Conflict background and actors in Kabul City

Although the Afghan capital is under government control⁵⁰³, Kabul remains a target for AGEs who continue to carry out attacks in the city.⁵⁰⁴ According to AAN analyst Thomas Ruttig, suicide and complex attacks in urban centres like Kabul ‘do not directly change the balance of power on the

489 Foschini, F., Kabul and the Challenge of Dwindling Foreign Aid, USIP, April 2017, url, p. 6; Foschini, F., Kabul Unpacked - A Geographical Guide to a Metropolis in the Making, AAN, 19 March 2019, url, pp. 5-27

490 Hamid Karzai International Airport [website], n.d., url

491 Pajhwok Afghan News, Elections 2019: Kabul Province Background Profile, n.d., url; Foschini, F., Kabul and the Challenge of Dwindling Foreign Aid, USIP, 10 April 2017, url, p. 6; Foschini, F., Kabul Unpacked - A Geographical Guide to a Metropolis in the Making, AAN, 19 March 2019, url, pp. 5-27

492 Foschini, F., Kabul Unpacked - A Geographical Guide to a Metropolis in the Making, AAN, 19 March 2019, url, p. 3

493 Foschini, F., Kabul and the Challenge of Dwindling Foreign Aid, USIP, 10 April 2017, url, pp. 6, 58

494 APPRO, Migration and Urban Development in Kabul: Classification or Accommodation?, October 2012, url, p. 8; IGC, Urbanisation in Fragile Societies: Thinking about Kabul, 4 December 2019, url

495 Foschini, F., Kabul and the Challenge of Dwindling Foreign Aid, USIP, April 2017, url, p. 7; Foschini, F., Kabul Unpacked - A Geographical Guide to a Metropolis in the Making, AAN, 19 March 2019, url, p. 3

496 Foschini, F., Kabul and the Challenge of Dwindling Foreign Aid, USIP, 10 April 2017, url, p. 5; Osman, B., A Black Week in Kabul (2): Who Are the Most Likely Perpetrators?, AAN, 7 June 2017, url

497 RFE/RL, New Security Plan In Kabul After Deadly Attacks, 7 February 2018, url

498 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - June 2018, 3 July 2018, url, pp. 1, 15, 43, 46-47

499 EFE, Kabul Implements New Security Plan Following Repeated Assaults on City, 18 February 2018, url; Safer Edge, Safer Edge Insights: New Security Measures in Kabul, 20 February 2018, url; USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - December 2018, 20 December 2018, url, p. 36

500 Frontier Post (The), Kabul’s New Security Plan Irks Residents, 23 February 2018, url; Tolonews, WAK Residents Bear The Brunt Of Tightened Security, 5 March 2018, url

501 South China Monitoring Post, Life Inside Kabul’s Fortified Green Zone for Foreigners, 19 March 2019, url; NYT, After Bombing, Afghans Demand That Foreigners Leave Their Neighbourhood, 4 September 2019, url

502 Tolonews, [Twitter], posted on: 30 June 2020, url

503 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - June 2020, 1 July 2020, url, pp. 2, 18

504 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 16; Ruttig, T., First Breakthrough Toward Peace? A Look at the Seven Day ‘Reduction of Violence’, AAN, 17 February 2020, url; UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict - Annual Report 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 36-37, 84-85, 94

battlefield, but do have propaganda impacts’.⁵⁰⁵ USDOD describes the objectives of militant groups conducting suicide attacks in Kabul as attracting international media attention, creating the perception of widespread insecurity and undermining the Afghan government’s legitimacy as well as the population’s confidence in the Afghan security forces.⁵⁰⁶

Several sources have reported on an infiltration of the Taliban in Kabul City, with information/intelligence networks supporting the movement.⁵⁰⁷ According to USDOD, the Taliban have continued to prioritise attacks in Kabul in 2019, although their ground movements in the capital have been reduced.⁵⁰⁸ The Taliban strategy in the third quarter of 2019 was described as a mixture of

‘fight and talk’, combining several high-profile attacks in Kabul City with continuous peace negotiations for a US troop withdrawal.⁵⁰⁹ According to analysts interviewed by Landinfo in October 2019, the Taliban’s capacity has not diminished and their rhetoric has not changed, indicating that the insurgence group could turn back to large suicide attacks in Kabul to show its strength.⁵¹⁰

According to 2019 United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) figures cited by UNAMA, ISKP security-related incidents have decreased in Kabul.⁵¹¹ Continued ANDSF pressure and several raids on ISKP hideouts in the capital region have reportedly disrupted the militant group’s activities and ability to conduct high-profile attacks in Kabul.⁵¹² However, at the same time, ISKP is reported to remain active and threatening, maintaining an operational capacity in the capital.⁵¹³ In June 2020, USDOD suggested the militants might be moving to smaller groups in urban areas, which are harder to locate and identify.⁵¹⁴ After a six-month period of no ISKP-claimed assaults in Kabul at the end of 2019 and in the first months of 2020, several attacks have been attributed to the group again since March 2020 (see below).⁵¹⁵ According to researcher Amira Jadoon, ISKP’s interest in Kabul can be related to various factors: the capital being the most densely populated region in the country, providing opportunities to strike both state and civilian targets and located close to ISKP’s strongholds in the east.⁵¹⁶

ISKP is reported to have maintained an active cell in Kabul.⁵¹⁷ According to analyst Borhan Osman, ISKP’s Kabul cell is an ‘almost entirely Afghan phenomenon’, recruiting urban youth from diverse

socio-505 Ruttig, T., Five Questions to Make Sense of the New Peak in Urban Attacks and a Violent Week in Kabul, AAN, 5 February 2018, url

506 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 16

507 Giustozzi, A., Afghanistan: Taliban’s Intelligence and the Intimidation Campaign, Landinfo, 23 August 2017, url, p. 10;

Finland, FIS/Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Fact-Finding Mission to Kabul in April 2019 - Situation of Returnees in Kabul, 15 October 2019, url, pp. 21-22; Sweden, Lifos/Migrationsverket, Säkerhetsläget i Afghanistan (Version 2.0), 7 April 2020, url, p. 54

508 USDOD, Lead Inspector General (IC) for Overseas Contingency Operations, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel - Report to the United States Congress 1 April - 30 June 2019, 20 August 2019, url, p. 14

509 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, pp. 15, 25

510 Norway, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Sikkerhetssituasjon og konfliktmonster i 2019, 22 January 2020, url, p. 24

511 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict - Annual Report 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 110

512 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, pp. 25-26; UNSC, Tenth Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat Posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to International Peace and Security and the Range of UN Efforts in Support of Member States in Countering the Threat, 4 February 2020, url, pp. 6-7; USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - June 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 9

513 UNSG, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,A/73/990–S/2019/703, 3 September 2019, url, p. 6; UNSC, Tenth Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat Posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to

International Peace and Security and the Range of UN Efforts in Support of Member States in Countering the Threat, 4 February 2020, url, p. 7; Withington, S. & Ehsani, H., Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan: Phoney Caliphate or Bonafide Province, AISS, 5 March 2020, url, p. 83; VoA, Pushed to the Brink Again, Islamic State’s Afghan Affiliate Claims Deadly Attacks, 12 May 2020, url

514 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - June 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 28

515 UNSG, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security, A/74/897–S/2020/549, 17 June 2020, url, p. 6

516 Jadoon, M., Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan’s Network and Organisational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Combating Terrorism Center, 3 December 2018, url, p. 14

517 UNSC, Eight Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat Posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to International Peace and Security and the Range of UN Efforts in Support of Member States in Countering the Threat, 1 February 2019, url, p. 7; USDOD, Lead

economic backgrounds (often from middle class-families) in the capital and in the surrounding provinces of Parwan, Panjsher and Kapisa. In contrast to the usually reported pattern of Pashtun recruitment into Afghanistan’s militant extremist groups, a majority of Kabul’s ISKP cell’s members and supporters reportedly come from predominantly Tajik areas.⁵¹⁸ Osman points at the scarcity of reliable information about the Kabul cell’s operational methods. Instructions to organise and carry out attacks in the capital have reportedly often been relayed directly to small ISKP leadership circles in Nangarhar province. According to senior Afghan security officials, all the ISKP-claimed attacks in the capital depended on the same supply and logistics chain from a single network, also used for attacks by the Taliban (including the Haqqani Network), likely having the support of corrupt government security figures. According to Osman, the Taliban’s limiting of attacks in urban areas in the months following the Doha Agreement with the US on 29 February 2020 seems to have encouraged ISKP’s Kabul cell to seize the opportunity to gain greater visibility and to cast itself as an alternative force to the Taliban.⁵¹⁹ ISKP reportedly applies an effective recruitment strategy (often online, through social media)⁵²⁰ in the capital, conducting outreach activities in religious and academic institutions, including Kabul University.⁵²¹ University professors recruiting for ISKP and first-grade students joining their ranks reportedly give the militant’s group’s cell in the capital an elite character. Mid-career professionals, business owners and well-educated urbanites are mostly recruited for logistical, financial or communication roles, often leading a double life.⁵²² According to analyst Osman, the growing appeal of ISKP’s Salafi-Jihadist ideology among urban Afghan youth may explain the militant group’s resilience.

The search for ideological ‘purity’, commitment to rigidly practicing Islamic Law, support for an anti-Shia sectarian agenda, strong in-group solidarity and egalitarian behaviour, enthusiasm for a global jihad and the ‘fantasy of living under the caliphate’ are suggested as pull-factors attracting Kabul’s youth to ISKP. A growing dissatisfaction with the current elite and the status quo of the Afghan political system is indicated as a push factor driving urban youth to search for a radical alternative.⁵²³

In March 2019, the Haqqani Network was described as ‘maintaining a significant terror network in Kabul’.⁵²⁴ In recent years, the network is believed to be responsible for several complex attacks on government and international targets in heavily populated areas of the city.⁵²⁵ In June 2020, the UN Security Council reported on a ‘tactical accommodation’ between the Haqqani Network and ISKP in Kabul, referring to a certain degree of ‘involvement, facilitation or technical assistance’ of the Haqqanis in ISKP-claimed attacks in the capital.⁵²⁶

Attacks in Kabul City often remain unclaimed or are conducted by unidentified armed groups.⁵²⁷ Analysts highlight the challenge in assessing the credibility of claims or denials of involvement in certain attacks -referring to indications that diverse pro-ISKP groups claim attacks that have not been

Inspector General (IC) for Overseas Contingency Operations, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel - Report to the United States Congress 1 October - 31 December 2019, 19 February 2020, url, p. 13

518 Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, June 2020, url, pp. 3-4, 11-14

519 Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, June 2020, url, pp. 9-10

520 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 26

521 VoA, Afghan University Teacher, Students Among IS Operatives Arrested in Kabul, 8 July 2019, url

522 Washington Post (The), Afghanistan Claims the Islamic State Was ‘Obliterated’. But Fighters Who Got Away Could Stage a Resurgence, 9 February 2020, url; Withington, S. & Ehsani, H., Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan: Phoney Caliphate or Bonafide Province, AISS, 5 March 2020, url, p. 86; Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, June 2020, url, pp. 11-14

523 Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, June 2020, url, pp. 4, 15-20

524 LWJ, UN: Al Qaeda Continues to View Afghanistan as a ‘Safe Haven’, 5 March 2019, url

525 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict - Annual Report 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 85

526 UNSC, Eleventh Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2501 (2019) Concerning the Taliban and Other Associated Individuals and Entities Constituting a Threat to the Peace, Stability and Security of Afghanistan, 27 May 2020, url, pp. 18-19

527 UNSG, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,A/73/777–S/2019/193, 28 February 2019, url, pp. 6-7; UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Midyear Report 2020: 1 January - 30 June 2020, 27 July 2020, url, pp. 10-11

carried out by them and the Taliban often denying their involvement in attacks causing high numbers of civilian casualties.⁵²⁸

In terms of the presence of government security forces, the responsibility for Kabul’s enhanced security zone has been transferred to the Kabul Security Force (KSF). ANP forces maintain responsibility for security within the city, with the special Crisis Response Unit (CRU 222)⁵²⁹ addressing (high-profile) attacks. The independent ANA division for the capital (111)⁵³⁰ secures the perimeter of the city. The capital NDS corps ensures that intelligence sharing remains focused on the prevention of high-profile attacks.⁵³¹

According to AAN analyst Foschini, security concerns in Kabul are not limited to AGE attacks alone, but include a significant rise in criminality. Foschini relates Kabul’s surging crime scene to growing unemployment, combined with the increasing influence of heavily armed and politically connected criminal networks⁵³², as well as the impact of changing patterns in the social behaviour of Kabul’s youth. Foschini differentiates between targeted killings disguised as criminally-motivated attacks and common criminality in the city⁵³³: home raids and personally-driven murders⁵³⁴ in central city areas that used to be considered relatively safe⁵³⁵, organised petty theft on public transport, armed robberies⁵³⁶ and violent car-jackings, an increase in narco-trafficking and drug-related crimes⁵³⁷ in several city areas and kidnappings⁵³⁸ and extortion⁵³⁹ by organised criminal gangs.⁵⁴⁰ According to UNHCR, kidnapping is a major concern for many Kabul citizens.⁵⁴¹ Foreigners and wealthy Afghans are indicated as the main targets.⁵⁴² Several sources report on an ineffective police response to Kabul’s rapidly expanding crime scene.⁵⁴³ According to Foschini, there is ‘a modus vivendi between police and criminals’ in many city neighbourhoods, with powerful and deeply-rooted (political) interests often resulting in impunity.⁵⁴⁴ Mid-July 2020, the ‘Security Charter - Mobilizing the People in the Fight against Crime’ program was launched by the Afghan government, intensifying operations against criminal gangs and armed robbers in the capital region.⁵⁴⁵

528 Osman, B., A Black Week in Kabul (2): Who Are the Most Likely Perpetrators?, AAN, 7 June 2017, url; Ruttig, T., Five Questions to Make Sense of the New Peak in Urban Attacks and a Violent Week in Kabul, AAN, 5 February 2018, url;

Norway, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Sikkerhetssituasjon og konfliktmonster i 2019, 22 January 2020, url, p. 23

529 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2019, url, p. 99; USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - June 2020, 1 July 2020, url, pp. 90-91

530 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan - June 2020, 1 July 2020, url, pp. 13, 58

531 USDOD, Lead Inspector General (IC) for Overseas Contingency Operations, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel - Report to the United States Congress 1 October - 31 December 2019, 19 February 2020, url, p. 11

532 Tolonews, Criminal Networks Have Political Support: Andarabi, 12 June 2020, url

533 Foschini, F., Kabul’s Expanding Crime Scene (Part 1): The Roots of Today’s Underworld, AAN, 11 February 2020, url

534 Tolonews, 4 Members of One Family Killed in Kabul, 19 January 2020, url

535 Tolonews, Crimes in Kabul's 'Most Secure Areas' Alarm Residents, 24 May 2020, url

536 Tolonews, University Professor Wounded as Armed Robbery Increases in Kabul, 8 January 2020, url; Khaama Press, KP Reporter Traumatized after Being Robbed at Gunpoint close to Kabul Police Station, 24 March 2020, url

537 Tolonews, Interior Ministry Pledges Crackdown on Drug Dealers, 7 February 2020, url

538 Pajhwok Afghan News, 6-Member Gang of Kidnappers Busted in Kabul: NDS, 26 December 2019, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Girl Rescued, 2 Suspected Abductors Held in Kabul, 14 June 2020, url

539 Tolonews, Concerns Rise on ‘Increasing’ Threats to Business Community, 23 April 2019, url

540 Foschini, F., Kabul Unpacked - A Geographical Guide to a Metropolis in the Making, AAN, 19 March 2019, url, pp. 1, 5-13, 15-16, 19-20, 22, 26; Foschini, F., Kabul’s Expanding Crime Scene (Part 2): Criminal Activities and the Police Response, AAN, 21 February 2020, url

541 Finland, FIS/Migrationsverket, Afghanistan: Fact-Finding Mission to Kabul in April 2019 - Situation of Returnees in Kabul, 15 October 2019, url, p. 6

542 Norway, Landinfo, Afghanistan: Sikkerhetssituasjon og konfliktmonster i 2019, 22 January 2020, url, p. 26

543 NYT, They Fight Suicide Bombers. But Can Afghan Police Fight Crime?, 8 February 2020, url; Foschini, F., Kabul’s Expanding Crime Scene (Part 2): Criminal Activities and the Police Response, AAN, 21 February 2020, url

544 Foschini, F., Kabul’s Expanding Crime Scene (Part 2): Criminal Activities & the Police Response, AAN, 21 February 2020, url

545 Tolonews, Police Target Paghman Gang Accused of Robbing Kabul Residents, 17 July 2020, url