Afghanistan Security situation

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European Asylum Support Office

SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

Afghanistan

Security situation

Country of Origin Information Report

September 2020

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European Asylum Support Office

September 2020

Afghanistan

Security situation

Country of Origin Information Report

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More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).

PDF ISDN: 978-92-9485-651-7 doi:10.2847/251142 BZ-02-20-566-EN-N

Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated.

For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties.

Cover photo: © Al Jazeera English, Sangin, Helmand, 4 November 2012, url CC BY-SA 2.0 The IED Threat. The bomb disposal team of the Afghan Army 215 Corps neutralises an IED in Sangin, Helmand. With roadside bombs the largest threat in Afghanistan, the few teams that have been trained are being relied heavily on to keep the roads safe for troops and civilians.

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Acknowledgements

EASO would like to acknowledge the following national asylum and migration departments as the co- drafters of this report:

Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, Cedoca (Centre for Documentation and Research)

France, Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless persons (OFPRA), Information, Documentation and Research Division (DIDR)

Poland, Department of Refugee and Asylum Proceedings

The following national asylum and migration departments reviewed this report:

Germany, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)

Slovakia, Migration Office, Department of Documentation and Foreign Cooperation The following external organisation reviewed parts of this report:

ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but it does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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Disclaimer

This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019).¹ The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. To the extent possible and unless otherwise stated, all information presented, except for undisputed or obvious facts, has been cross-checked.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report.

The target users are asylum caseworkers, COI researchers, policymakers, and decision-making authorities.

The drafting process (including reviewing) for this report was finalised on 31 July 2020. Any event taking place after this period is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the Methodology section of the introduction.

1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI), 2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu.

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Glossary and abbreviations

AAN Afghanistan Analysts Network

ACC Afghan Citizen Card

AGEs Anti-Government Elements are individuals and armed groups involved in armed conflict with, or armed opposition against, the government of Afghanistan and/or international military forces. Examples of such groups include the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkari Tayyiba, Jaysh Muhammed and groups identifying themselves as Islamic State/‘Daesh’.²

ALCS Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey

ANASOC Afghan National Army Special Operations Command

ANSF/ANDSF Afghan National Security Forces/Afghan National Defense And Security Forces, an umbrella term which includes:³

ABF (Afghan Border Force);

ALP (Afghan Local Police);

ANA (Afghan National Army);

AAF (Afghan Air Force);

ANP (Afghan National Police);

ANCOF (Afghan National Civil Order Force);

ASF (Afghan Special Forces);

ANA TF (Afghan National Army Territorial Force);

NDS (National Directorate of Security)

AQ Al Qaeda

Attrition Attrition is unplanned and planned total losses, including Dropped from Rolls, Killed in Action, Separation, and Other losses [disappearance/captured, disability, death (not in action), retirement, exempted (i.e. AWOL or permanent medical), or transfer to the ANA/ANP]⁴

AWOL Absent Without Leave⁵

Civilian UNAMA refers to international law for a definition of ‘civilians’:

persons who are not members of military/paramilitary forces or members of organised armed groups with continuous combat function and are protected against direct attacks unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.⁶

2 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. 59, 61

3 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 61

4 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 42

6 UNAMA Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 62

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CTC US Combating Terrorism Center

DFR Dropped from Rolls personnel are those soldiers and police who leave the organisation prior to the end of their contract for reasons that include desertion or being absent without leave for over a month.⁷ Eid ul-Fitr ‘Festival of breaking the fast’ that marks the end of the fasting month

of Ramadan

ETIM East Turkestan Islamic Movement

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Ground engagements Ground engagements include kinetic ground operations, stand-off attacks, crossfire and armed clashes between parties to the conflict.

Ground engagements include attacks or operations in which small arms, heavy weapons and/or area weapons systems, i.e. mortars and rockets are fired.⁸

HIG Hezb-e Islami/Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

IEC Independent Election Commission

IED Improvised Explosive Device. A bomb constructed and deployed in ways other than in conventional military action. IEDs can broadly be divided into four categories:

Command-Operated IEDs – Radio or remote-controlled IEDs operated from a distance that can enable operators to detonate a pre-placed device at the precise time a target moves into the target area.

Magnetic-IEDs are IEDs attached by a magnetic or other device and are a sub-category of command-operated IEDs.

Victim-Operated IEDs – These detonate when a person or vehicle triggers the initiator or switch which could be a pressure plate (PP-IED) or pressure release mechanism, trip wire or another device, resulting in an explosion.

Other IEDs – This category includes command-wired IEDs and timed- IEDs and IEDs where the trigger/switch type for detonation could not be determined.

Suicide IEDs – Separately from data on IEDs, UNAMA documents civilian casualties resulting from complex and suicide attacks. Suicide IEDs are generally either Body-Borne IEDs (BB-IEDs) or Suicide Vehicle- Borne IEDs (SVB-IEDs). Body-Borne IEDs refer to situations where a suicide bomber wears an explosive vest or belt while Suicide Vehicle- Borne IEDs is defined as the detonation of a vehicle rigged with explosives by a driver or passenger inside the vehicle, or the detonation of a BB-IED by the driver or a passenger while inside the vehicle.⁹

IEHCA Islamic Emirate High Council of Afghanistan

8 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 63

9 UNAMA, Afghanistan, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report - Increasing Harm to Afghan Civilians from the Deliberate and Indiscriminate Use of Improvised Explosive Devices, October 2018, url, p. 10

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IMF International Military Forces

IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

IS, ISKP Islamic State, also called ISIS, ISIL or Daesh. Islamic State in Afghanistan is referred to as Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

Khost Protection Force A ‘campaign force’ that was established after 2001 under international (CIA/US special forces) control. There are long-standing allegations against the Khost Protection Force of extrajudicial killings, torture, beating and unlawful detentions.¹⁰

KIA Killed in Action¹¹

LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

LeT Lashkar-e-Tayyiba

Loya Paktia ‘Greater Paktya’, an area encompassing the provinces of Paktya, Paktika and Khost

NUG NSIA

National Unity Government

National Statistics and Information Authority (formerly Central Statistics Organisation, CSO)

ODI Overseas Development Institute

OFS Operation Freedom’s Sentinel

PGF Pro-Government Forces. Afghan National Security Forces and other forces and groups that act in military or paramilitary counter- insurgency operations and are directly or indirectly under the control of the government of Afghanistan¹²

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

Red Unit/Red Brigade In 2015, the Taliban established a ‘special forces’ unit named Red Unit or Red Brigade (‘sra qet’a’ in Pashto). They are better equipped and trained and are generally used as a ‘rapid reaction force’.¹³

RS Resolute Support; a NATO-led mission

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

TAAC Train, Advise, and Assist Command

TTP Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan USDOD United States Department of Defense

USDOS United States Department of State

Ushr An Islamic tax (normally 10 %) on certain products, for example agricultural products.

10 Clark, K., Khost Protection Force Accused of Fresh Killings: Six men shot dead in Zurmat, AAN, 21 January 2019, url

12 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of civilians in armed conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 64

13 Times (The), Helmand teeters after Taliban storm in with British tactics, 21 August 2016, url

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Introduction

This report was co-drafted by EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) sector and specialists from the COI units and asylum offices listed in the Acknowledgements section.

The report aims to provide information on the security situation in Afghanistan, which is relevant for the assessment of international protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection, and in particular for use in EASO’s country guidance development on Afghanistan. The terms of reference can be found in Annex 2.

Methodology

This report is an update of the EASO COI report Afghanistan Security Situation first published in January 2015 and updated annually.¹⁴

For the assessment of the need for international protection, the terms of reference for this report have been developed with a focus on the key elements from Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive (QD).

Based on various sources consulted by EASO¹⁵, these key elements can be broken down into topics and/or indicators. Examples include: parties to the conflict; intensity level of the violence; nature of the violence; regional spreading of the violence; targets of the violence; risk of collateral damage; use of arms and tactics; possibility to reach areas – security of transport (roads and airports); and indirect effects of the violence/conflict.

Based upon a study of all the mentioned sources, a list of elements and indicators was drafted, which served as a basis for the terms of reference (see Annex 2). In order to make a well-informed assessment of the fear of persecution or risk of serious harm, information is needed on these security- related elements and indicators on a regional, provincial or even district level in the country of origin.

EU+ countries’¹⁶ COI specialists, policy and decision experts and UNHCR gave input on the terms of reference.

The information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper-based and electronic sources. The reference period for the description of latest trends and illustrative incidents is from 1 March 2019 until 30 June 2020. Some additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 31 July 2020.

This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)¹⁷ and the EASO COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).¹⁸ In order to ensure that the drafters respected the EASO COI Report Methodology, a review was carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report.

14 EASO COI reports are available via EASO’s website: url

15 The elements, topics and indicators were identified by various sources that have a different position in the legal hierarchy and provide different levels of detail: The Qualification Directive (Recitals and articles); Case law from the Court of Justice of the EU in Luxembourg; National State Practice (National legislation; National case law; National policy and first instance decision practice); Case law from the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg; Opinions of experts, academics and specialised organisations; See the following EASO publications: EASO, Article 15(c) Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU) A judicial analysis, December 2014, url; The Implementation of Article 15(c) QD in EU Member States, July 2015, url

16 EU+ countries are the EU Member States plus the associated countries Norway and Switzerland.

17 EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url

18 EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url

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Sources

For data on civilian casualties, the two main sources used in this report are the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and NATO Resolute Support (RS) mission/ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). In addition, to illustrate examples of incidents which caused civilian casualties in some provinces, information from The New York Times’

Afghan War Casualty Report was used. The Afghan War Casualty Report is a weekly and monthly bulletin compiling ‘all significant security incidents confirmed by New York Times reporters throughout Afghanistan’. As New York Times clarifies ‘the report includes government claims of insurgent casualty figures, but in most cases these cannot be independently verified by The Times. Similarly, the reports do not include Taliban claims for their attacks on the government unless they can be verified.’¹⁹ Information from Voice of Jihad,²⁰ the Taliban’s official website, was also used in the report mainly to illustrate examples of incidents causing civilian casualties in some provinces.

UNAMA:

This report relies extensively on data and information provided by UNAMA in their reports on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Afghanistan. UNAMA uses a robust methodology to verify reported incidents by corroborating and cross-checking incidents, conducting on-site investigations, and consulting a broad range of credible and reliable sources. For verification of each incident involving a civilian casualty, UNAMA requires at least three different and independent sources. Unverified incidents are not included in its reporting.²¹ According to analysts, this stringent verification standard also means ‘there may be many more casualties than UNAMA is able to confirm.’²²

For data on violent incidents, publicly available curated datasets from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) have been used.

ACLED:

ACLED is a project collecting, analysing and mapping information on crisis and conflict in Africa, south and south-east Asia and Middle East and provides datasets on conflict incidents.²³ Its methodology applied for coding and monitoring of the data is explained in details in its Codebook.²⁴ As ACLED points out, the reader should, however, be aware of some limitations in the data. These limitations are:

‘the first is that most of the data is gathered based on publicly available, secondary reports.

This means that the data is in part a reflection of the coverage and reporting priorities of media and international organisations. One of the effects of this is that it may under-estimate the volume of events of non-strategic importance (for example, low-level communal conflict, or events in very isolated areas). We work to address this possibility by triangulating data sources to include humanitarian and international organisation reports, rather than media alone; and by conducting ground-truthing exercises in which we present data to local organisations and partners to assess its validity among people working directly in conflict-affected contexts.’²⁵ Therefore, ACLED's figures in this report are to be considered as an estimate and indication of trends in violence over a given period of time.

19 NYT, Afghan War Casualty Report, n.d., url

20 Voice of Jihad, [English], n.d., url

21 UNAMA’s full description of their methodology can be found at: UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. i-ii

22 Bjelica, J. and Ruttig, T., UNAMA Mid-Year Report 2017: Number of civilian casualties still at “record level”, 18 July 2017, url

23 ACLED, About Acled, n.d., url

24 ACLED methodology, see ACLED Codebook url

25 ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Guide for Media Users, January 2015, url, pp. 9-10

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For Afghanistan, ACLED covers political violence and protest spanning from January 2017 to the present. Each week, ACLED researches and reviews about 60 sources in English and Dari/Farsi on political violence in Afghanistan and collects the information into a database.²⁶

ACLED codes security incidents as follows:

• Battles: violent clashes between at least two armed groups. Battles can occur between armed and organised state, non-state, and external groups, and in any combination therein. Sub- events of battles are armed clashes, government regains territory and non-state actor overtakes territory. The sub-event type ‘Armed clash’ occurs when ‘armed, organized groups engage in a battle, and no reports indicate a change in territorial control’.

• Violence against civilians: ‘violent events where an organised armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants. “Violence against civilians” includes attempts at inflicting harm (e.g. beating, shooting, torture, rape, mutilation, etc.) or forcibly disappearing (e.g. kidnapping and disappearances) civilian actors. The following sub-event types are associated with the “Violence against civilians” event type: “Sexual violence”, “Attack”, and

“Abduction/forced disappearance”.’

• Explosions/remote violence: events where an explosion, bomb or other explosive device was used to engage in conflict. They include one-sided violent events in which the tool for engaging in conflict creates asymmetry by taking away the ability of the target to engage or defend themselves and their location. They include air/drone strikes, suicide bombs, shelling/artillery/missile attack, remote explosive/landmine/IED, grenade, chemical weapon.

• Riots: are a violent demonstration, often involving a spontaneous action by unorganised, unaffiliated members of society. They include violent demonstration, mob violence.

• Protests: public demonstration in which the participants do not engage in violence, though violence may be used against them. It includes peaceful protests, protest with intervention, excessive force against protesters.

• Strategic developments: information regarding the activities of violent groups that is not itself recorded as political violence, yet it may trigger future events or contribute to political dynamics within and across states. It includes agreements, change to group/activity, non- violent transfer of territory, arrests.²⁷

Data on violent incidents reported in Chapter 2 of this report is based on EASO analysis of ACLED public data extracted on 7 July 2020. For the purpose of this report, only the following types of events were included as violent incidents in the analysis of the security situation in Afghanistan: battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians. The ACLED data, and maps derived from such data, used in this report refer to the timeframe between 1 March 2019 and 30 June 2020.

On territorial control by the Taliban in Afghanistan, information collected and presented in a map by the Long War Journal (LWJ) was used in this report, alongside additional sources researched to the extent possible to corroborate the LWJ findings.

LWJ:

The LWJ is a project by the non-profit policy institute the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).²⁸ The LWJ’s Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan is based on open-source information, such as press reports and information provided by government agencies and the Taliban. The LWJ classifies the level of control as follows:

‘“Unconfirmed” district […] has some level of claim-of-control made by the Taliban, but either has not yet been—or cannot be— independently verified by LWJ research. A “Contested”

district may mean that the government may be in control of the district center, but little else, and the Taliban controls large areas or all of the areas outside of the district center. A

26 ACLED, Methodology and Coding Decisions around the Conflict in Afghanistan, (Version 3) March 2020, url

27 ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, October 2017, url, pp. 7-14

28 LWJ, About us, n.d. url

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“Controlled” district may mean the Taliban is openly administering a district, providing services and security, and also running the local courts.’²⁹

On internal displacement, the main source used is the ‘Internal Displacement due to Conflict’ data collection by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). The UNOCHA data reported in the displacement sections was extracted on the ‘accessed date’ indicated in the Bibliography.

Structure and use of the report

This report is not meant to be read as a whole. In the first part a general description is given on the security situation in Afghanistan including a geographical overview, which is then explained in greater detail in the second part, holding a regional description of geographic subdivisions (Kabul City and 34 provinces).

Provinces and districts

The provincial chapters in this report are organised alphabetically and have the following structure: a general description of the province contains information on the geography and population; the conflict background takes a longer term look at the security situation in a province, including the armed actors active in the province. A section on recent trends in the security situation describes the nature of the violence, targets, locations, and casualties within the timeframe from 1 March 2019 - 30 June 2020.

Finally, conflict-induced displacements are described in a separate section. Recent security incidents described in sub-sections should be read as illustrations of trends in the security situation and not as an exhaustive list of incidents.

Both the general and regional sections provide information from various sources on the relevant elements and indicators. Information on an indicator as such should never be taken as conclusive but as indicative for protection assessment and is to be read together with all other indicators and information on the region (or province, district).

There are a number of provinces and districts for which the administrative boundaries are unclear. For example, it is unclear whether the district of Gizab belongs to Uruzgan or Daykundi province.³⁰ Nor is it clear whether the district of Gormach belongs to Badghis or Faryab province.³¹

The Managing Director at Alcis, a company providing geographic information services with many years of experience in Afghanistan, contacted by OFPRA’s Information, Documentation and Research Division, stated in an e-mail in August 2017 that

‘there is not one unified agreed district and province boundary dataset currently in use. There are various ‘official’ versions. […] The boundaries within these different datasets have changed over time. Some districts have been passed across to other provinces for administrative purposes. Some new districts have been created over time. Some areas within Afghanistan are still referred to as districts by locals of the area, even though they have never had boundaries created for them and never been treated as a district.’³²

In absence of an official list of districts, EASO chooses in principal to follow the administrative divisions of the provinces used by UNOCHA, as they produce very clear maps and use the same division systematically in all their publications.³³

29 More information on the methodology used by LWJ can be found at: LWJ, Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan, Methodology, n.d., url

30 Norway, Landinfo, Respons. Afghanistan: Gizab-distriktet, 11 December 2014, url

31 Bjelica, J., How Neglect and Remoteness Bred Insurgency and a Poppy Boom: The story of Badghis, 22 February 2017, url

32 Brittan, R., Managing Director Alcis, e-mail to OFPRA, 16 August 2017

33 All relevant maps on Afghanistan by UNOCHA can be found at: UNOCHA, Maps/Infographics – Afghanistan, n.d., url

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Map

Map 1: Afghanistan - administrative divisions, source: UNOCHA³⁴

34 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - administrative divisions, January 2014, url

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1. General description of the security situation in Afghanistan

1.1 Background of the conflict

1.1.1 Overview of recent conflicts in Afghanistan

The so-called Saur Revolution on 27 April 1978 brought the Afghan communists to power.³⁵ In 1979, the government of the former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to support the communist Afghan government headed by Babrak Karmal. The invasion was followed by a decade of armed conflict between the Afghan government, supported by Soviet troops, and armed opposition groups, often referred to as the ‘mujahideen’. These groups were divided into several different factions, but they all participated in a nation-wide armed uprising that lasted until the government finally collapsed in 1992, following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.³⁶

After this collapse, a period generally referred to as ‘Civil War’ saw different mujahidin groups who had formed new alliances and fronts fighting for control of Afghanistan.³⁷ War between the competing mujahidin factions and militias was characterised by severe human rights breaches.³⁸ This led to the emergence in 1994 of a group called the Taliban, who brought stability in areas under their control, which won them support from segments of the population.³⁹ They gradually gained more control and conquered Kabul in 1996. By 2001, the Taliban controlled most of the Afghan territory. But by the end of the year, as a consequence of the 11 September attacks in the US, they were ousted by a US-led military operation.⁴⁰ The US gave its support to the mujahideen front opposing the Taliban, at that time known as Northern Alliance or Northern Coalition.⁴¹

On 22 December 2001, based on the Bonn Agreement, an Afghan interim government was formed, led by Hamid Karzai⁴², a Pashtun, who also won the first presidential elections in October 2004.⁴³ The Taliban had reorganised and increased their presence substantially by 2006 in Wardak, Logar, Zabul and Uruzgan provinces and began expanding along the western edge of Kabul province.⁴⁴ Other anti- government elements (AGEs) operating in Afghanistan included Hezb-e Islami/Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG), the Haqqani Network⁴⁵ and Al Qaeda affiliates, including Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).⁴⁶ This

35 Clark, K., An April Day that Changed Afghanistan 2: Afghans remember the ‘Saur Revolution’, AAN, 27 April 2018, last updated 9 March 2020, url

36 Barfield, T., A Cultural and Political History, 2010, p. 234; BBC News, Afghanistan profile – Timeline, updated on: 9 September 2019, url; Ipsos/ICRC, Our world. Views from the field. Summary report: Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia and the Philippines. Opinion Survey, June 2009, url, p. 10; Oxfam International, The Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009, November 2009, url, pp. 7-9.

37 BBC News, Afghanistan profile – Timeline, updated on: 9 September 2019, url; HRW, Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity, July 2001, url, pp. 13-17; International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 17 June 2011, url, p. 3

38 Oxfam International, The Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009, November 2009, url, p. 10

39 Giustozzi, A. and Ibrahimi, N., Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978- 2011, January 2012, url, p. 22.

40 CFR, The Taliban in Afghanistan, 4 July 2014, url

41 International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 17 June 2011, url, p. 5

42 Oxfam International, The Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009, November 2009, url, p. 13; UNAMA, Eighth Anniversary Today of 2001 Afghan Interim Authority, 22 December 2009, url

43 Guardian (The), The Afghan interim government: who's who, 6 December 2001, url; NYT, Election of Karzai Is Declared Official, 4 November 2004, url

44 International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 17 June 2011, url, p. 7

45 International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 17 June 2011, url, pp. 14-15

46 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 18 June 2014, url, p. 6.

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insurgency was characterised by mainly asymmetric warfare: AGEs used roadside and suicide bombs and complex⁴⁷ attacks, intimidation of civilians and targeted killings to destabilise the country. This was countered by searches, clearance operations and bombings by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and international military forces.⁴⁸ According to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the security situation deteriorated after 2005. The conflict deepened throughout 2007 and 2008, directly affecting around a third of the country.⁴⁹

From 2010 onwards, the Taliban-led insurgency spread into all regions of Afghanistan.⁵⁰ By the end of 2014, a transition of security responsibility from international troops to the ANSF was completed. The support for the further development of the ANSF continued ‘under a new, smaller non-combat NATO- led mission (“Resolute Support”)’.⁵¹ After the 2014 international military withdrawal, the Taliban have rapidly expanded their presence countrywide.⁵² A 2017 report by UN Secretary General noted that the Taliban had been able to control larger parts of the country and the emergence of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant - Khorasan Province (ISKP) added ‘a new, dangerous dimension’ to the situation.⁵³ In 2018, fighting intensified particularly in the east, south-east and in some areas within the south. The Taliban ‘made territorial gains in sparsely populated areas, and advanced their positions in areas that had not seen fighting in years’.⁵⁴ Human Rights Watch noted that although the Taliban claimed to target government and foreign military facilities only, their indiscriminate use of force killed and injured hundreds of civilians.⁵⁵

On 29 February 2020, after more than 18 years of conflict, the US and the Taliban signed an ‘agreement for bringing peace’ to Afghanistan (for more details on the so-called Doha agreement see 1.1.3 Peace Talks).⁵⁶ During the ‘reduction in violence’ (RiV) week, from 22 to 28 February 2020, a drop in security incidents was recorded between the pro-government forces and the Taliban.⁵⁷ However, after the RiV ended with the signature of the Doha agreement, the Taliban stated that ‘the war would continue’ not against foreign troops, but against the Afghan government.⁵⁸ The Taliban’s Military Commission reportedly sought assurances from the main Taliban leadership that fighting will continue regardless of the agreement.⁵⁹ Violence resumed immediately after the RiV ended.⁶⁰

1.1.2 Political landscape

The disputed 2014 presidential election resulted in a political compromise which led to the establishment of the National Unity Government (NUG), under the presidency of Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah. Divisions within the government, particularly between Ghani and Abdullah and their camps, severely compromised the NUG’s effectiveness.⁶¹ According to AAN, in January 2017, ‘its complex power-sharing arrangements [have] paralysed governance in

47 See Glossary

48 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of civilians in armed conflict Midyear Report 2014, July 2014, url, pp. 5, 9, 21

49 UNAMA, Afghanistan, Annual Report On Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2008, url, p. 1

50 UN, Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Afghanistan, 15 May 2015, url, p. 2

51 NATO, Inteqal: Transition to Afghan lead, updated on: 7 January 2015, url

52 International Crisis Group, Afghanistan: Growing Challenges, 30 April 2017, url

53 UN, Special report on the strategic review of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 10 August 2017, url, p. 3

54 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 8

55 HRW, World Report 2019 - Afghanistan, 17 January 2019, url

56 BBC News, Afghan conflict: US and Taliban sign deal to end 18-year war, 29 February 2020, url

57 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, First Quarter Report: 1 January- 31 March 2020, June 2020, p. 3; AAN, Voices from the Districts, the Violence Mapped (1): What has happened since the reduction in violence ended? 21 March 2020, url

58 AAN, Voices from the Districts, the Violence Mapped (1): What has happened since the reduction in violence ended? 21 March 2020, url

59 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501 (2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 4

60 Ruttig, T., From Doha to Peace? Obstacles rising in the way of intra-Afghan talks, 3 March 2020, url

61 Foreign Policy, NUG One Year On: Struggling to Govern, 29 September 2015, url

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Afghanistan.’⁶² A series of violent events in Kabul in May-June 2017 caused a political crisis, resulting in a ‘significant shift in the political climate’ marked by a rift between President Ghani and key members of the Jamiaat-e Islami party.⁶³ The crisis also resulted in the consolidation of power within the NUG⁶⁴ and in the first eight months of 2017, the government made progress on high-level appointments, which had previously been a source of tension.⁶⁵

The Independent Election Commission (IEC) set a date for the next parliamentary and district council elections in July 2018.⁶⁶ However, as a result of security challenges and voter registration reforms the long-delayed parliamentary elections were rescheduled again to October 2018.⁶⁷ Parliamentary elections were held in 32 provinces on 20-21 October 2018.⁶⁸ Voting in Kandahar was delayed by a week after the assassination of the provincial police chief in a Taliban-claimed attack two days before the original date of the elections.⁶⁹ Voting in Ghazni was postponed indefinitely due to security issues and disagreements around constituencies.⁷⁰

Although voter turnout in Kabul and other urban centres was reportedly high, technical and organisational problems occurred at some of the roughly 4 900 polling stations across the country. In some polling stations machines registering fingerprints and portrait photos aiming to prevent double voting did not function properly while in others election staff had difficulties handling them.⁷¹ In December 2018, the IEC announced a three-month delay for the presidential election which was originally scheduled for 20 April 2019.⁷² In March 2019, the elections were postponed again, due to

‘problems with the voting process’.⁷³ Presidential candidates included incumbent Ashraf Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, former national security adviser, Muhammad Hanif Atmar and also Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.⁷⁴ Interior Minister Amrullah Saleh, once a strong critic of the President stepped down from his position to join Ghani's team as a candidate for the post of vice-president.⁷⁵ Appointing Saleh was an effort from the ethnic Pashtun Ghani to neutralise a political opponent and to get the support of the Tajiks, among whom Saleh has a strong backing.⁷⁶

On 28 September 2019, the presidential elections were finally held, with the lowest election turnout recorded since the Taliban were ousted in 2001. In the immediate aftermath of the elections, both frontrunners, incumbent Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, declared victory⁷⁷, which resulted in the following five months of political impasse.⁷⁸ After almost three months since the elections, and with delays due to allegations of fraud, irregularities, attacks and technical problems with biometric devices used for voting⁷⁹, on 22 December 2019, the IEC announced the preliminary results showing 50.64 % of the votes (923 868) in favour of Ghani and 39.52 % of the votes (720 990)

62 AAN, What to Watch? Key issues to follow in Afghanistan in 2017, 27 January 2017, last updated 9 March 2020, url

63 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 15 September 2017, url, p. 2

65 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 15 June 2017, url, p. 2; UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 15 September 2017, url, p. 2

67 Al Jazeera, Afghanistan's elections: All you need to know, 19 October 2018, url

68 Tolo News, Ghazni Elections Could Be Held With Presidential Elections, 27 October 2018, url

69 CNN, Kandahar goes to the polls in Afghan parliamentary vote delayed by violence, 27 October 2018, url

70 Tolo News, Ghazni Elections Could Be Held With Presidential Elections, 27 October 2018, url

71 Diplomat (The), Afghan Parliamentary Elections Marred by Technical Troubles and Insecurity, 21 October 2018, url

72 France24, Afghan presidential election delayed until July 20, 30 December 2018, url

73 Reuters, Afghanistan presidential election postponed to September, 20 March 2019, url

74 Adili, A.Y., Afghanistan’s 2019 elections (2): Who is running to become the next president?, AAN, 11 February 2019, url

75 NYT, Afghan Presidential Race Takes Shape as Ghani’s Challengers Emerge, 18 January 2019, url

76 Reuters, Afghanistan's Ghani launches bid for second presidential term, 20 January 2019, url

77 BBC, Afghanistan presidential election: Rivals declare victory after record low turnout, 30 September 2019, url

78 Adili A. Y., End of post-election impasse? Ghani and Abdullah’s new power-sharing formula, AAN 20 May 2020, url

79 Reuters, Afghan election runoff likely amid thousands of complaints: officials, 23 December 2019, url

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in favour of Abdullah Abdullah.⁸⁰ This latter rejected the preliminary results, stating they were based on fraud.⁸¹ The election turnover was estimated to be over 1.8 million⁸², with 31.5 % being composed of women.⁸³

After three days since the announcement of the preliminary results, IEC said to have registered around 16 500 complaints.⁸⁴ The final results were announced in February 2020, confirming almost exactly the preliminary outcome.⁸⁵ Incumbent Muhammad Ashraf Ghani was declared the winner, with 50.64 % of votes. His rival Abdullah Abdullah, who was second with 39.52 % of votes⁸⁶, rejected the results, declaring himself the winner⁸⁷; he announced his intention to form an alternative, ‘inclusive’

government, and in the following weeks started appointing some provincial governors.⁸⁸ On 9 March 2020, both Ghani and Abdullah held separate inauguration ceremonies taking the oath of office as the president of Afghanistan.⁸⁹

After months of tension, on 17 May 2020, President Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, finally signed a power-sharing agreement.⁹⁰ Under agreement, Abdullah is to lead the peace negotiations, becoming the leader of the High Council of National Reconciliation with executive authorities; in addition he has the right to appoint 50 % of the cabinet⁹¹, including for some key ministries, while provincial governors will be appointed based on ‘a rule agreed upon by the two sides’. However, as of 13 June 2020, AAN’s researcher Ali Yawar Adili and co-Director Thomas Ruttig observed that it was not clear yet whether such a rule had been put in place, noting that a cabinet had yet to be fully formed.⁹²

1.1.3 Peace talks

After the collapse of the Doha peace talks in June 2013, talks did not resume before the new president, Ashraf Ghani, was inaugurated in September 2014.⁹³ In January 2015, the Taliban stated that its preconditions for entering peace talks were the end of foreign military presence, the establishment of an Islamic government and the implementation of sharia.⁹⁴ After the death of Mullah Omar was revealed in July 2015, a power struggle broke out within the Taliban which, at least in part, prevented further progress in the peace talks.⁹⁵

In January 2016, the US, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China formed a Quadrilateral Coordination Group to take forward the peace talks. However, the Taliban refused to engage with this process.⁹⁶ In

80 BBC, Afghanistan presidential election: Ghani set for second term after initial results, 22 Decemer 2019, url; TKG, The preliminary results of the Afghanistan presidential elections announced, 22 December 2019, url

81 Reuters, Afghanistan's Ghani claims narrow win in preliminary presidential vote results, 22 December 2019, url

82 Reuters, Afghan election runoff likely amid thousands of complaints: officials, 23 December 2019, url

83 UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security A/74/753–

S/2020/210, 17 March 2020, url, p. 2

84 Adili A. Y., Afghanistan’s 2019 Election (28): ECC starts final, decisive phase of complaints procedure, AAN, 20 January 2020, url

85 Ruttig T., Afghanistan’s 2019 Elections (30): Final results… and parallel governments?, AAN, 19 February 2020, url

86 IEC, Afghanistan 2019, Presidential election, n.d., url

87 Ruttig T., Afghanistan’s 2019 Elections (30): Final results… and parallel governments?, AAN, 19 February 2020, url;

Reuters, Ghani named winner of disputed Afghan poll, rival also claims victory, 18 February 2020, url

88 UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security A/74/753–S/2020/210, 17 March 2020, url p. 3; Tolonews, Abdullah-Loyal governor installed in Sar-e Pul, 22 February 2020, url

89 NYT, Ghani Takes the Oath of Afghan President. His Rival Does, Too, 9 March 2020, url

90 A Adili A. Y., End of post-election impasse? Ghani and Abdullah’s new power-sharing formula, AAN 20 May 2020, url

91 A Adili A. Y., End of post-election impasse? Ghani and Abdullah’s new power-sharing formula, AAN 20 May 2020, url;

Tolonews, Ghani and Abdullah Sign Agreement to Break Political Deadloc, 17 May 2020, url

92 Adili A. Y., Ruttig T., Between Professionalism and Accommodation: The slow progress on the new cabinet, AAN, 13 June 2020, url

93 Farrell, T. and Semple, M., Ready for Peace? The Afghan Taliban after a decade of War, January 2017, url, p. 3

94 UN Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 27 February 2015, url, p. 3

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September 2016, the government signed a peace deal with Hezb-e Islami/Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG).

Describing HIG as a ‘fading insurgent group’, Borhan Osman explained in 2016 the likely effect of this deal on the battlefield as ‘unlikely to significantly lower the current levels of violence’.⁹⁷ In 2017, President Ghani offered the Taliban a ’last chance’ for reconciliation at the ‘Kabul-process’, ‘an international conference aiming to set the stage for peace talks and restore security in Afghanistan’.⁹⁸ However, according to a September 2017 report of the UN Secretary General ‘no discernible progress has been made in fostering negotiations between the Government and the Taliban.’⁹⁹

In February 2018 the Afghan government presented very ‘concrete proposals for peace talks with the Taliban’ which, according to AAN, was ‘the most complete peace offer that has been publicly announced since 2001’. Although President Ghani’s peace plan was offered ‘without any preconditions’, it was made clear that issues as women’s rights or the basic values of the constitution were not up for negotiation. While the proposal included the prospect of establishing a Taliban office in Kabul, the possibility of a ceasefire and also lifting the sanctions on those Taliban leaders who would join the negotiation, the Taliban accused Ghani of ‘missing the point’ namely their key demand on the withdrawal of foreign troops.¹⁰⁰ In June 2018, ‘President Ghani called a unilateral halt to all offensive government actions’ over the Muslim holiday of Eid ul-Fitr which the Taliban also joined.¹⁰¹ However, the Taliban rejected the President’s idea of extending the ceasefire and continued to refuse official negotiations with the Afghan government.¹⁰²

International diplomatic efforts intensified towards peace with the appointment of Zalmay Khalilzad as the US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation in September 2018¹⁰³ and with Russia hosting a meeting in November 2018 on the peace process that was attended by 11 countries and the Taliban as well.¹⁰⁴ Both tracks of negotiations continued in 2019. The Moscow meeting in the beginning of February 2019 brought together the Taliban delegation led by chief negotiator, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai and senior Afghan politicians led by former President Hamid Karzai. The talks were scheduled just a week after the US and the Taliban finished six days of negotiations in Qatar.¹⁰⁵ According to Thomas Ruttig, co-Director of AAN, while in Doha progress was being made in the form of an agreed draft framework, the negotiations so far did not involve the Afghan government, one of the main three parties to the conflict, since their inclusion is blocked by the Taliban.¹⁰⁶ The next round of talks, the highest level negotiations yet, began on 25 February 2019 between the insurgent group and the US involving Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s deputy leader.¹⁰⁷

A consultative Loya Jirga – a gathering of Afghan politicians and tribal, ethnic and religious leaders - was initially planned in Kabul in March 2019 with the goal of creating a framework for the Afghan government to engage in peace negotiations with the Taliban. The Loya Jirga was eventually postponed.¹⁰⁸ In September 2019, US President Donald Trump declared the US-Taliban negotiations

97 Osman, B., Peace With Hekmatyar: What does it mean for battlefield and politics?, AAN, 29 September 2016, url

98 DW, Ashraf Ghani offers Taliban 'last chance' for peace, 6 June 2017, url

100 Ruttig, T. and Bjelica, J., Who shall cease the fire first? Afghanistan’s peace offer to the Taleban, AAN, 1 March 2018, last updated 9 March 2020, url

101 Clark, K., The Eid Ceasefire: Allowing Afghans to imagine their country at peace, AAN, 19 June 2018, last updated 9 March 2020, url

102 Ruttig, T., Getting to the Steering Wheel: President Ghani’s new set of peace proposals, AAN, 4 December 2018, url

103 USDOS, Zalmay Khalilzad - Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, n.d., url

104 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 9

105 NYT, In Moscow, Afghan Peace Talks Without the Afghan Government, 4 February 2019, url

106 Ruttig, T., “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”: First steps in Afghan peace negotiations, AAN, 4 February 2019, url

107 NYT, U.S. and Taliban Begin Highest-Level Talks Yet on Ending Afghan War, 25 February 2019, url

108 RFE/RL, Afghan Loya Jirga Aimed At Discussing Peace Talks Delayed, 3 March 2019, url

Afghanistan Security situation

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Afghanistan

Security situation

Country of Origin Information Report

September 2020

European Asylum Support Office

September 2020

Afghanistan

Security situation

Country of Origin Information Report

Acknowledgements

Contents

Disclaimer

Glossary and abbreviations

Introduction

Methodology

Sources

Structure and use of the report

Map

1. General description of the security situation in Afghanistan

1.1 Background of the conflict

1.1.1 Overview of recent conflicts in Afghanistan

1.1.2 Political landscape

1.1.3 Peace talks