Geographical overview

1.5.1 Urban-rural divide

According to the Afghanistan National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA), around 71 % of the population (23.4 million) is estimated to live in rural areas and 24.4 % (8 million) in urban areas in 2020-2021; 4.6 % (1.5 million) of the population is officially estimated to pursue a nomadic way of life.⁴¹⁵ According to NSIA, urban areas display a higher population growth because of rural-urban migration.⁴¹⁶ According to the researcher Antonio Giustozzi, Afghanistan’s history is characterised by a structural urban-rural divide. While urban centres became hubs for administration, market-driven methods of production, taxation, education, judiciary, and reforms, the rural population was left aside from these

408 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 27

409 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 24

410 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Midyear Report: 1 January – 30 June 2020, 27 July 2020, url, p. 20

411 UN, Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary General A/74/845-S/2020/525, 9 June 2020, url, pp. 5-6

412 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary General A/74/753–S/220/210, 17 March 2020, url, p. 10

413 UNAMA, Afghanistan – Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2019, February 2020, url, p. 23

414 Sorush, R., Child Rights Protection Law in Afghanistan: Can the parliamentary chaos be resolved, AAN, 18 March 2020, url

415 Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated population of Afghanistan, 1 June 2020, url, p. iii

416 Afghanistan, NSIA, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2018-19, July 2019, url, p. 2

developments, which caused a feeling of resentment in rural inhabitants.⁴¹⁷ Several sources describe the rural population as ‘more conservative’ and ‘traditional’ with many living ‘in absolute or near-absolute poverty’⁴¹⁸ and facing realities of war ‘as a part of daily life’⁴¹⁹ in contrast with urban dwellers, who are ‘more liberal’, have more opportunities to gain income and include a class of urban elites and persons engaged in ‘family politics’.⁴²⁰

Asia Foundation 2019 Survey found that 79 % of urban respondents and 73 % of rural interviewees indicated insecurity/crime as a reason for pessimism about the direction in which the country is going.

Pessimism due to concerns with the economy was mentioned by 52 % of urban respondents compared with 38 % of those living in rural areas. At the same time, rural respondents cited lack of infrastructure and/or services twice as often as urban interviewees (8 % compared to 4 %). Foreign intervention was seen as a reason for pessimism by 8 % of rural and 3 % of urban respondents.⁴²¹

In 2015, the Taliban set as an objective to ‘capture and hold towns and provincial capitals’.⁴²² Following attempts of capturing provincial centres like Kunduz City, Lashkargah in Helmand, Pul-e Khumri in Baghlan, Farah City, Tarinkot in Uruzgan, and Maimana in Faryab in 2015, 2016 and 2017⁴²³, in August 2018 Taliban insurgents carried out a large-scale attack on Ghazni City.⁴²⁴As reported by the UN Secretary General in February 2019, ‘the Taliban succeeded in temporarily capturing 21 district administrative centres throughout the year, the second highest level since the security transition to the Afghan forces at the end of 2014.’⁴²⁵ At the end of August and beginning of September 2019, the Taliban conducted large-scale offensives against provincial capitals of Kunduz, Pul-e Khurmi, and Farah.⁴²⁶

According to the 2019 Asia Foundation survey, feeling fear of the Taliban and ISIL was expressed by 93 % and 95 % of the respondents.⁴²⁷ Almost 69 % of the respondents said that the Taliban posed a threat in their local area; rural inhabitants (almost 76 %) saw a threat in the Taliban twice often than respondents living in urban areas (around 37 %).⁴²⁸

1.5.2 Regional differences

According to the June 2020 report by the UN Secretary General, the southern region saw the highest number of incidents between February and May 2020; second highest figures were documented by UNAMA in eastern and northern regions. Overall, the incidents taken place in these three regions accounted for 59 % of all incidents.⁴²⁹ In the course of offensives against provincial capitals of the provinces of Kunduz, Pul-e Khurmi, and Farah, conducted by the Taliban in August-September 2019,

417 Giustozzi, A. and Ibrahimi, N., Thirty Years of Conflict: drivers of anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978-2011, January 2012, url, pp. 7-8

418 Asey, T., The Price of Inequality: The Dangerous Rural-Urban Divide in Afghanistan, Global Security Review, last updated 9 June 2019, url

419 Feroz, E., Let’s face the truth, rural Afghanistan has been lost, TRT World, 16 April 2019, url

420 Asey, T., The Price of Inequality: The Dangerous Rural-Urban Divide in Afghanistan, Global Security Review, last updated 9 June 2019, url

421 Asia Foundation (The), Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People, 2 December 2019, url, p. 43

422 BBC News, Why are the Taliban resurgent in Afghanistan?, 5 January 2016, url

423 Ali, O., The Taleban Assault on Kunduz city: Déjà vu, but why?, AAN, 12 October 2016, url; LWJ, Taliban threatens another provincial capital in the Afghan north, 21 October 2016, url; LWJ, Taliban Assaults Provincial Capital in southeastern Afghanistan, 22 May 2017, url

424 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General A/73/624-S/2018/1092, 7 December 2018, url, p. 6

425 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General A/73/777-S/2019/193, 28 February 2019, url, p. 6

426 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 36-37

427 Asia Foundation (The), Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People, 2 December 2019, url, pp. 18, 57

428 Asia Foundation (The), Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People, 2 December 2019, url, pp. 19, 62

429 UN General Assembly, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General [A/74/897-S/2020/549], 17 June 2020, url, p. 5

the attack on Kunduz ‘had the largest impact on civilians’, causing 99 casualties (20 killed and 79 injured), 55 of which were attributed to the Taliban and 44 to the Afghan national security forces.⁴³⁰ While the fighting was reported to decrease at the end of 2019 and the beginning of 2020 ‘in line with seasonal trends during the winter months’, the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Nangahar, and Balkh were the most active conflict areas between November 2019 and February 2020.⁴³¹ During the period between March and June 2020, ‘the highest amount of conflict activity’ was reported in the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Wardak, and Balkh.⁴³²

As reported by UNAMA, ISKP maintained its presence in some areas in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar. Following the start of a military operation in Achin district, Nangarhar province, in November 2019, ISKP fighters in the eastern region were reported to surrender. Civilian casualties resulting from ISKP attacks were documented in Kabul, Ghazni, Herat, Laghman, and Khost provinces.⁴³³ USDOS reported that ISKP resumed ‘terrorist attacks against ANDSF and Coalition Forces’

in February 2020; moreover, in spring 2020 the group conducted several large-scale attacks in Kabul.⁴³⁴ In communication with EASO in 2019, a military analyst specialising in Afghanistan-related issues noted that the Taliban and ISKP pursued different strategies. While the Taliban fighters focused their attacks mostly against security forces and/or Afghan government employees, trying to avoid ‘collateral damage’ among the civilian population, ISKP targeted also Shias and non-cooperating civilians, aiming to reach high numbers of civilian casualties, which allowed for a high number of ‘collateral damage’.⁴³⁵ As found in a research study on ISKP’s ‘Kabul cell’ published by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in June 2020, the two groups had also different recruitment systems. While the Taliban recruited

‘typically’ unemployed, madrasa-educated young Pashtuns from rural communities, ISKP had cells in urban centres and recruited men and women from middle-class families, with many university students of non-Pashtun origin, predominantly from Kabul City and the surrounding urban centres of Parwan, Kapisa, and Panjsher provinces.⁴³⁶ According to the research, ‘with the exception of a minority made up of original Kabulis and a number of Uzbeks from Jawzjan, Takhar, and Faryab provinces in the far north of the country, the membership of ISKP’s Kabul cell is composed of youth from the areas of muqawamat (anti-Taliban resistance)’, who have either settled in Kabul or visit it regularly.⁴³⁷

In 2019, the provinces of Badakhshan, Badghis, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Kunduz, Laghman, and Nangarhar were ‘the main provinces of origin and displacement for conflict-affected communities’.⁴³⁸

1.5.3 Government versus Taliban control

As stated by the AAN co-Director Kate Clark in May 2017, many assessments of territorial control in Afghanistan were made in recent years. Besides the disagreement over figures, there were also debates over the definition of the word ‘control’; moreover, assertions were made about the meaning of ‘loss of government control’, partly linked to deliberate withdrawals to areas deemed to be of more strategical importance.⁴³⁹ As noted by ANN expert Thomas Ruttig, there are different counts of the

430 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 35

431 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General A/74/753-S/2020/210, 17 March 2020, url, p. 5

432 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General [A/74/897-S/2020/549], 17 June 2020, url, p. 5

433 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 36-37

434 USDOS, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2020, url, p. 18

435 Military analyst, confidential communication, 14 January 2019, in EASO, Afghanistan – Security Situation, June 2019, url, p. 58

436 Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, Peaceworks No 62, 1 June 2020, url, pp. 2, 11. The research is based on 65 interviews with current and former ISKP members, their families, and friends, conducted in Kabul city, the surrounding provinces, and the provinces of Nangahar and Kunar in November 2019.

437 Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, Peaceworks No 62, 1 June 2020, url, p. 12

438 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview – Afghanistan, December 2019, url, p. 67

439 Clark, K., Looking at the ‚Nicholson plan‘: A bid to tilt the Afghan war in the government‘s favour, AAN, 24 May 2017, url

number of districts, ranging from 379 to 407⁴⁴⁰, which has to be considered when analysing assessments by different sources.

As reported by UN Secretary General, on 31 December 2019, the Taliban allegedly captured Darzab district in Jawzjan province after the withdrawal of the ANDSF. The Taliban also took the control over Arghandab district, Zabul province, while the ANDSF recaptured Guzargahi Nur district in Baghlan province, which was held by the Taliban since September 2019.⁴⁴¹ In June 2020, the UN Secretary General reported that neither PGFs nor AGEs ‘achieved any significant territorial gains’ between March and June 2020. In March 2020, the Taliban recaptured Yamgan district, Badakhshan province, while in April the ANDSF overtook the districts of Khamyab and Qarqin in Jowzjan province, held by the Taliban for around two years.⁴⁴² In June 2020, USDOS reported that the Afghan government maintained its control in ‘Kabul, provincial capitals, major population centres, most district centres, and most portions of major ground lines of communications (GLOCs)’, while the Taliban threatened district centres and contested ‘several positions of main GLOCs’.⁴⁴³ According to the Afghan authorities, ‘the Taliban carried out 422 attacks in 32 provinces’ during the third week of June, killing almost 300 Afghan security personnel, making the week the ‘deadliest’ in the course of the conflict.⁴⁴⁴

An assessment of the Long War Journal (LWJ) mapping Taliban control in Afghanistan in a frequently updated map and based on open-source information, considered 133 districts of Afghanistan (33 %) to be under the control of GoA or have undetermined status, 189 districts (47 %) to be contested, 75 districts (19 %) to be held by the Taliban; one district was assessed as ‘unconfirmable Taliban claim of control’.⁴⁴⁵ According to the population figures, 15 million people were living in areas controlled by GoA or having undetermined status, while 13 million Afghans found themselves in contested areas and 4.5 million in the Taliban-controlled areas.⁴⁴⁶