General description of the governorate Basic geography Basic geography

Diyala province is located in the central-eastern part of Iraq and has borders with

Sulaymaniyah, Salah al-Din, Baghdad and Wassit provinces and an international border with Iran. The governorate is divided into six districts: Baquba, Baladrooz, Khalis, Khanaqin, Kifri and Muqdadiya. Baqubah city is the capital of the governorate.⁸⁸⁹ The districts in Diyala which are disputed by the KRG and the central government are Khanaqin, Kifri and the sub-district Mandali, situated in Baladrooz district.⁸⁹⁰ The district of the disputed Khanaqin (also written as Khaniqin) includes the sub-districts of Jalawla, Saadiya and Qara Tape.⁸⁹¹

888 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url

889 UNOCHA, Diyala Governorate Profile, March 2009, available at: url, p. 1

890 Kane, S., Iraq’s disputed territories: a view of the political horizon and implications for U.S. policy, United States Institute of Peace, 2011, url, p. 35; EPIC, ISHM, ISHM reference guide, last revision: May 2020, url

891 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries, 14 December 2018, url, p. 14

120 Population

Diyala governorate has an estimated population of 1 768 920 inhabitants as of 2021.⁸⁹² Ethnicity

Diyala has a diverse ethnic and religious population. Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens make up the majority of the population, each including the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam. ⁸⁹³ A majority of Diyala residents are Sunni Arabs and Sunni Turkmens. The majority of the population of the provincial capital of Baquba are Sunni Arabs.⁸⁹⁴ The (‘Pro-KRG’)⁸⁹⁵ Shia Kurds constitute the largest portion of the population in the city of Khanaqin.⁸⁹⁶ Other ethnic and religious groups residing in the governorate include Christians, Yazidis and Ahl al-Haqq (a religious group with roots in Shia Islam). Among the Kurdish population is also the community of Faili (also written as Feili, Fayli or Feily) Kurds, who are predominantly Shia Muslims.⁸⁹⁷

The Juburi and the Tamimi tribes are the biggest and most influential tribes in the

governorate.⁸⁹⁸ Other important tribes in Diyala are the al-Assadi, the Atighi and the Salhi.⁸⁹⁹ Road security

The highways Baghdad–Tehran and Baghdad–Kirkuk–Erbil–Mosul pass through Diyala.

Diyala has particularly good connections with Baghdad, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.⁹⁰⁰ Whilst the road network of Diyala is in bad condition and suffered further damage in the context of the battle against ISIL, the main road Baghdad–Baquba did not sustain any major damage and is in good condition.⁹⁰¹

In the September 2020 – February 2021 period, iMMAP designates stretches of the road from Baquba to Khanaqin as a primary risk road, other parts of the same road have qualified as a secondary risk road. Stretches of the road leading from Khanaqin to Kalar have also been designated as primary and secondary risk roads. Parts of the road leading from Baquba to Baladrooz have been designated as primary risk road, as have parts of the road leading from Khalis to Kifri at times.⁹⁰² Especially in Khanaqin district and, to a lesser extent, in Muqdadiya

892 Iraq, CSO, Population indicators and population estimates, n.d., url

893 NCCI, Diyala Governorate Profile, January 2016, url, p. 2

894 Knights, M., Losing Mosul, Regenerating in Diyala: How the Islamic State Could Exploit Iraq’s Sectarian Tinderbox, October 2016, url, p.2

895 Saleem, Z.et al., Security and Governance in the Disputed Territories Under a Fractured GOI, November 2018, url

896 Saleem, Z.et al., Security and Governance in the Disputed Territories Under a Fractured GOI, November 2018, url

897 NCCI, Diyala Governorate Profile, January 2016, url, p. 2; Minority Rights Group International, Iraq, Faili Kurds, November 2017, url

898 US Army, Tamimi, Jibouri tribes uphold reconciliation in Diyala, 29 October 2007, url; New York Times (The), Wary tribal alliances, born of necessity, offer hope in Iraq, 6 October 2014, url; LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 27

899 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 27

900 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 15

901 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 61

902 iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala Governorate (1-28 February 2021), 7 March 2021, available at: url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access

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district explosive hazard incidents, resulting in casualties, have been reported from December 2020 to February 2021.⁹⁰³

Groups under the PMF issue their own ‘authorization’ letters that allow passage through checkpoints across the country. Moving through the province of Diyala may be best facilitated with a letter from the Badr Organization or AAH, which have gained power in much of the province.⁹⁰⁴ At Diyala’s largest checkpoint, Safra, PMF groups such as Badr or AAH have variously worked with the Iraqi army’s operations command and the province’s governor (Muthanna al-Tamimi) to collect anywhere between 100 and 500 US dollars per truck, earning at times as much as 20 000 US dollars per day.⁹⁰⁵ In Jalawla, AAH staffed

checkpoints on commercially strategic roads in 2018, imposing taxes on vehicles passing through.⁹⁰⁶

Economy

Known as the orange capital of the Middle East due to its production of oranges and citrus fruits, Diyala’s economy rests largely on agriculture.⁹⁰⁷ Diyala province is a key gateway for Iranian-Iraqi trade.⁹⁰⁸ It is ‘strategically important for commercial, security and political

reasons’ and produces major revenues via the Mounzariah and Paruezkhan border crossings with Iran.⁹⁰⁹ As customs officials have to collaborate with the Badr-controlled political and security apparatus in Diyala, Badr has effective control over the Mounzariah and the Mandali border crossings and relies on them for revenues and military support from Iran.⁹¹⁰ Khanaqin district, rich in oil, deploys an oil field and an oil refinery.⁹¹¹ In April 2021, a contract to develop the al-Mansouriya natural gas field in Diyala province was awarded to the Chinese company Sinopec.⁹¹²

Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala Governorate (1-31 January 2021), 11 February 2021, available at: url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala Governorate (1-31 December 2021), 10 January 2021, available at: url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala Governorate (1-31 October 2021), 5 November 2020, available at: url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala Governorate (1-31 August 2020), 6 September 2020, available at: url

903 iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Casualties from Explosive Hazard Incidents in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates 1-28 February 2021, 2 March 2021, available at: url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Casualties from Explosive Hazard Incidents in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates 1-31 January 2021, 11 February 2021, available at: url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Casualties from Explosive Hazard Incidents in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates 01-31 December 2020, 10 January 2021, available at: url

904 Mansour, R., Networks of power: the Popular Mobilization Forces and the state in Iraq, Chatham House, February 2021, url, p. 26

905 Mansour, R., Networks of power: the Popular Mobilization Forces and the state in Iraq, Chatham House, February 2021, url, p. 31

906 Skelton, M. & Saleem, Z., Displacement and Iraq’s political marketplace: Addressing political barriers to IDP return, February 2021, url, p. 26

907 UNDP, Iraqi heroes confronting COVID-19 in Diyala and Kirkuk, 20 November 2020, url

908 ICG, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018, url, p. 15

909 Skelton, M. & Saleem, Z., Iraq’s disputed internal boundaries after ISIS, February 2019, url, p. 11

910 Saleem, A.Z. & Skelton, M., Searching for ghosts: fighting corruption at Iraq’s border crossings, 24 February 2021, url

911 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 43

912 EPIC, ISHM, April 15 – April 22, 2021, 22 April 2021, url

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Water scarcity, exacerbated by climate change and dam construction projects in Iran, threatens Diyala’s agricultural sector.⁹¹³ ‘The surface area of Lake Hamrin, Diyala province’s main source of water, has shrunk by half, affecting irrigation and agricultural production.’⁹¹⁴

‘The Iraqi government restricted farmers from planting summer crops due to the diminishing water levels, which affects income and food security,’ USDOD reports in July 2021.⁹¹⁵ In October 2021, the grain growing season in Diyala was canceled due to ‘severe water scarcity’.⁹¹⁶

2.4.2 Conflict background

Diyala has been described as an ‘ethno-sectarian microcosm for security dynamics’ for the whole of Iraq.⁹¹⁷ Its mixed ethnic-religious population and proximity to Baghdad and Iran turned it into ‘a crucial prize in the sectarian struggle engulfing Iraq’ and it became ‘a battleground of Shia and Sunni factions who vied for power’.⁹¹⁸ The governorate’s

geographical location made it a priority for the Iraqi government and the Iranian-backed PMF to control the region.⁹¹⁹ Diyala is known to have hosted extremist insurgents in Iraq since 2004.⁹²⁰

Diyala is one of Iraq’s governorates ‘worst affected’ by the 2013-2014 ISIL invasion.⁹²¹ ISIL managed to occupy large areas in the north of the governorate including Saadiyah and Jalawla during its offensive.⁹²² Portions of the rural areas of Kifri, Khanaqin, Muqdadiya, and Khalis were also captured. None of the district centres were seized, despite a number of attacks into some of them.⁹²³ ISIL’s advances in Diyala in 2014 prompted many tribal leaders, such as from the Aza, Obeidi and Juburi tribes, angered and humiliated by the atrocities committed by ISIL, to broker ad hoc allegiances to support the ISF in the fight against ISIL.⁹²⁴ The Karawi (or Kerwi /Kerwei), a large Arab tribe in the area of Jalawla, pledged loyalty to ISIL.⁹²⁵

Diyala was declared entirely freed of Islamic State control in January 2015, after an occupation of approximately six months that led to thousands of its inhabitants being

913 Middle East Monitor, Water shortages leave Iraq thirsty for regional cooperation, 6 September 2021, url; Rudaw, Iraq’s environment, food security very fragile: deputy minister, 25 August 2021, url ; EPIC, ISHM, July 8 – July 15, 2021, 15 July 2021, url; Corona, A., How mangled dam diplomacy is shaping Iraq’s water crisis, 4 November 2020, url;

914 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2021 – June 30, 2021, 30 July 2021, url, p. 58

915 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2021 – June 30, 2021, 30 July 2021, url, p. 58

916 EPIC, ISHM, October 14 -21, 2021, 14 October 2021, url

917 Flood, D., From Caliphates to Caves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq, September 2018, url, p. 36

918 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 22

919 Flood, D., From Caliphates to Caves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq, September 2018, url, p. 32

920 Niqash, New frenemies: Extremists return to Diyala, to reunite with old allies, Al Qaeda, 27 April 2017, url

921 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 23

922 NCCI, Diyala Governorate Profile, January 2016, url, pp. 3-4

923 Sanad for Peacebuilding and Social Inquiry, Conflict Fragility and Social Cohesion in Diyala Governorate: Khalis, Muqdadiya, Kifri, and Balad, 14 June 2018, url, p. 22

924 New York Times (The), Wary tribal alliances, born of necessity, offer hope in Iraq, 6 October 2014, url

925 BBC News, Islamic State Crisis: How Jalawla became a changed town, 15 December 2014, url; Knights, M., Losing Mosul, Regenerating in Diyala: How the Islamic State Could Exploit Iraq’s Sectarian Tinderbox, October 2016, url, p.4

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displaced.⁹²⁶ During the counter-ISIL offensive Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Units

‘forcibly displaced thousands of Sunni Iraqi civilians from Diyala Province, killing hundreds’, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reports in December 2020.⁹²⁷ An international NGO working in Iraq interviewed in April 2018 by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS)/Landinfo states Diyala’s security landscape evolved into ‘a real hodgepodge’, pointing out the

presence of armed groups, protracted communal conflicts and PMU competition over access to resources and rents.⁹²⁸

Especially after ISIL’s territorial defeat in central Iraq, many ISIL fighters rejoined forces with former allies inside the Diyala governorate.⁹²⁹ Retreating to the rural periphery, ISIL’s

diminished insurgency in Diyala remained deadly,⁹³⁰ particularly in parts of the province into where the state’s reach is weak or non-existent.⁹³¹ The Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), cited by USDOD, reported in early 2020 that ‘Diyala, which has one of the largest concentrations of Iranian aligned militias, is also the largest focus of attacks by ISIL within Iraq’.⁹³² USDOD added that ‘since the fall of ISIL’s territorial caliphate,’ ‘Diyala province northeast of Baghdad has consistently seen the highest concentration of ISIL attacks in the OIR [Operation Inherent Resolve] battlespace’.⁹³³ The PMF, who are the dominant authority in Diyala, exacerbate sectarian tensions, USDOD explains, ‘as they are mainly concerned with using Diyala’s strategic location to smuggle arms and other assistance from Iran.’⁹³⁴ Their combat against ISIL is hampered by a lack of coordination with local tribal forces, the Peshmerga, and Coalition forces.⁹³⁵ In its report covering the period 1 April 2020 – 30 June 2020, USDOD noted that ISIL were responsible for small attacks in Diyala almost on a daily basis. Many of these attacks targeted farmers and other civilians, who were often killed or kidnapped for ransom.⁹³⁶ According to a March 2020 Middle East Institute report ISIL’s daily attacks in Diyala impede any attempt at a return to normal life stating that ‘areas like Jalawla remain impossible to reach, while larger cities such as Khanaqin or Baquba are becoming increasingly insecure the longer the situation is ignored.’⁹³⁷

926 Flood, D., From Caliphates to Caves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq, September 2018, url, p. 32; NCCI, Diyala Governorate Profile, January 2016, url, p. 4.

927 ISW, Iraq is fragile, not hopeless: how Iraq’s fragility undermines regional stability, December 2020, url, p. 27;

GICJ, Iraq: ethnic and sectarian cleansing in Diyala, 17 February 2016, url

928 Denmark, DIS (Danish Immigration Service)/Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, incl. possibility to enter and access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), 5 November 2018, url, p. 43

929 Niqash, New frenemies: Extremists return to Diyala, to reunite with old allies, Al Qaeda, 27 April 2017, url

930 ICG, Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, Middle East Report N°207, 11 October 2019, url, p.3

931 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Governing the ‘ungoverned’: Suppressing the Islamic State’s insurgency in Iraq, 12 April 2019, url

932 US, USDOD, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress – January 1, 2020-March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 26

933 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve –Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020, url, p. 24

934 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020, url, p. 24

935 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020, url, p. 24

936 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020, url, p. 23

937 MEI, The forgotten Iraq, policy paper 2020-7, March 2020, url

124 2.4.3 Presence and areas of control of armed actors Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)

Dijla Operations Command (DOC)

Diyala governorate falls under the Dijla Operations Command (DOC), which includes all of Diyala governorate⁹³⁸, eastern Salah al-Din and its ethnically mixed town of Tuz Khurmatu, as well as the Hamrin Mountains.⁹³⁹ In October 2020, Major General Adnan Salman al-Anzi took command of the 5th Iraqi Army division in Diyala province, replacing Major General Saleh Harz Nasser.⁹⁴⁰ The ISF Diyala is led by either Badr members or other members from the PMF networks, Renad Mansour noted in a February 2021 report.⁹⁴¹ USCENTCOM noted in 2020 that the 5th Iraqi Army Division, which is responsible for Diyala, ‘operates as an extension of the Badr Organization, making it more responsive to Iran than to the Iraqi Prime Minister and the formal Iraqi chain of command’.⁹⁴²

Border Guards Command

In 2017, the Border Guards Command in Diyala operated under the 3^rd border region which covers the Diyala –Wassit border with Iran. ⁹⁴³ In July 2020, Prime Minister Kadhimi visited a border crossing near the Iraq-Iran border in Diyala, proclaiming a new era in fighting

corruption and stating that border guards had the authorization to use firearms against those who violated the rules of the customs zone.⁹⁴⁴ AFP reports in March 2021 that many of Iraq’s entry points are informally controlled by groups within the PMF. Diyala’s Mandali crossing on the Iranian border, for instance, is run by Badr. An official informed AFP that border operatives at the Mandali crossing can collect as much as 10 000 US dollars per day in bribes, the bulk of which is distributed to Badr and complicit officials.⁹⁴⁵ To reduce corruption at border crossings, Iraq signed a contract with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in May 2021 to automate custom procedures.⁹⁴⁶

Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU)

The Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF or PMU) Diyala Operations Command is led by Talib al-Musawi, a commander of the Badr Organisation.⁹⁴⁷ Based at Camp Ashraf, it exercises

operational control over PMF Brigades 4, 23, 24, and 110 (all Badr formations)—plus Liwa al-Taff (Brigade 20).⁹⁴⁸ Particularly in southern Diyala, the Badr Organisation remains the

938 Al-Hashimi, H., Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, 5 May 2020, url

939 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 17

940 EPIC, ISHM, October 8- October 15, 2020, 15 October 2020, url

941 Mansour, R., Middle East and North Africa Programme, Networks of power: the Popular Mobilization Forces and the state in Iraq, Chatham House, February 2021, url, p. 19

942 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 25

943 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 27

944 Saleem, A.Z. & Skelton, M., Searching for ghosts: fighting corruption at Iraq’s border crossings, LSE [Blog], 24 February 2021, url

945 France 24, ‘Worse than a jungle’: the cartel controlling Iraqi borders, 29 March 2021, url

946 Al-Monitor, Iraq automates its customs service to reduce corruption at border crossings, 22 June 2021, url

947 Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, A thousand Hezbollahs: Iraq’s emerging militia state, May 2021, url, p.

89; Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, url, p. 5

948 Knights, M., et al., Honored, not contained, The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p.

41

125

dominant Shia militia, the ‘first among equals’.⁹⁴⁹ PMU brigades 4, 20, 23, and 24 are all under Badr Organisation leader al-Ameri’s command and are almost all focused on southern Diyala and the adjacent Jallam Desert.⁹⁵⁰ Hashd Brigade 110 and Liwa al-Taff (Brigade 20) are mainly based in the Khanaqin area.⁹⁵¹ PMU-brigade 110 belongs to Badr Organisation and consists of Faili Kurds.⁹⁵² Liwa al-Taff (Brigade 20) is led by Hashim Ahmad al-Tamimi. It is an

independent militia that split off from the al-Abbas Combat Division and its fighters are said to be Sistani loyalists.⁹⁵³ In a May 2020 report, Husham Al-Hashimi noted the presence of PMUs in Al-Udhaym, Khanaqin, Mansuriya, Muqdadiyah, Khana, Mandali and Hamrin as of

December 2019.⁹⁵⁴

Northern Diyala has increasingly become an area of operations for Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH).⁹⁵⁵ AAH forces operating in northern Diyala do not seem to be under the operational control of the PMU Diyala Operations Command.⁹⁵⁶ In northeastern Diyala, Badr has ceded control of Jalawla to AAH.⁹⁵⁷ In the area, AAH constructed local Sunni-manned militias from the Kerwi (or Karawi⁹⁵⁸) tribe.⁹⁵⁹ In Abu Sayda, AAH militiamen have unsuccessfully contested Badr’s

control of the town in 2016.⁹⁶⁰

Diyala is ‘a vital military and economic entry point for Iran into Iraq’, and a priority area for Iran and the brigades of Badr Organisation, the Institute for the Study of War reports in 2017.⁹⁶¹ USDOD, in its Lead Inspector General Report covering the second quarter of 2020, reported that in Diyala the PMU has ‘outsized influence relative to the ISF’.⁹⁶² The source further described that PMUs regularly conduct counter-ISIL operations, drone surveillance, raids, clearing operations and man checkpoints, but also engage in extortion, detaining Sunnis on false changes and weapon smuggling from Iran, ‘exacerbating sectarian tensions’.⁹⁶³ In its 2020 report USDOS notes that a Sunni parliamentarian from Diyala was warned of repeated forced displacement of Sunnis in the governorate by PMF forces or associated militias, resulting in demographic change along the border with Iran.⁹⁶⁴ According to Sunni

949 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, url, p. 5

950 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, url, p. 5

951 Knights, M., et al., Honored, not contained, The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p.

42

952 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, url, p. 5

953 Knights, M., et al., Honored, not contained, The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p.

205

954 Al-Hashimi, H., Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, 5 May 2020, url

955 Knights, M., et al., Honored, not contained, The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p.

131

956 Knights, M., et al., Honored, not contained, The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p.

42

957 Skelton, M. & Saleem, Z., Displacement and Iraq’s political marketplace: Addressing political barriers to IDP return, February 2021, url, p. 22

958 Saleem, Z. et al., Security and Governance in the Disputed Territories Under a Fractured GOI, November 2018, url

959 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, url, p. 5

960 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, url, p. 5

961 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 17

962 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020, 20 August 2020, url, p.23

963 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020, 20 August 2020, url, p.25

964 US, USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url

126

Endowment representatives, Shia militias, including AAH, Badr, and Khurasani, turned Sunni mosques into PMF headquarters in a number of Sunni areas in Diyala.⁹⁶⁵ Reporting on the first quarter of 2021 USDOD observes thatShia militia groups belonging to the PMF continue to operate in Sunni areas against the will of the local populations.⁹⁶⁶ In the April 2021 – June 2021 period, USDOD notes that malign activities conducted by PMF in the predominately Sunni Arab areas are driving more Sunni Arabs to join or support ISIL. Furthermore, the presence of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in the disputed territories exacerbates the security gap in these areas because Peshmerga forces and the PMF do not cooperate.⁹⁶⁷ In May 2020, a top commander of Kata’eb Hezbollah stated that the forced displacement of residents in Tarmiyah and al-Mukhaisa villages in Diyala was the only way to curb ISIL in these predominantly Sunni Arab regions.⁹⁶⁸

Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF, Hashd al-Asha’iri)

The Hashd al-Asha’iri (or Ashayari) are an Arab Sunni militia, composed mainly of Sunni tribes and backed and armed by the Ministry of Defense. To defend and to secure the northern Diyala area, a TMF branch was created in the area in 2014.⁹⁶⁹ In a March 2019 interview, Abdul Khaliq Al-Azzawi, a member of the Defense Committee in the Iraqi parliament from Diyala, stated that tribal mobilization forces are better organized in Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Anbar than in Diyala. In Diyala 3 500 armed men can be counted, serving without pay.⁹⁷⁰ According to Christopher H. Brodsky, a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, Iraq’s economic crisis poses a challenge to Sunni Arabs in the Tribal Mobilization Forces. TMF are intentionally organized as ‘the smallest and weakest entities’ within the PMF in order to prevent them from posing a threat to Shia militia. As such, they are likely to be affected first by government austerity measures such as cuts to public sector salaries.⁹⁷¹ TMF in Diyala do not receive funding from the United States, whilst TMF in Anbar and Nineveh do.⁹⁷²

Tribal Mobilization Forces participate in military operations against ISIL⁹⁷³ and are targeted directly by ISIL.⁹⁷⁴ On 14 October 2020, for instance, a member of the TMF was killed in an ISIL attack on a security post northeast of Baquba.⁹⁷⁵

965 US, USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url

966 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2021 – March 31, 2021, 30 April 2021, url, p.16

967 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2021 – June 30, 2021, 30 July 2021, url, p. 15

968 EPIC, ISHM, April 29 – May 6, 2021, 6 May 2021, url

969 Iraqi Center for Policy Analysis and Research, Sunni Arabs’ grievances in post-ISIS Iraq, 30 March 2019, url

970 Iraqi Center for Policy Analysis and Research, Sunni Arabs’ grievances in post-ISIS Iraq, 30 March 2019, url

971 Small Wars Journal, Iraq’s ethno-sectarian landscape: Sunni Arab collaboration with the dominant Shi’a militia apparatus, 14 November 2020, url

972 Gaston, E., Regulating irregular actors, can due diligence checks mitigate the risks of working with non-state and substate actors, May 2021, url, p. 51

973 Al-Hamid, R., Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, ISIS in Iraq: weakened but agile, 18 May 2021, url

974 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2020 – December 31, 2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 14; EPIC, ISHM, August 6 – August 13, 2020, 13 August 2020, url

975 EPIC, ISHM, October 8- October 15, 2020, 15 October 2020, url

In document Iraq Security Situation (Page 119-129)