Conflict background

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targeting ‘symbolic or economically vital targets’.¹⁵⁰⁷ For further information on these 2019 attacks, please see section 2.7.1 of EASO’s report on the security situation in Iraq from October 2020. In March 2021, it was reported that Iraqi security authorities dismantled a minefield in the Alas oilfield area, which still contains unexploited oil wells. The Alas and Ajil oilfields reportedly hold reserves of about three billion barrels¹⁵⁰⁸ in Salah Al-Din, along with gas and sulphur.¹⁵⁰⁹

Salah Al-Din’s capital Tikrit is reported to offer some employment opportunities as well as (educational) resources, such as Tikrit University.¹⁵¹⁰ Tooz Khurmatu represents the

commercial centre and transportation hub in the northeast of the governorate.¹⁵¹¹ Samarra once also offered commercial as well as agricultural and fishing areas; however, these have been destroyed in the course of the conflicts since 2003.¹⁵¹²

Road security

As previously reported for 2018 and 2019,¹⁵¹³ ISIL continued to threaten road security in Salah Al-Din governorate during the reference period. Roadside bomb attacks targeted roads connecting Kirkuk, Tikrit and Tooz Khurmatu, and hit and run attacks occurred at checkpoints near the cities of Tikrit and Tooz Khurmatu.¹⁵¹⁴ According to the latest iMMAP publication on the risk of explosions on Salah Al-Din’s roads in February 2021, primary risk was reported to exist on the main road linking Mosul to Baghdad near the cities of Baiji, Samarra and Balad and on the road connecting Tooz Khurmatu with Tikrit, mainly in the vicinity of Tooz Khurmatu city:¹⁵¹⁵

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defended against ISIL forces by PMU, which had emerged as a parallel force to the ISF in the fight against ISIL and consisted of pre-existing Shia militias as well as new groups and

forces.¹⁵¹⁸ In Salah Al-Din governorate most of the key population centres were recaptured from ISIL control by mid-2015. Salah Al-Din was moreover one of the first governorates to see large numbers of IDPs return. By July 2015, 130 000 IDPs had returned, and by December 2016, 360 000, mostly Sunni Arab IDPs.¹⁵¹⁹

The UN reported that between 23 and 27 November 2017, ISF conducted a military offensive in central and northern Iraq, aimed at clearing remnants of ISIL from the Jazirah (Jazeera) desert expanse, which spans across the governorates of Anbar, Salah Al-Din and Ninewa;

14 000 square kilometres and 175 villages in the Jazirah and upper Euphrates areas were reportedly cleared.¹⁵²⁰ Following this operation, the Prime Minister of Iraq at the time, Haider Al-Abadi, declared final victory over ISIL in 2017.¹⁵²¹ However, despite this declaration, ISIL continued carrying out asymmetric attacks: ISIL militants reportedly roamed the countryside in late 2017, attacking villages at night.¹⁵²² Throughout 2018, security forces and civilians

continued to be targeted by ISIL, including incidents that resulted in civilian casualties.¹⁵²³ The security vacuum in rural parts of Salah Al-Din governorate reportedly enabled ISIL militants to operate and control limited amounts of territory, leading to an increase in the number of attacks from 2017 to 2018 in the governorate.¹⁵²⁴ Reports on asymmetric ISIL attacks in Salah Al-Din continued throughout the period between 2019 and 2021.¹⁵²⁵ For information on recent incidents involving ISIL in the governorate, please see section 2.7.4 Recent security trends.

After ISIL’s ousting in 2015, exceptionally high ‘rates of abduction, killing, forced evictions, unlawful detentions, and property destruction’ were reported in the governorate, especially against families and tribes accused of affiliation with ISIL. This development was primarily attributed to the dominant role that the PMU play in the governorate, further influencing

Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 17

1518 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, pp. 16-17

1519 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 43

1520 UNSG, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant resolution 2367 (2017) [S/2018/42], 17 January 2018, url, para.

25

1521 UNSG, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant resolution 2367 (2017) [S/2018/42], 17 January 2018, url, para.

2

1522 International Crisis Group, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries, 14 December 2018, url, p. 17

1523 UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) [S/2019/101], 1 February 2019, url, para. 14; UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) [S/2018/975], 31 October 2018, url, para. 22, 43, 44; UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) [S/2018/677], 9 July 2018, url, para. 20; see also Flood, H. D., From Caliphate to Caves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq, September 2018, url, p. 33; Washington Post (The), ISIS is making a comeback in Iraq just months after Baghdad declared victory, 17 July 2018, url

1524 Markusen, M., The Islamic State and the Persistent Threat of Extremism in Iraq, CSIS, November 2018, url, pp. 4, 6

1525 UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2576 (2021) [S/2021/946], 11 November 2021, url, para. 19; UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020) [S/2021/426], 4 May 2021, url, para. 17; UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020) [S/2021/120], 8 February 2021, url, para. 18; UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020) [S/2020/1099], 10 November 2020, url, para. 26; UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020) [S/2020/792], 11 August 2020, url, para. 19; UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) [S/2020/363], 6 May 2020, url, para. 24; UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) [S/2020/140], 21 February 2020, url, para. 23;

UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) [S/2019/903], 22 November 2019, url, para. 29; UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) [S/2019/365], 2 May 2019, url, para. 18

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existing political divisions.¹⁵²⁶ Reports of the difficulties faced by the Sunni population (in particular ‘ordinary Sunni citizens’ compared to the Sunni elites who ‘integrated themselves’

accessing ‘state resources and prerogatives via different tactics and mechanisms’)¹⁵²⁷ under pressure from Shiite militias and the ISF continued in 2020.¹⁵²⁸ In a March 2021 media report, Salah Al-Din residents were quoted as saying that security violations often arose due to the presence of non-local armed forces. Shiite-led PMU units reportedly caused many problems for residents, including restricting their freedom of movement as well as violent incidents.¹⁵²⁹ Following the expulsion of most of ISIL from the province in 2015, the northern part of the disputed area of Tooz Khurmatu district was held by Kurdish security forces, while local Shia Turkmen PMU factions controlled the remaining parts of the district. The district’s capital, Tooz Khurmatu, was also divided between Kurdish Security Forces and PMU and remained a hotbed for clashes between those groups as well as ‘tit-for-tat retaliation against civilians.’¹⁵³⁰ Following the September 2017 Kurdish independence referendum, Tooz Khurmatu district became caught up in high levels of violence during the military stand-off between the Iraqi government forces, including PMU, and Kurdish forces over the disputed territories.¹⁵³¹ In October 2017, violence escalated in the ethnically mixed city of Tooz Khurmatu.¹⁵³² Clashes and ensuing sporadic violence over the following two months led to civilian casualties, displacement as well as destruction of civilian property and infrastructure along ethnic lines.¹⁵³³ Tooz Khurmatu district was reported to have ‘suffered more violence than other disputed areas in the immediate aftermath of the October 2017 takeover by the Iraqi army and Hashd [PMU],’¹⁵³⁴ as outlined in EASO’s report on the security situation in Iraq from October 2020 (see section 2.7.2).

According to a June 2018 report, one of the Badr Organization’s longstanding top commanders established himself as the ‘strongman’ in Tooz Khurmatu, along with his

‘personal militia’ comprised of local Shiite Turkmen, allegedly involved in looting and arms- and drugs trafficking.¹⁵³⁵ In December 2018, it was reported that Tooz Khurmatu district’s rural areas were under complete control of the PMU, comprising one Sunni Arab brigade ‘held

1526 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 43

1527 Saleem, Z. A., The King of Salah al-Din: The Power of Iraq’s Sunni Elites, January 2021, url, p. 18

1528 Saleem, Z. A., The King of Salah al-Din: The Power of Iraq’s Sunni Elites, January 2021, url, pp. 18-19; see also Al-Monitor, Flurry of Sunni Triangle ops sparks questions over Islamic State, 15 March 2021, url

1529 Al-Monitor, Flurry of Sunni Triangle ops sparks questions over Islamic State, 15 March 2021, url

1530 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 44; see also Al-Monitor, Why Tuz Khormato clashes were more than just local skirmishes, 5 April 2016, url

1531 International Crisis Group, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries, 14 December 2018, url, pp. 15, 17; UNAMI and OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 4;

AI, Iraq: Fresh evidence that tens of thousands forced to flee Tuz Khurmatu amid indiscriminate attacks, lootings and arson, 24 October 2017, url

1532 UNAMI and OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 4; AI, Iraq:

Fresh evidence that tens of thousands forced to flee Tuz Khurmatu amid indiscriminate attacks, lootings and arson, 24 November 2017, url

1533 UNAMI and OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 4; OHCHR, Press briefing notes on Iraq executions, Iraq: Tuz Khurmatu clashes and El Salvador, 15 December 2017, url; AI, Iraq: Fresh evidence that tens of thousands forced to flee Tuz Khurmatu amid indiscriminate attacks, lootings and arson, 24 November 2017, url; HRW, Iraq: Fighting in Disputed Territories Kills Civilians, 20 October 2017, url

1534 International Crisis Group, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries, 14 December 2018, url, p. 15

1535 Quesnay, A. and Beaumont, R., The Return of the State and Inter-Militia Competition in Northern Iraq, Noria, 14 June 2018, url

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under tight control’, while the district capital was held by local ISF and police.¹⁵³⁶ In February 2019, the city of Tooz Khurmatu was reported to be under effective control of the Badr Organisation which enjoyed local influence thanks to the Shia Turkmen community.¹⁵³⁷ According to a February 2019 report, toxic populism was still prevalent among the local population of Tooz Khurmatu and previous inter-community violence was still on residents’

minds, rendering the threat of a renewed outbreak of violence particularly imminent.¹⁵³⁸ The same report quotes former Minister of Migration, Darbaz Mohammed, stating that, ‘Tuz

Khurmatu is like a time bomb that could explode at any minute. For Tuz to return to communal war, it only requires murdering a young Shia Turkmen, which would definitely ignite a civil war in the town. There are armed groups ready to take advantage of any development.’¹⁵³⁹ For further details on security developments in Salah Al-Din governorate in 2019-2020, please refer to section 2.7.3 in EASO’s report on the Security Situation in Iraq from October 2020.

2.7.3 Presence and areas of control of armed actors