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Conflict background and actors in Kunar

In document Afghanistan Security situation (Page 194-197)

2. Regional description of the security situation in Afghanistan

2.19 Kunar

2.19.2 Conflict background and actors in Kunar

In February 2020, a security analyst interviewed by Sweden’s Lifos described Kunar as ‘strongly controlled/influenced’ by the Taliban.2141 As of May 2020, the UN Security Council listed Mawalawi Hamdullah Uruzgani, originally affiliated to the Peshawar Shura network, as the Taliban shadow governor of Kunar. He was appointed after the ‘reshuffle’ of the Taliban government structure during the 2019-2020 winter, ahead of the 2020 fighting season.2142 By December 2019, according to the provincial vice-governor, about 1 000 militants, most of them former members of the Taliban, had

2130 Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan 2020-2021, June 2020, url, p. 4

2131 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Kunar Provincial Overview, n.d., url, Afghanistan, Office of the President, Provincial Profile Kunar, n. d., url

2132 IWPR, Illegal Logging Destroying Afghan Forests, 23 January 2018, url; RFE/RL/Gandhara,Precious Stones Illegally Mined In Afghan Province, 24 April 2020, url ; FP, Afghanistan’s Forests are Turning a Profit for the Islamic State, 15 July 2019, url

2133 Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Evaluation Report - Afghanistan: Rehabilitation of Maidan Shar – Bamyan Road, 2014, url, p. 8; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Kunar Province – District Atlas, April 2014, url

2134 Salaam Times, Afghan forces reopen key Kunar highway blocked by Taliban, 9 August 2018, url

2135 Libération, Afghanistan : mon voisin, ce taliban devenu fréquentable [Afghanistan : my neighbour, this Taliban guy who has become reputable], 3 February 2020, url

2136 Pajhwok Afghan News, Kunar’s Nawapas road reopens after 5-year closure, 7 September 2019, url; Sabawoon, A. M., The Gates of Friendship: How Afghans cross the Afghan-Pakistani border, AAN, 28 January 2020, url

2137 UNOCHA, Afghanistan : Weekly Humanitarian Update (23 – 29 September 2019), 2 October 2019, url

2138 US, Naval Postgraduate School, Kunar Provincial Overview, n.d., url

2139 Tolonews, 'Pakistani Forces Building Facilities on Afghan Soil': Residents, 8 June 2020, url

2140 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 23

2141 Sweden, Lifos/Migrationsverket, Säkerhetsläget i Afghanistan (version 2.0.), 7 April 2020, url, p. 41

2142 UN Security Council, Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 27 May 2020, url, pp. 8-9, 27

reportedly enrolled in a NDS-sponsored ‘Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration’ program in Kunar.2143

As of May 2020, Kunar was one of the 12 provinces where Al Qaeda was said to be ‘covertly active’.

The UN Security Council mentioned in the same report that the group intended to form a joint unit of 2 000 fighters with the Haqqani Network, headed by Shir Khan Manga in the operational zone composed of Kunar and Nuristan.2144 UNAMA added that Al Qaeda’s main tasks consist in ‘training, including weapons and explosives, and mentoring’.2145 Besides, in March 2020, Kunar officials expressed concern about the recruitment by Al Qaeda of former Taliban fighters hostile to the negotiations between the movement and the USA.2146 Long War Journal also mentioned the presence in Kunar and Nuristan provinces of a commander affiliated to both the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Qari Zia Rahman.2147

As of July 2020, the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, ISKP, was said to be headed by Sheikh Matiullah Kamahwal, former leader of the Kunar chapter.2148 During the first half of 2019, ISKP appeared to gain territory in the province2149, which had already been described as one its strongholds in Afghanistan in February 2019.2150 However, from the fall of 2019, military operations simultaneously led by ANDSF, coalition forces and the Taliban pressured ISKP into leaving the areas under its control in southern Nangarhar and in Kunar.2151 Although the group endured further losses in Kunar in early 20202152, the UN Secretary General stated that the province had ‘effectively become the group’s new Afghan core areas’.2153 Between January and May 2020, sources reported the presence of ISKP fighters or bases in western parts of the province: in remote areas of Chawkay district, where the dense forests provide quality hideouts2154, in Narang, Nurgal and Chapadara2155, as well as in Watapur and Dara-e Pech districts.2156 Estimates of the total number of ISKP fighters in Kunar oscillated between 400 (half of them in Chapadara), as reported by the Diplomat in August 20192157, 1 200, according to the provincial governor in January 20202158, and 2 100, as stated by the UN Secretary General in February 2020.2159

2143 Le Figaro, Afghanistan: un programme gouvernemental pour réintégrer des talibans repentis [Afghanistan : a government program to reinstate repentant Taliban], 26 December 2019, url

2144 UN Security Council, Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 27 May 2020, url, pp. 12-13

2145 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 85-86

2146 Tolonews, Al-Qaeda Recruiting Disaffected Taliban: Kunar Officials, 12 March 2020, url

2147 LWJ, Female Pakistani Taliban suicide bomber hits hospital, 21 July 2019, url

2148 UN Security Council, Letter dated 16 July 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011)and 2253 (2015)concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakingsand entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, 23 July 2020, url, p. 15

2149 RFE/RL/Gandhara, Islamic State In Afghanistan Growing Bigger, More Dangerous, 22 May 2019, url

2150 UN Secretary-General, Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 1 February 2019, url, p. 7

2151 USDOD, Enhancing Security & Stability in Afghanistan, June 2020, url, p. 28

2152 UNSG, Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 27 May 2020, url, pp. 3

2153 UN Secretary-General, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 4 February 2020, url, p. 7

2154 UNSG, Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 27 May 2020, url, p. 18

2155 Tolonews, More Than 1,000 Daesh Fighters Active In Kunar: Governor, 8 January 2020, url

2156 Ali, O., Hit from Many Sides 1: Unpicking the recent victory against the ISKP in Nangrahar, AAN, 1 March 2020, url

2157 Diplomat (The), The Peculiar Presence of the Islamic State in Kunar, 14 May 2019, url

2158 Tolonews, More Than 1,000 Daesh Fighters Active In Kunar: Governor, 8 January 2020, url

2159 UNSG, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 4 February 2020, url, p. 7

Local ISKP ranks were bolstered by the arrival of about 350 fighters – including foreign nationals – pushed out of neighbouring Nangarhar by ANDSF and Taliban operations.2160

In an article published by the magazine The Diplomat, Afghanistan-based journalist Franz J. Marty noted that, according to ‘anecdotal evidence’, ‘some alleged Islamic State fighters in Kunar have simply adopted a vague, locally-colored version of the Islamic Sate’, sometimes for opportunistic reasons or ideological compatibility, since many Kunar residents are Salafists.2161 In this regard, in January 2020, Foreign Policy reported that in both Nangarhar and Kunar provinces, some Salafist madrasas, funded by Gulf states-based NGOs, were supporting ISKP activities.2162

In 2017, sources mentioned the presence of a group of Hezb-e Islami militants based in Shigal district.

At that time, they were reportedly communicating with other insurgent groups but had neither joined the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, nor ISKP.2163

In a June 2019 report, the UN Security Council listed Kunar as one of the border areas where ‘many foreign terrorist fighter groups operate and have established safe havens’. Of these groups, Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) was said to be ‘one of more prominent’ and ‘a key facilitator in recruitment and financial support activities’. It reportedly numbers about 500 active members in Kunar and Nangarhar, and is thought to have adopted a ‘more neutral role’ towards the Taliban and ISKP, from which it distanced itself.2164 As of May 2020, LeT fighters were ‘dispersed within Taliban forces’.2165 Another active group is Jaish-e Mohammed (JeM). As LeT, it is said to help terrorist fighters to enter Afghanistan and to carry out targeted assassinations, notably against government officials.2166 Up to 2018 at least, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ran a military base, called Ghazi Camp, in Kunar.2167 It reportedly numbered 500 fighters in the province as of May 2020.2168 Finally, as of July 2020, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was supposedly present in Afghanistan, mainly in three provinces, among which Kunar.2169

In terms of presence of government security forces, Kunar province is under the responsibility of the 201st ANA Corps, which falls under the Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East (TAAC-E), led by US and Polish forces.2170 According to AAN, Kunar is often listed as one of the provinces where the ALP is working well. Indeed, whereas it was one of the most violent provinces, the ALP and other ANDSF corps were able to stabilise the situation after the withdrawal of international forces.2171

The NDS-04, a unit of the NDS paramilitary strike forces, operates in Nuristan, Kunar and other provinces in the North-East. In a 2019 report, Human Rights Watch explained that, although they are technically subordinated to the NDS, these forces are trained, equipped and overseen by the CIA. They conduct brutal night raids, targeting alleged insurgents and often injuring or killing civilians. These

2160 UN Security Council, Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 27 May 2020, url, p. 17

2161 Diplomat (The), The Peculiar Presence of the Islamic State in Kunar, 14 May 2019, url

2162 FP, In Afghanistan, Religious Schools Are a Breeding Ground for Islamic State Influence, 24 January 2020, url

2163 Diplomat (The), Afghan Jihad Frozen in Time?, 25 April 2017, url ; USIP, The Political Deal with Hezb-e Islami, 6 July 2018, url

2164 UN Security Council, Letter dated 10 June 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 13 June 2019, url, pp. 17-18

2165 UN Security Council, Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 27 May 2020, url, p. 20

2166 UN Security Council, Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 27 May 2020, url, p. 20

2167 LWJ, US hits Pakistani Taliban training camp in eastern Afghanistan, 8 March 2018, url

2168 UNSG, Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 27 May 2020, url, p. 20

2169 UNSG, Letter dated 16 July 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011)and 2253 (2015)concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakingsand entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, 23 July 2020, url, p. 16

2170 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2020, url, p. 13

2171 Clark, K. et al., Ghosts of the Past: Lessons from Local Force Mobilisation in Afghanistan and Prospects for the Future, AAN & Global Public Policy Institute, July 2020, url, pp. 46, 93

operations have grown increasingly frequent since late 2017.2172 According to AAN’s Kate Clark, in 2017, the NDS-04 unit numbered 250 men.2173 However, another AAN report stated that Kunar was actually the operation field of the NDS-02 Special forces unit.2174

In April 2020, RFE/RL’s Gandhara reported that the Taliban and other AGEs controlled ‘large swathes of rural territories’ in Kunar province.2175 According to information LWJ collected and presented in a map, all of Kunar districts are assessed as contested by the Afghan government and the Taliban, except for Asadabad district (presented as undetermined or government-controlled) and Chapadara (presented as Taliban-controlled, based on 2017 information).2176 Regarding Chapadara, in May 2019, the Diplomat described the situation as ‘calm’. Its main valley was then controlled by the government, while ISKP had ousted the Taliban from two others valleys, Lindalam and Digal, in March 2019.2177 As of August 2019, government forces were said to be ‘in full control’ of the Pech valley area, encompassing districts of Watapur, Dara-e Pech and Chapadara, despite sporadic AGEs attacks.2178 In September 2019, on the eve of the presidential election, the Taliban retook parts of Manroo (equated with Marawara by AAN2179) district that they had lost to ISKP six months earlier.2180

In document Afghanistan Security situation (Page 194-197)