forum (2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Afghanistan Albania Algeria Andorra Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bhutan
Bolivia Brazil Botswana
Brunei Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Chad Chile China Comoros Congo DR Congo Costa Rica Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Djibouti Dominica Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Eswatini Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea−Bissau Haiti Hungary Iceland India Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati North Korea South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Lithuania Luxembourg Macedonia Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands Mauritius Mexico Micronesia Moldova Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Namibia Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Oman Pakistan Palau Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda Samoa Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Solomon Islands
Somalia South Africa
South Sudan Spain St Lucia Sudan Suriname Sweden Syria Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Timor−Leste Togo Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda
Ukraine United Arab Emirates
U.K. U.S.A. Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe High Low High Low 0 10 20 30 40 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Road T
raffic Death Rate (per 100,000 P
op.)
Road Traffic Death Rate (per 100,000 Pop.) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 187 R−Squared: 0.40
Sources: World Health Organization (2013) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Azerbaijan Bahrain Belarus Brazil Chile China Colombia Cyprus Ecuador Egypt Estonia Georgia Germany Ghana India Iraq Japan Jordan Kazakhstan South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lebanon Libya Malaysia Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda Singapore Slovenia South Africa Spain Sweden Taiwan Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Ukraine U.S.A. Uruguay Uzbekistan Yemen Zimbabwe High Low High Low 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Most P eople Can Be T rusted
Most People Can Be Trusted vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 58 R−Squared: 0.22
Sources: World Values Survey (2010 − 2014) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Azerbaijan Bahrain Belarus Brazil Chile China Colombia Cyprus Ecuador Egypt Estonia Georgia Germany Ghana India Iraq Japan Jordan Kazakhstan South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lebanon Libya Malaysia Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda Singapore Slovenia South Africa Spain Sweden Taiwan Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia Turkey Ukraine U.S.A. Uruguay Uzbekistan Yemen Zimbabwe High Low High Low 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Confidence in P arliament
Confidence in Parliament vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 58 R−Squared: 0.01
Sources: World Values Survey (2010 − 2014) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Argentina Australia Brazil Chile Colombia Cyprus Ecuador Estonia Georgia Germany Ghana Japan South Korea Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Peru Poland Romania Slovenia South Africa Spain Sweden Taiwan Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia U.S.A. Uruguay High Low High Low 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Confidence in P arliament
Confidence in Parliament vs. Control of Corruption in Democracies
Number of observations: 28 Adjusted R−Squared: 0.21
Sources: World Values Survey (2010 − 2014) & The World Bank Group (2017). Democracies are understood as countries with more than 0.6 in V−Dem's electoral democracy.
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Azerbaijan Bahrain Belarus Brazil Chile China Colombia Cyprus Ecuador Egypt Estonia Georgia Germany Ghana India Iraq Japan Jordan Kazakhstan South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lebanon Libya Malaysia Mexico Morocco
Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda Singapore Slovenia South Africa Spain Sweden Taiwan Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia Turkey Ukraine U.S.A. Uruguay Uzbekistan Yemen Zimbabwe High Low High Low 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Feeling of Happiness
Feeling of Happiness vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 58 R−Squared: 0.01
Sources: World Values Survey (2010 − 2014) & The World Bank Group (2017)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Azerbaijan Bahrain Belarus Brazil Chile China Colombia Cyprus Ecuador Egypt Estonia Georgia Germany Ghana India Iraq Japan Jordan Kazakhstan South Korea Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lebanon Libya Malaysia Mexico Morocco
Netherlands New Zealand
Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda Singapore Slovenia South Africa Spain Sweden Taiwan Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia Turkey Ukraine U.S.A. Uruguay Uzbekistan Yemen Zimbabwe High Low High Low 5 6 7 8 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption
Satisfaction with Lif
e
Satisfaction with Life vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 58 R−Squared: 0.05
Sources: World Values Survey (2010 − 2014) & The World Bank Group (2017)
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Antigua and Barbuda
Australia Austria Bahamas Barbados Belgium Bhutan Brazil Brunei Burundi Canada
Cape Verde Chile
China Taiwan Croatia Benin Denmark Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Fiji France Georgia Germany Kiribati Haiti Hungary Iceland India Iran Iraq Ireland Italy Japan North Korea Kuwait Lesotho Libya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Mali Mauritius Mexico Morocco Oman Namibia New Zealand Nigeria Norway Micronesia Marshall Islands Paraguay Portugal Guinea−Bissau Qatar Russia Rwanda
St Kitts and Nevis Saudi Arabia Seychelles Somalia South Africa Zimbabwe Spain Suriname Sweden Switzerland Syria Tuvalu Uganda U.K. U.S.A. Uruguay Venezuela Yemen High Low High Low
Countries that improved
Countries that deteriorated
45 degree line −2 −1 0 1 2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption in 2007 Contr ol of Corruption in 2017
Control of Corruption (10 year change)
Number of observations: 116 Adjusted R−Squared: 0.9 Sources: The World Bank Group
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Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo DR Congo Costa Rica Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Dominica Ecuador El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Fiji Finland France Djibouti Germany Ghana Kiribati Grenada Guatemala Haiti Hungary Iceland India Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Kenya South Korea Lesotho Latvia Liberia Libya Lithuania Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Oman Namibia Nepal Netherlands Niger Nigeria Norway Micronesia Marshall Islands Panama Portugal Timor−Leste Qatar Russia Saudi Arabia Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Vietnam Slovenia Somalia South Africa Zimbabwe South Sudan Sudan Suriname Sweden Switzerland Syria Thailand Togo Tonga
United Arab Emirates
Tunisia Turkey Tuvalu Uganda Ukraine U.K. Tanzania U.S.A. Burkina Faso Uruguay Samoa Yemen Zambia High Low High Low −2 −1 0 1 2 −2 −1 0 1 2 Control of Corruption Go vernment Eff ectiveness
Government Effectiveness vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations: 192 R−Squared: 0.81
Sources: The World Bank Group (2017) & The World Bank Group (2017)
