Displacement and return Displacement Displacement

The highest numbers of IDPs in the country originate from Ninewa governorate, according to IOM’s DTM report for August and September 2021.¹⁴⁴⁶ The majority of the IDPs in Ninewa governorate, estimated at 256 034 individuals as of October 2021, originated from the districts of Mosul, Sinjar and al-Ba´aj.¹⁴⁴⁷ The governorate itself hosts about 22 percent of the country’s IDP population. The majority, about 77 percent, lives in out-of camp-settings. Mosul and Shekhan districts host the largest numbers of IDPs in the governorate.¹⁴⁴⁸

In January 2021 IOM produced an updated in-depth report on return barriers, “Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting categories of return barriers”.¹⁴⁴⁹ IOM observed a change in the duration IDPs spent in displacement- so called protracted displacement- between

September 2018 and August 2020. Findings show significant increase in the number of IDPs living in protracted displacement in August 2020 compared to September 2018,¹⁴⁵⁰ 92 percent and 57 percent respectively.¹⁴⁵¹ Return barriers such as lack of material resources, services and security, as well as political factors are some of the underlying factors behind protracted displacement noted the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.¹⁴⁵²

Almost 20 ,000 Yazidis in Iraq continue to live in displacement camps in Iraqi Kurdistan. Many of them originate from Sinjar, according to IOM.¹⁴⁵³ Living conditions in the camps are

1444 Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Iraq: Providing much-needed post-operative care in Mosul, 19 July 2021, url

1445 Center for Civilians in Conflict (The) (CIVIC), Caught in the middle: The impact of security and political fragmentation on civilian protection in Sinjar, October 2020, url, p. 29

1446 IOM, DTM , Iraq master list report 123, August-September 2021, 26 October 2021, url, p. 1

1447 IOM, DTM , Iraq master list report 123, August-September 2021, 26 October 2021, url, p. 1

1448 IOM, Return dynamics in Ninewa governorate, May 2021, url, p. 2

1449 IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting categories of return barriers, 9 January 2021, url

1450 For more details on the various return barriers and their impact on protracted displacement in Ninewa governorate see IOM’s report - Protracted displacement in Iraq: Revisiting categories of return barriers

1451 IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting categories of return barriers, 9 January 2021, url, p. 13

1452 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Iraq’s internally displaced: A protracted crisis, April 2021, url, pp. 3, 4

1453 IOM, Iraq Mission, Six years after Yazidi genocide, investment in Service is crucial for returning Yazidi families, 16 July 2020, url

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reportedly overcrowded.¹⁴⁵⁴ In June 2021, a fire broke out at the Sharaya camp, in Dohuk governorate, forcing over 200 families to seek shelter in nearby schools.¹⁴⁵⁵

The October 2020 agreement signed between the GOI and the KRG, aimed at restoring security and stability to Sinjar district, was set as an incentive for the Yazidis to return.

ACAPS¹⁴⁵⁶ reported that 47 % of the Yazidis who had been displaced by ISIL six years ago had not returned to Sinjar district, as of October 2020.¹⁴⁵⁷ However, despite prevailing reluctance, the community noted a gradual increase in return since June 2020. The increase is mainly due to the economic consequences of the lockdown driven by the Covid-19 pandemic during displacement.¹⁴⁵⁸

Return

Ninewa governorate continues to receive returnees, previously dispersed across various locations (926 locations) around the country. The governorate has the highest number of returnees in the country, 1 922 496, according to IOM, DTM Master List Report for August-September 2021.¹⁴⁵⁹

Camp closure is another factor pertaining to return dynamic. IOM maintained that individuals originating from high severity areas often opted to remain in protracted displacement. This being the preferred option prior to the closure of the camps. Mosul and Sinjar districts witnessed the highest number of arrivals from camp settings (85 % and 77 % respectively), whereby the majority were arriving from camps in Dohuk governorate.¹⁴⁶⁰ Between November 2020-december 2020, IOM observed that at least 61% of the new arrivals from camps to non-camp setting returned in high-severity locations. IOM concluded that the protracted

displacement in camps before their closure can be explained with the lack of favourable living conditions in the place of return.¹⁴⁶¹

The districts hosting the highest numbers of returnees living in high severity conditions are predominately Sinjar (88 %) and al-Ba´aj (81 %). Some of the drivers attributed to the severity conditions are poor services and lack of livelihood.^14621463

Mosul district is one of the areas with a high-level return migration. Conditions are reportedly

‘more conducive’ with a relatively low number of return to high severity areas (2%).¹⁴⁶⁴ REACH initiative’s Returns and Durable Solutions (ReDS) Assessment for Mosul sub-district, including Mosul City, identified the following drivers for return: increased safety and security, camp closure, nostalgia, security clearance granted, job opportunities and difficult living conditions in area of displacement.¹⁴⁶⁵

1454 Acaps, Iraq: the return to Sinjar, 20 November 2020, url

1455 Middle East Eye, In pictures: Fire tears through Yazidi displacement camp in Iraq, 8 June 2021, url

1456 ACAPS is an independent specialist in humanitarian need analysis and assessment.

1457 ACAPS, Iraq: the return to Sinjar, 20 November 2020, url

1458 ACAPS, Iraq: the return to Sinjar, 20 November 2020, url

1459 IOM, DTM , Iraq master list report 123, August-september 2021, 26 October 2021, url, pp. 1-2

1460 IOM, Return dynamics in Ninewa governorate, May 2021, url, p. 3

1461 IOM, Return dynamics in Ninewa governorate, May 2021, url, pp. 2-3

1462 IOM, Return dynamics in Ninewa governorate, May 2021, url, p. 6

1463 For more information on the conditions in the various districts of return, see IOM’s analysis of return in Ninewa governorate, see IOM, Return dynamics in Ninewa governorate, May 2021, url.

1464 IOM, Return dynamics in Ninewa governorate, May 2021, url, p. 6

1465 REACH, Markaz Mosul sub-district, March 2021, url, p. 3

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The Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), an international organization promoting the

protection of civilians in conflict,¹⁴⁶⁶ reported in April 2021, that local authorities used coercive measures in Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Anbar to pressure IDPs to leave the camps. For

example, in December 2020, returnees to Mosul reported that members of the Ministry of Migration and Displacement and the National Security Services threatened residents in the Hamam al-Alil camp if they did not leave. Other families, CIVIC spoke to reported that they were misinformed about conditions in their areas of origin.¹⁴⁶⁷ Families renting apartments in Mosul City reported that they were unable to return to their homes due to lack of services, livelihood opportunities, or due to opposition from community leaders and security actors in the areas of origin. Reportedly, Sunni Arabs from Sinjar faced threats due to ongoing

community tensions or because of the presence of certain security actors.¹⁴⁶⁸

Tensions along the disputed areas are other contentious factors impeding return. The Hassan Sham area in the Ninewa Plains was one example. The area included eleven villages under the control of the Peshmerga forces. According to CIVIC report on displaced persons from April 2021, the KRG has denied around 4 000 Sunni Arabs permission to return. A similar situation occurred in the Rabee´a area of Tal Afar, where 1 200 Sunni Arabs cannot return.¹⁴⁶⁹ Sunni Arabs from Sinjar fear retaliation from security actors, authorities and members of the community, due to perceived affiliation to ISIL. Sunni leaders and civilians reported that they are harassed and threatened upon return. Members of the Sunni community are regularly stopped at checkpoints and kept for a long time for interrogation.¹⁴⁷⁰

In May 2021, the governorate received repatriated Iraqis from al-Hol camp in Syria. It was the first repatriation of Iraqis following ISIL’s defeat in Baghuz, its last stronghold in Syria. The families arrived at the camp of Jeddah 1 near Mosul. The 94 families were the first group of 500 families cleared for return by the Iraqi government.¹⁴⁷¹ In September 2021, a second convoy of 115 families repatriated from al-Hol to al-Jeddah camp.¹⁴⁷² According to the New Humanitarian, the families will remain at the camp for several months before they return to their homes, located in different parts of Iraq. Iraqi authorities have kept a low profile on the repatriation in order to avoid security concerns and community backlash. Humanitarian workers at the camp told the New Humanitarian that they received short notice of the arrivals and were therefore not fully prepared to accommodate the returnees.¹⁴⁷³ An estimated 30 000 Iraqis remain held in the al-Hol camp.¹⁴⁷⁴

1466 For more information on CIVIC, see home page, about us, url

1467 Center for Civilians in Conflict (The) (CIVIC), Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url p. 9

1468 Center for Civilians in Conflict (The) (CIVIC), Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url pp. 9, 10

1469 Center for Civilians in Conflict (The) (CIVIC), Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url p. 21

1470 Center for Civilians in Conflict (The) (CIVIC), Caught in the middle: The impact of security and political fragmentation on civilian protection in Sinjar, October 2020, url, p. 16

1471 New Humanitarian (The), Inside the troubled repatriation of Iraqis from Syria’s al-Hol camp, 7 June 2021, url

1472 VOA, Hundreds of Iraqi nationals leave al- Hol refugee camp in Syria, 30 September 2021, url, Shafaq News, A second convoy of ISIS families enter Iraqi territory, 29 September 2021, url

1473 New Humanitarian (The), Inside the troubled repatriation of Iraqis from Syria’s al-Hol camp, 7 June 2021, url

1474 National (The), Repatriation of ISIS-linked families from Syria to Iraq angers local, 26 May 2021, url

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