Actors in the conflict

This section provides information on the main armed actors in Iraq and KRI and their territorial presence and capacity. Please see Section 1.3. of the EASO-COI Report – Iraq: Security Situation (2019) and Section 1.2 of the EASO-COI Report – Iraq Security Situation (2020) for an overview of these. Where new information has been found about their presence and

capacities, it has been added below.

Detailed information on state actors of protection and their capacity to protect, including integrity issues such as alleged abuses, is available in the EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection (2018).

Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) Presence and capacities

Raed Al-Hamid¹⁵⁶ indicated that the UN estimated the number of ISIL fighters in Iraq and Syria at 10 000 in August 2020, an estimation that matches that of the KRG in late 2019 which estimated the number of fighters at 4 000 – 5 000 and the rest to be supporters and sleeper cells.¹⁵⁷ Iraqi intelligence sources estimate the number of ISIL fighters at a range of 2 000 – 3 000.¹⁵⁸

ISIL cells were reportedly present in the desert and remote areas of Iraq and carried out hit-and-run operations according to UN reporting from July 2021.¹⁵⁹ Based on statements by Iraqi security officials, the group ‘relies on remote bases deep in the desert in Anbar, Ninewa, mountain ranges, valleys, and orchards in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Diyala to house

151 New Arab (The), The fate of Kurdish parties after Iraq’s election, 22 October 2021, url

152 Amwaj.media, Iraqi Kurdistan at crossroads as elections reshape political balance, 5 November 2021, url

153 New Arab (The), The fate of Kurdish parties after Iraq’s election, 22 October 2021, url

154 Amwaj.media, Iraqi Kurdistan at crossroads as elections reshape political balance, 5 November 2021, url

155 New Arab (The), The fate of Kurdish parties after Iraq’s election, 22 October 2021, url

156 ‘Raed El-Hamed is an Iraqi journalist and member of the Iraqi Journalists Union’. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Raed El-Hamed, n. d., url

157 Al-Hamid, R., ISIS in Iraq: Weakened but Agile, Newlines Institute, 18 May 2021, url

158Al-Hamid, R., ISIS in Iraq: Weakened but Agile, Newlines Institute, 18 May 2021, url; European Center for Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, رطاخملا مجحو بابسلأا.. قارعلا ي ف شعاد ةدوع.. باهرلإا ةحفاكم [Counter Terrorism.. The return of Daesh in Iraq.. Reasons and Threats], 22 January 2021, url

159 UN Security Council, Letter dated 15 July 2021 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2021/655, 21 July 2021, url, para. 37

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its fighters and establish monitoring and control points to secure supply routes. It also uses these bases to establish command centers and small camps for training, digging tunnels, and exploiting caves in mountainous areas.’¹⁶⁰ UNDP, citing the Joint Analysis Unit of the UN Mission in Iraq, stated that ‘Rugged terrain and mountain ranges in Diyala provides a haven for ISIL fighters and complicates ISF counter insurgency operations’.¹⁶¹ ISIL remnants ‘sought to reestablish footholds in Ninewa, Kirkuk, Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Anbar provinces,

especially in the areas of disputed control between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government’.¹⁶²

Al-Hamid identified four sectors in which ISIL activities occur:

• The first sector is the meeting point between ISIL militants in Syria and Iraq and constitutes an extension of the Syria desert. It includes areas of Anbar and Ninewa Provinces such as Houran Valley and Wadi Al-Abyad Valley.

• The second sector includes areas such as Al-Ba’aj and Hatra districts south of Mosul, the Badush mountain range, Al-Tharthar Valley, the geographical area between the districts of Sharqat in Salah Al-Din and Kirkuk and Makhmour in Ninewa.

• The third sector includes Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk and Diyala Provinces and is considered the most important to the group as it contains agricultural areas that constitute a suitable place ‘for hiding and transporting ISIS fighters, setting up ambushes, and planting explosive devices’.

• In addition to those three sectors, ISIL has presence in the western and northern Baghdad Belts, as well as in the cities of Balad and Samarra in southern Salah Al-Din and Jurf Al-Sakhr in Babil.¹⁶³

Additionally, ISIL maintains ‘safe havens’ and trains its militants in Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) which include areas in Kirkuk, Salah Al-Din and Diyala provinces. ¹⁶⁴ This could be attributed to the gaps created by the redeployments of PMF units in the Disputed Areas which ISIL could exploit to reassert itself,¹⁶⁵ and to the withdrawal of the Peshmerga in October 2017 in the wake of the KRI independence referendum.¹⁶⁶

Activity, tactics and targets

Reporting in July 2021, a report to the UN Security Council by the Al Qaida/ISIL Sanctions Monitoring Team stated that ISIL in Iraq remains active, although ‘under constant

counter-160 Al-Hamid, R., ISIS in Iraq: Weakened but Agile, Newlines Institute, 18 May 2021, url

161 UNDP, Public Perception Survey on Local Safety and Security in Iraq, January 2021, url, p. 2

162 OSAC, Iraq Country Security Report, 2 September 2021, url

163 Al-Hamid, R., ISIS in Iraq: Weakened but Agile, Newlines Institute, 18 May 2021, url

164 ISW, ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region’, 7 May 2021, url, pp. 1-2; UN Security Council, Letter dated 15 July 2021 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2021/655, 21 July 2021, url, para. 39

165 ISW, IRAQ 2021–2022: A FORECAST, June 2021, url, p. 19

166 Al-Hamid, R., ISIS in Iraq: Weakened but Agile, Newlines Institute, 18 May 2021, url

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terrorism pressure’.¹⁶⁷ Al-Hamid also observed that ISIL in Iraq ‘remains very weak’ despite its

‘sufficient combat capabilities to threaten security and stability’.¹⁶⁸

ISIL’s current focus is on maintaining and expanding its rural areas of support which would allow the group to conduct training and ‘mitigate threats’ posed by the ISF. According to ISW.

‘ISIS maintains small, rural support zones from which it resists Iraqi Security Forces’ activity, including occasional Counter-terrorism Service (CTS) clearing operations and minimal Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and Iraqi Army operations’. Additionally, ISIL is ‘rebuilding complex explosives networks’ in those rural zones’.¹⁶⁹ In urban areas, the group seems to be re-organising its fighters ‘in small “mobile” subgroups in order to cope with the restrictions to which it has been subjected since its defeat.¹⁷⁰

Additionally, the group has also developed Vehicle-born improvised explosive device (VBIED) production cells in northeastern Salah Al-Din to facilitate attacks in Baghdad Belts aimed at weakening the ISF. The ISF discovered three such facilities in the Hamrin Mountains and al-Dour District of Salah Al-Din province in February and March 2021. Moreover, ISW observed that ISIL attempted to ‘revive its VBIED network in Fallujah and Ramadi’ in Anbar province, in late 2020, ‘possibly to employ along lines of transit approaching Baghdad toward Abu Ghraib’.¹⁷¹

According to a report of the UN Security Council published on 21 July 2021, the group’s strategic goal is ‘to undermine critical infrastructure projects, inflame sectarian divisions and grievances and sustain media coverage and relevance’. The source added that ISIL

‘reasserted itself somewhat in Iraq’ with its attacks of 21 January and 15 April 2021 in Baghdad which resulted in dozens of deaths.¹⁷² ISIL attacks were reported to have taken place primarily in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah Al-Din during the periods 12 August – 10 November 2020,¹⁷³ 9 February – 4 May 2021,¹⁷⁴ and 5 May – 3 August 2021.¹⁷⁵

OSAC observed, in September 2021, that ISIL militants used bombings, indirect fire, IEDs, and ambushes as methods of attack.¹⁷⁶

Based on media affiliated with ISIL, Al-Hamid stated that ‘the group carried out 1,422 operations in 2020’, of which 485 were operations with explosive devices, 334 sniping operations, 252 clashes, 94 execution operations targeting individuals affiliated with the ISF, PMF, Peshmerga or individuals cooperating with the government, and 257 unclassified

167 UN Security Council, Letter dated 15 July 2021 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2021/655, 21 July 2021, url, paras. 37, 40

168 Al-Hamid, R., ISIS in Iraq: Weakened but Agile, Newlines Institute, 18 May 2021, url

169 ISW, IRAQ 2021–2022: A FORECAST, June 2021, url, p. 20

170 Al-Hamid, R., ISIS in Iraq: Weakened but Agile, Newlines Institute, 18 May 2021, url

171 ISW, ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region’, 7 May 2021, url, p. 2

172 UN Security Council, Letter dated 15 July 2021 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2021/655, 21 July 2021, url, para. 38

173 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020) Report of the Secretary-General (S/2020/1099), 10 November 2020, url, para. 26

174 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020) Report of the Secretary-General, (S/2021/426), 4 May 2021, url, para. 17

175UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2576 (2021) Report of the Secretary-General, (S/2021/700), 3 August 2021, url, para. 16

176 OSAC, Iraq Country Security Report, 2 September 2021, url

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operations.¹⁷⁷ According to UN sources, an estimated 211 ISIL attacks, mainly in Diyala, were reported between 1 January and 31 March 2021,¹⁷⁸ and 157 attacks against security forces were recorded between 25 August and 9 October 2021, all of which were attributed to ISIL.¹⁷⁹ In Baghdad city, ISIL launched attacks exploiting the security vacuum created by the PMF’s strive to push out the ISF from certain neighbourhoods. This was evident through the two successive suicide attacks that the group conducted on 21 January 2021 in Tayaran Square, Bab Al-Sharqi neighbourhood, which resulted in 32 deaths and 110 injuries.¹⁸⁰ According to ISW, the threat of ISIL in Baghdad ‘persists despite a spate of Counter-terrorism Services (CTS) arrests in Baghdad and Abu Ghraib in late January as well as the killing of ISIS Wali in Iraq, Abu Yassir al Issawi, on January 27 with coalition support’.¹⁸¹ Those suicide attacks were the first in three years. According to Al-Aqeedi, the existence of ‘checkpoints in all the major areas, intense background surveillance on all points of entry into Baghdad from other provinces, intelligence and informant tips on bomb manufacturing in the outskirts, and periodic raids to disrupt sleeper cells have contributed to the noticeable decrease in attacks in the capital’.¹⁸²

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) observed that both ISIL and Iran-backed militias seem to ignite ethnic tensions and displacement ‘to exert control over the Sunni and Shia

populations, respectively’. According to the source, ISIL targeted a holy Shia site in Khazraj in Salah Al-Din province on 19 August 2020 which ‘sparked renewed tensions between the local Sunni and Shia communities’. ISIL also increased its attacks against Iranian-backed militias in Jurf Al-Sakhr in late 2020 and early 2021, an area which used to be majority Sunni but is now majority Shia and is controlled by KH which ‘prevents the previous Sunni inhabitants from returning and excludes other Iraqi security forces from operating’.¹⁸³ Additionally, ISIL tends to attribute some of its attacks to Iranian-backed militias. According to ISW, ISIL fighters wore stolen PMF uniforms when launching two attacks in Salah Al-Din Province in March 2021. By doing so, ISIL ‘effectively aggravated local resentment borne from legitimate concerns about militia abuses of power’.¹⁸⁴ Sources also stated that in some of their attacks, ISIL fighters were seen in uniforms of Iraqi soldiers or federal police.¹⁸⁵

Al-Jazeera reported, on 5 September 2021, that ISIL continues to use sleeper cells in Iraq to attack security forces with asymmetric attacks. The article indicates that these sleeper cells

‘regularly target the Iraqi army and police in the north of the country.’¹⁸⁶ A Middle East Researcher who was contacted in November 2021, similarly stated that, in their view, ISIL is doing two things currently: one is setting up fake checkpoints and conducting abductions of civilians on the road, as well as of security officers. The researcher remarked that ISIL militants are targeting security officers with the aim to bargain for ransoms and to bring in money. They

177 Al-Hamid, R., ISIS in Iraq: Weakened but Agile, Newlines Institute, 18 May 2021, url

178 UNDP, Public Perception Survey on Local Safety and Security in Iraq, January 2021, url, p. 2

179 UN Security Council, Electoral process in Iraq Report of the Secretary-General, (S/2021/932), 8 November 2021, url, para. 13

180 ISW, ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region’, 7 May 2021, url; Newlines Institute, ISIS Attacks Rekindle Iraqi-Saudi Conflict, 1 February 2021, url; ISW, IRAQ 2021–2022: A FORECAST, June 2021, url, p. 20

181 ISW, ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region’, 7 May 2021, url

182 Al-Aqeedi, R., ISIS Attacks Rekindle Iraqi-Saudi Conflict, Newlines Institute, 1 February 2021, url

183 ISW, ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region’, 7 May 2021, url, p. 2

184 ISW, ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region’, 7 May 2021, url, p. 2

185 Shafaq, ISIS claims responsibility for Saladin bloody attack, 12 March 2021, url; Rudaw, ISIS is regrouping, gaining strength in Iraq’s disputed territories: Peshmerga ministry official, 27 January 2021, url; CNN, ISIS behind brutal attack in Salah al-Din province, Iraq, miltiary says, 14 March 2021, url

186 Al-Jazeera, Suspected ISIL attack kills at least 12 Iraqi police near Kirkuk, 5 September 2021, url

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are equally targeting civilians for ransom and release them upon receiving money.

Additionally, ‘there have been more of these incidents in the last months, though still not that many.’ ¹⁸⁷ Furthermore, more generally regarding ISIL targeting, she observed that ISIL is also separately going into certain villages and towns and killing Mukhtars, other community leaders, and other individuals who are providing evidence of ISIL movements/membership to security actors. She stated that that ‘that has been going on for a long time, with the vast majority of incidents happening in Nineveh.’ Specifically on the individual targeting of security force members, she did not have information on reports of patterns of other types of

individual targeting except those done by ISIL.¹⁸⁸

The following map shows the areas of Baghdad Belts where ISIL and the PMF compete for control:

Map 2: ISIS and Shia Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Belts © ISW 2021¹⁸⁹

In addition to the above-mentioned tactics, ISIL increased its attacks on the Iraqi electricity grid.¹⁹⁰ On 24 January 2021, the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity announced on Facebook that

‘organised’ terrorist attacks targeted the electricity grid in the governorates of Ninewa, Kirkuk and Salah Al-Din which included several towers and lines located to the west of Mosul and in

187 Middle East Researcher, Email to EUAA, 3 November 2021. The researcher has worked in the field for several years and has extensive knowledge on several Middle Eastern countries including Iraq. The researcher has insight to the situation and treatment of persons (perceived to be) ISIL affiliates and issues of westernization.

188 Middle East Researcher, Email to EUAA, 3 November 2021

189 ISW, ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region, 7 May 2021, url

190 EPIC, ISHM: JANUARY 21 – JANUARY 28, 2021, 28 January 2021, url

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Al-Sufra in Kirkuk. According to the source, the attacks resulted in significant outages across the provinces.¹⁹¹ Later that day, technicians and security personnel who were sent by the Ministry to repair the damages were targeted by IED attacks that led to light injuries among the personnel and material damage.¹⁹² Moreover, similar attacks damaged 13 electricity towers in Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk, and Ninewa in August 2021, and ISIL claimed dozens of such attacks in Iraq and ‘threatened other vital infrastructure’.¹⁹³

Other Iraqi infrastructure targeted by ISIL included highways and oil refineries.¹⁹⁴ Government of Iraq

In response to US threats to close its embassy in Iraq due to increased attacks targeting the International Zone by Iranian-backed militias between July and September 2020, the Iraqi government took measures to increase the security in that area of Baghdad. ¹⁹⁵ However, the ability of the Iraqi government to contain the Popular Mobilisation Committee (PMC) or hold its fighters accountable for their actions ‘remains tenuous’.¹⁹⁶ Newlines Institute observed that

‘attempts to bring these militias within the fold of the Iraqi state have been unsuccessful’.¹⁹⁷ KH, for instance, called for the dismissal of the Iraqi Prime Minister, Al-Kadhimi, and

threatened that KH would take its role in maintaining security, following the Prime Minister’s changes to the leadership of the ISF in the wake of the ISIL suicide attacks in Baghdad that took place in January 2021.¹⁹⁸ Another militia, Rab’Allah, staged a parade in Baghdad on 25 March 2021, intimidating the Iraqi government. The latter responded with symbolic

deployments to Baghdad due to lack in manpower and capacity to address the threat such militias pose. ¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, the Iraqi authorities arrested a PMF commander in Baghdad on 26 May 2021 for accusations of assassination of an activist in Karbala. Reportedly, PMF elements ‘deployed within the former International Zone and demanded his release’; and the commander was released 12 days later as ‘the investigation court did not find evidence proving his involvement’.²⁰⁰

Relating in July 2021, a report to the UN Security Council by the Al Qaida/ISIL Sanctions Monitoring Team described the government’s efforts to counter ISIL as successful, as they resulted in the killing of ISIL deputy leader Jabir Salman Saleh Al-Issawi in the south of Kirkuk in late January 2021, and of the leader Jabbar Ali Fayadh Ghanem Sabbah in southern Iraq,

191 Iraq, Ministry of Electricity [Facebook], posted on: 24 January 2021, url

192 Iraq, Ministry of Electricity [Facebook], posted on: 24 January 2021, url

193 Rudaw, Terror attacks damage 13 electricity towers: Iraqi ministry, 5 August 2021, url

194 OSAC, Iraq Country security Report, 2 September 2021, url

195 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2020 – December 31, 2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 34

196 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2021 – September 30, 2021, 4 November 2021, url, p. 50

197 Newlines Institute, A Thousand Hezbollahs: Iraq’s Emerging Militia State, May 2021, url, p. 6

198 Rudaw, اهرود ذخأتس ةيملاسلإا ةمواقملا :دده يو يمظاكلا "درطل" وعدي ي فارعلا الله بزحل ي نملأا لوؤسملا [KH’s security commander calls for the dismissal of Kadhimi and threatens: Islamic Resistance would take its role], 22 January 2021, url

199 ISW, ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region’, 7 May 2021, url; see also: Kurdistan 24, Rab’allah militia parades through Baghdad, issues list of demands to PM, 25 March 2021, url; Shafaq, Raballah movement appeared in military parade in Baghdad, 25 March 2021, url

200 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2576 (2021) Report of the Secretary-General, (S/2021/700), 3 August 2021, url, para. 7

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who trained the suicide bombers who conducted the January attacks in Baghdad in February 2021.²⁰¹

According to USDOD, there are four security institutions in federal Iraq, all under the command of the Iraqi Prime Minister: Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Counter-terrorism Service, and the PMC. The Ministry of Defence comprises the following units:

Ground forces (which include Army Divisions, Special Forces, Special Security Division, and Commando Brigades), Army Aviation Command, Air Force, Navy, and Air Defence Command.

The Ministry of Interior comprises the Emergency Response Division, the Federal Police, and the Border Guard Force. ²⁰²

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)

For more information on the ISF, please see Section 1.3.1.1 of the EASO-COI Report – Iraq:

Security Situation (2019).

According to OSAC²⁰³ report of 2 September 2021, the ISF are largely present in most of the major urban areas and have ‘a limited ability to respond to security incidents, terrorist attacks, and criminal activities’. They operate under the auspices of the Ministries of Interior and Defence, as well as ‘within the quasi-ministerial Counterterrorism Service’. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) is in charge of domestic law enforcement and oversees the ‘Federal Police, Provincial Police, Facilities Protection Service, Civil Defence, and Department of Border Enforcement’. The Iraqi military forces which operate under the Ministry of Defence conduct counterterrorism operations in conjunction with the MOI in addition to their conventional tasks of defending the country. Additionally, the Counterterrorism Service (CTS) oversees the

‘Counterterrorism Command, an organization that includes three brigades of special

operations forces’ and reports directly to the prime minister. It is also in charge of the security of the International Zone of Baghdad together with the Special Division of the ISF.

Furthermore, there is an intelligence agency for the National Security Service which reports directly to the prime minister and an Energy Police which is responsible for protecting energy infrastructure and which operates under the Ministry of Oil.²⁰⁴

Attempts to ‘curb militia influence’ render the ISF, or the Iraqi government in general,

‘vulnerable to intimidation and attacks by the militias’.²⁰⁵ GardaWorld stated that ‘Militias increasingly appear to be targeting Iraqi security forces perceived as loyal to the prime minister; state security forces are unlikely to confront militias, however, mitigating the risk of civil war‘.²⁰⁶ According to ISW, PMF units had already targeted ISF officials in Shula and

Al-201 UN Security Council, Letter dated 15 July 2021 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2021/655, 21 July 2021, url, paras. 37, 40

202 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2021 – September 30, 2021, 4 November 2021, url, p.32

203 ‘a partnership between the U.S. Department of State and private-sector security community that supports the safe operations of U.S. organizations overseas through threat alerts, analysis, and peer networking groups’. OSAC, Who We Are, n. d., url

204 OSAC, Iraq Country Security Report, 2 September 2021, url

205 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2020 – December 31, 2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 34

206 GardaWorld, Iraq Country Report, updated 26 October 2021, url; USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2021 – September 30, 2021, 4 November 2021, url, p. 50

In document Iraq Security Situation (Page 31-47)