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Conflict background and actors in Jawzjan

In document Afghanistan Security situation (Page 156-159)

2. Regional description of the security situation in Afghanistan

2.14 Jawzjan

2.14.2 Conflict background and actors in Jawzjan

Despite being home to the former powerful Uzbek militia leader Abdul Rashid Dostum and the presence of his ‘former militia fighters’, insurgent activity reportedly increased in Jawzjan after NATO-led forces handed over control to Afghan security forces in 2012.1686 A 2017 study on Islamic State (IS) presence in Afghanistan found that ‘there are enormous numbers of armed forces in [...] Jawzjan [...], among which the irregular (arbaki, private paramilitary units of commanders) and anti-government forces (mostly various local Taliban groups) clearly outnumber the ANSF (ANA, ANP and ALP) and National Uprising units.’1687

1674 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Northern Region - District Atlas, April 2014, url

1675 Afghanistan, IEC, Afghanistan 2019 Presidential Elections – Final results by Polling Stations: Province Jawzjan, 2020, url;

Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2020-21, June 2020, url, p. 38

1676 Ruttig, T., The Afghanistan Election Conundrum (12): Good news and bad news about district numbers, AAN, 16 August 2018, url

1677 Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2020-21, June 2020, url, p. 38

1678 Larsson, K., A Provincial Survey of Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan and Saripul, November 2008, url, p. 68

1679 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Northern Region - District Atlas, April 2014, url; iMMAP, Afghanistan Administrative Map, 19 September 2017, url; Diplomat (The), Kabul's Plan to Realize Afghanistan’s Geographic Dividend, 5 December 2017, url

1680 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/73/990–S/2019/703, 3 September 2019, url, pp. 5-6

1681 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Weekly Humanitarian Update (13 January – 19 January 2020), 22 January 2020, url; UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Weekly Humanitarian Update (20 January – 26 January 2020), 29 January 2020, url

1682 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Weekly Humanitarian Update (13 January – 19 January 2020), 22 January 2020, url

1683 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 19

1684 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 26

1685 UNODC and Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018, November 2018, url, p. 17

1686 RFE/RL, Afghanistan's New Northern Flash Points, n.d., url

1687 Mielke, K., Miszak, N., Making sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A social movement perspective, June 2017, url, pp. 28-29

AAN reported in 2017 that the Taliban became increasingly successful in Jawzjan, setting up administrative and military institutions, after opening their ranks to non-Pashtun fighters. The recruitment of Uzbeks allegedly proved particularly successful in the province.1688 Subsequently, the Taliban were able to expand their control in Jawzjan as well as in other provinces of northern Afghanistan.1689 Within Jawzjan, they have been reportedly pushing into the province's northern and eastern parts, as well as the strategic areas around the provincial centre.1690

AAN reported that conflict emerged between local Taliban commanders and the Taliban leadership in 2014 after the latter tried to enhance the accountability of the commanders in operations. According to AAN, the appearance of IMU in Qushtepa subsequently favoured the formation of an ‘Islamic State (IS)’ faction in the district.1691

IMU, which appeared to have started infiltrating Jawzjan in early 2015 from neighbouring Faryab province according to RFE/RL1692, has been a former ally of the Taliban, but shifted allegiance towards IS after the disclosure of Taliban leader Mullah Omar's death in 2015.1693 The presence of IMU in Jawzjan reportedly provided Qari Hekmat and his followers with an opportunity to pledge allegiance to IS. Subsequently, Hekmat succeeded in shaping his former Taliban unit into an independent IS-associated group.1694 AAN stated that it had found no reliable evidence of a connection between Hekmat's IS group and Nangarhar's Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which is allegedly recognised by the ‘Daesh central’ in Syria and Iraq (i.e. the main franchise) as an IS branch.1695 A study on IS presence in Afghanistan published in 2017 supported this finding.1696

According to AAN, Hekmat's shift to ‘IS’ was rather driven by ‘[...] power-saving opportunism [...]’ than by ideological motives.1697 The self-proclaimed IS group managed to hold control over the districts of Qushtepa and Darzab for three years, fighting the Taliban1698 – though not expanding its territory due to the widespread Taliban presence in the province1699 – and initially outlasting the death of its founder by a US drone strike in April 2018.1700 In August 2018, the Taliban overran the group's strongholds1701, prompting a faction of Hekmat's former unit to surrender to the government forces in fear of retaliation by the Taliban, while others (reportedly mainly Central Asian fighters) surrendered to the Taliban.1702 There were reports of an insider attack in Qushtepa district in June 2019, claiming that the attackers were former members of groups affiliated with ISKP, who had surrendered to the government in

1688 Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url

1689 RFE/RL, Afghanistan's New Northern Flash Points, n.d., url; Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url

1690 Ali, O., Qari Hekmat’s Island Overrun: Taleban defeat ‘ISKP’ in Jawzjan, AAN, 4 August 2018, url

1691 Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url

1692 RFE/RL, Afghanistan's New Northern Flash Points, n.d., url

1693 Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url; AAN, Toward Fragmentation? Mapping the post-Omar Taleban, 24 November 2015, url

1694 Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url

1695 Ali, O., Qari Hekmat’s Island Overrun: Taleban defeat ‘ISKP’ in Jawzjan, AAN, 4 August 2018, url

1696 Mielke, K., Miszak, N., Making sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A social movement perspective, June 2017, url, pp. 28-29

1697 Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url

1698 Ali, O., Qari Hekmat’s Island: A Daesh enclave in Jawzjan?, AAN, 11 November 2018, url; Ali, O., Precarious

Consolidation: Qari Hekmat’s IS-affiliated ‘island’ survives another Taleban onslaught, AAN, 4 March 2018, url; Der Spiegel, Afghanistan 120 Tote bei Kämpfen zwischen Taliban und IS [Afghanistan: 120 Dead in Clashes Between Taliban and IS], 19 July 2018, url

1699 Ali, O., Non-Pashtun Taleban of the North (4): A case study from Jawzjan, AAN, 18 September 2017, url

1700 Ali, O., Still under the IS’s Black Flag: Qari Hekmat’s ISKP island in Jawzjan after his death by drone, AAN, 15 May 2018, url; UN Security Council, Letter dated 10 June 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 13 June 2019, url, p. 15

1701 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 85

1702 Ali, O., Qari Hekmat’s Island Overrun: Taleban defeat ‘ISKP’ in Jawzjan, AAN, 4 August 2018, url; UN Security Council, Letter dated 10 June 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 13 June 2019, url, p. 15

2018.1703 No security incidents specifically attributed to ISKP were recorded by ACLED in Jawzjan province between 1 March 2019 and 20 June 2020.1704

In August 2019 provincial police officials stated that 1 500 fighters, forming 123 groups, have been involved in fighting against government forces under the Taliban leadership in Jawzjan province.1705 Darzab district was reported to be under Taliban control in March 2019.1706 There were reports of the Taliban capturing Qushtepa district in July 20191707 and again during the presidential elections at the end of September 2019.1708 Demanding more attention from the central government to Jawzjan’s security in August 2019, the provincial police stated that next to Qushtepa, Khamyab district had also fallen to the Taliban while Mangajak, Qarqin, Muradyan and Darzab districts were under threat.1709 In the months that followed media reports, adding Aqcha and Khanaqa districts, also reflected this threat on those districts.1710 The Taliban took control of Darzab district on 31 December 2019.1711 The Afghan security forces reportedly withdrew peacefully from their Antan Hill military base on demand of the local residents.1712 Although officials claimed that government forces had retaken Khamyab district in April 20201713, in its assessment, consulted on 11 June 2020, LWJ continued to indicate the district as

‘Taliban-controlled’.1714 As of 2 July 2020 the assessment by the Long War Journal presented in a frequently updated map and based on open-source information, additionally indicated Darzab and Qushtepa districts as ‘Taliban-controlled’, Mardyan, Mingajik and Shiberghan districts as ‘government-controlled’ and the remaining districts in Jawzjan province as ‘contested’.1715

According to information at the disposal of the UN Security Council in 2019 and 2020, in Afghanistan Central Asian groups were under the direct operational and financial control of the Taliban.1716 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was said to have no more than 100 members and operates mainly in

1703 NYT, Afghan War Casualty Report: June 21-27, 27 June 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, 5 pro-govt militiamen killed in Jawzjan, Samangan, 26 June 2019, url

1704 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, (Filters applied: Central Asia & the Caucasus; Afghanistan; Jowzjan; Event types: Battles; Explosions/Remote Violence; Violence against civilians; 1 March 2019 - 30 June 2020), url

1705 Pajhwok Afghan News, ‘123 groups fight government forces under Taliban leadership in Jawzjan’, 3 August 2019, url;

Tolonews, Jawzjan Security Needs More Attention: Official, 5 August 2019, url

1706 Tolonews, Over 3,700 Militants Killed In 88 Operations In North: Official, 19 March 2019, url

1707 NYT, Afghan War Casualty Report: June 28-July 4, 4 July 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban capture Jawzjan’s Qush Tepa district, 2 June 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban release 54 security forces in Jawzjan, 9 July 2019, url

1708 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/73/990–S/2019/703, 3 September 2019, url, p. 6; UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/74/582–S/2019/935, 10 December 2019, url, p. 6

1709 Pajhwok Afghan News, ‘123 groups fight government forces under Taliban leadership in Jawzjan’, 3 August 2019, url

1710 Tolonews, 11 Police Killed/Wounded In Balkh, Police Under Siege in Jawzjan, 1 October 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Darzab district residents seek arms for self-defense, 2 October 2019, url; NYT, Afghan War Casualty Report:

December 2019, 5 December 2019, url; Tolonews, Dostum Pledges Support to Afghan Forces, 31 October 2019, url;

Pajhwok Afghan News, Taliban torch 3 telecom antennas in Jawzjan, 1 January 2020, url

1711 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/74/753–S/2020/210, 17 March 2020, url, p. 6

1712 Khaama Press, Taliban takes over Darzab district of northern Jawzjan province, 31 December 2019, url

1713 Khaama Press, 25 Taliban militants killed, 17 wounded in the operation ‘Retake of Khamaab’, 12 April 2020, url;

Afghanistan Times, Security forces purge Jawzjan’s Khomaab district, kill 25 Taliban rebels, 12 April 2020, url; 1TV, Afghan forces retake Jowzjan's Khumab district, kill 14 Taliban militants, 19 April 2020, url; USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability In Afghanistan. June 2020, 1 July 2020, url, pp. 2, 18

1714 LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url. The source, however, does not specify when and which information of the aforementioned map was last updated.

1715 LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, n.d., url. The source, however, does not specify when and which information of the aforementioned map was last updated.

1716 UN Security Council, Letter dated 10 June 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 13 June 2019, url, p. 18; UN Security Council, Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 27 May 2020, url, p. 21

Faryab and Jawzjan provinces where it maintained links to splinter groups such as Islamic Jihad Group and Khatiba Imama al-Bukhari.1717

In terms of the presence of government security forces, Jawzjan province is under the responsibility of the 209th ANA Shaheen corps. Jawzjan province is included in the area of responsibility of the Train Advise Assist Command – North (TAAC – North), which is part of NATO's Resolute Support Mission within Afghanistan. TAAC-North is led by German forces and has its headquarters in Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh province.1718

In document Afghanistan Security situation (Page 156-159)