Conflict background ISIL insurgency ISIL insurgency

In 2013, the emerging ISIL insurgency established a presence in rural tribal areas of the southwestern Baghdad Belts including in the Jurf Al-Nasr (Jurf Al-Sakhar) area. A network of towns under its control linked ISIL in northern Babil with ISIL groups further north and west, allowing the group to project force upon other parts of Babil as well as on Anbar, Baghdad,⁵⁵³

543 AP, Shattered by war, Sunni Arabs despair over future in Iraq, 10 September 2017, url; NCCI, Babil Governorate Profile, updated July 2015, url, p. 2

544 NCCI, Babil Governorate Profile, updated July 2015, url, p. 2

545 NCCI, Babil Governorate Profile, updated July 2015, url, p. 2

546 Knights, M. et al., Honored, Not Contained: The Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 2020, url, p. 102

547 This town was called Jurf al-Sakhar until its recapture from ISIL and most Iraqis still refer to it by this old name.

New Lines Magazine, Post-ISIS Security Pitfalls Lurk in a Small Town Near Baghdad, 9 March 2021, url

548 ISW, ISIS Re-Establishes Historical Sanctuary in Iraq, 7 March 2019, url

549 Wing, J., Details on Collective Punishment Meted Out by Hashd Upon Jurf al-Sakhr, Musings on Iraq [Blog], 21 November 2019, url

550 Basnews, Iraqi Forces Thwart Triple Attack on Shia Pilgrims in Babel, 19 September 2021, url; Al Mayadeen, Plot to Target Pilgrims in Iraq Foiled, 19 September 2021, url

551 GardaWorld, Iraq: Supply convoy struck by improvised explosive device in Babil Governorate Feb. 25, 25 February 2021, url; for specific incidents, see also, for example, Shafaq News, Bomb attack hits US-led coalition convoy in Iraq, 12 August 2021; Shafaq News, Explosion targets a Logistics Convoy of the Global Coalition in Babel, 29 July 2021, url; Mehr News Agency, US logistic convoys targeted in Iraq’s Al-Diwaniyah, Babil, 5 April 2021, url;

GardaWorld, Iraq: Supply convoy for US-led forces struck by an improvised explosive device in Babil Governorate March 21, 21 March 2021, url; GardaWorld, Iraq: Supply convoy struck by improvised explosive device in Babil Governorate March 15, 15 March 2021, url; GardaWorld, Iraq: Supply convoy for US-led forces struck by IED in Babil Governorate, Dec. 21, 21 December 2020, url

552 GardaWorld, Iraq: Supply convoy struck by improvised explosive device in Babil Governorate Feb. 25, 25 February 2021, url

553 ISW, ISIS in the Southwest Baghdad Belts, 24 November 2014, url, p. 1

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and the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf.⁵⁵⁴ Thus, in 2014, ISIL used its presence in this area to support its combat operations in Fallujah. Shortly after this, it overran Jurf Al-Nasr town and declared an official province for its activities in northern Babil.⁵⁵⁵ In autumn 2014, ISF and Shia militias launched an offensive against the ISIL stronghold and recaptured Jurf Al-Nasr.⁵⁵⁶ With ISIL losing this territory, local Sunnis, who were mostly from the Al-Janabi tribe,⁵⁵⁷ were expelled by Shia militias⁵⁵⁸ and their homes looted and destroyed.⁵⁵⁹ The town was effectively

‘evacuated of its more than 120 000 residents over the course of the ISIS war, leaving only Iraqi security forces [ISF] and the Iranian-backed, state-sponsored Popular Mobilization Forces [PMU] in the town’.⁵⁶⁰ Most of those displaced by the conflict fled to Babil’s Al-Musayab

district, to Baghdad, or to the KRI,⁵⁶¹ and ISF and the PMU have prevented IDPs from returning to the area.⁵⁶²

In the years since, ISIL carried out a few large-scale attacks (notably in Hilla in 2016)⁵⁶³ and projected some influence towards Jurf Al-Nasr and northern Babil, with arrests of ISIL militants by ISF reported at checkpoints along highways linking Baghdad to Babil.⁵⁶⁴ In 2019, a deadly attack in Karbala was allegedly conducted by an ISIL cell from Jurf Al-Nasr.⁵⁶⁵ Sources reported in March 2021 that Shia militias controlling Jurf Al-Nasr have closed off the town to outsiders, denying entry even to Iraqi government officials.⁵⁶⁶

Protest movement

The large-scale protests that erupted in Baghdad in early October 2019 soon spread to Babil.⁵⁶⁷ At the end of the same month, armed guards in Hilla opened fire on protesters, killing 11 of them and injuring dozens of others.⁵⁶⁸ For further details on the targeting of protesters and activists in Iraq please refer to chapter 3: Political opposition activists and protesters of the EUAA COI report – Iraq: Targeting of Individuals (January 2022).

For further details on security developments in Babil governorate in 2019-2020, please refer to section 2.2.3 in EASO’s report on the security situation in Iraq from October 2020.

554 Intercept (The) and New York Times (The), A Spy Complex Revealed, 18 November 2019, url

555 ISW, ISIS Re-Establishes Historical Sanctuary in Iraq, 7 March 2019, url

556 ISW, ISIS in the Southwest Baghdad Belts, 24 November 2014, url, p. 1

557 New Lines Magazine, Post-ISIS Security Pitfalls Lurk in a Small Town Near Baghdad, 9 March 2021,url

558 New York Times (The), Bus Bomb Kills 12 Iraqis Near Major Pilgrimage Site, 21 September 2019, url

559 Intercept (The) and New York Times (The), A Spy Complex Revealed, 18 November 2019, url

560 Rudaw, Iraqi militia calls for evacuation of Sunni areas to cut support for ISIS, 3 May 2021, url

561 HRW, ‘Life Without a Father is Meaningless‘: Arbitrary Arrests and Enforced Disappearances in Iraq 2014-2017, September 2018, url, p. 58

562 Rudaw, Iraqi militia calls for evacuation of Sunni areas to cut support for ISIS, 3 May 2021, url; see also Rudaw, Sunni IDPs in Kurdistan accuse Shiite militias of preventing their return to Babil, 11 March 2021, url; Skelton, M. and Saleem, Z. A., Displacement and Iraq’s Political Marketplace: Addressing Political Barriers to IDP Return, IRIS, February 2021, url, p. 15; Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4

563 Al Jazeera, Iraq: Scores killed in petrol station Hilla attack, 25 November 2016, url; Reuters, Islamic State truck bomb kills at least 60 people south of Baghdad, 6 March 2016, url

564 ISW, ISIS Re-Establishes Historical Sanctuary in Iraq, 7 March 2019, url

565 New York Times (The), Bus Bomb Kills 12 Iraqis Near Major Pilgrimage Site, 21 September 2019, url

566 New Lines Magazine, Post-ISIS Security Pitfalls Lurk in a Small Town Near Baghdad, 9 March 2021, url; Rudaw, Sunni IDPs in Kurdistan accuse Shiite militias of preventing their return to Babil, 11 March 2021, url

567 IFRC, Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Iraq: Civil Unrest, 9 October 2019, url, p. 1

568 UNAMI, Update on Demonstrations in Iraq: Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Abuses by Unidentified Armed Elements, May 2021, url, p. 8

87 2.2.3 Presence and areas of control of armed actors Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)

The Iraqi military’s Babil Operations Command (BabOC), which included the 8th Iraqi Army Division, was responsible for Babil governorate (including Jurf Al-Nasr) and the Southern Baghdad Belts in the past.⁵⁶⁹ In late 2014 – shortly after the reconquest of Jurf Al-Nasr – the General Command of the Iraqi Armed Forces decided to ‘dissolve the Babel Operations Command and task the Mid-Euphrates Operations Command [MEOC] with security of Babel province’.⁵⁷⁰ A May 2021 report confirms that Babil no longer has an operations command of its own but is under the military responsibility of the Mid-Euphrates Operations Command (MEOC).⁵⁷¹ Meanwhile, activities of the 8^th Iraqi Army division were still reported in Babil as of early spring 2021.⁵⁷²

In 2019, it was reported that the government was planning to transfer security duties in Babil from military command to the local police.⁵⁷³ In January 2021, Iraq’s Interior Minister confirmed that his security forces had already taken over control in Babil governorate from the forces of the Ministry of Defence.⁵⁷⁴ The latter half of 2021 saw instances of large-scale deployment of police and other forces in the governorate. In September 2021, the Babil Police Command announced that it was implementing a security plan to protect Shia pilgrims heading to Karbala, with 18 000 personnel deployed from ‘all types of security services’ operating in the governorate, working alongside a PMU brigade.⁵⁷⁵ Moreover, in October 2021, over 20 000 security personnel, including police and members of the Third Brigade of the Iraqi Army, were deployed to protect election centres in the governorate during the October 2021

parliamentary elections.⁵⁷⁶ ISF members have been controlling checkpoints along the Baghdad–Babil highway, in collaboration with PMU and other forces.⁵⁷⁷ It has also been reported in August 2021 that Iraqi intelligence services were playing an active role in the governorate,⁵⁷⁸ including in dismantling alleged ISIL sleeper cells.⁵⁷⁹

Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU)

The PMU, especially those groups with strong links to Iran, maintain a heavy presence in the Baghdad Belts and the borderlands between Babil and Anbar governorates.⁵⁸⁰ The PMU Commission ‘maintains administrative offices in each Iraqi province outside Kurdistan,

569 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 14, 19

570 Iraq News Gazette, Urgent – Babel Operations Command dissolved, 26 December 2014, url

571 Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, Intelligence Briefing: A Thousand Hezbollahs – Iraq’s Emerging Militia State, May 2021, url, p. 75

572Al-Hamid, R., ISIS in Iraq: Weakened but Agile, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy [Map], 18 May 2021, url

573 Al-Monitor, As Iraqi army retreats to borders, local police controls cities' security, 30 January 2019, url

574 EPIC, ISHM: January 7 - January 14, 2021, 14 January 2021, url; see also MEMO, Iraq: Army hands security duties over to police in Wasit, 14 February 2020, url

575 INA, 18,000 security personnel participate in securing Arbaeen in Babylon, 19 September 2021, url

576 NINA, Twenty thousand security personnel protect the electoral centers in Babylon, 9 October 2021, url

577 Mansour, R., Networks of power: The Popular Mobilization Forces and the state in Iraq, Chatham House, February 2021, url, p. 30

578 INA, 18,000 security personnel participate in securing Arbaeen in Babylon, 19 September 2021, url; Shafaq News, Iraq’s Intelligence Services arrests prominent ISIS leader in Babel, 5 August 2021, url

579 See, for example, Shafaq News, Iraq’s Intelligence Services arrests prominent ISIS leader in Babel, 5 August 2021, url

580 Skelton, M. and Saleem, Z. A., Displacement and Iraq’s Political Marketplace: Addressing Political Barriers to IDP Return, IRIS, February 2021, url, p. 10

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providing a necessary link to wounded fighters and families, as well as a recruitment hub and contact point for off-duty members’.⁵⁸¹

As of early 2021, the town of Jurf Al-Nasr remained under the control of Kata‘ib Hezbollah (KH),⁵⁸² an Iranian-backed Shiite militia under the umbrella of the PMU⁵⁸³ that is strongly opposed to current Prime Minister Mustafa Kadhimi.⁵⁸⁴ Jurf Al-Nasr has been described as the most important military hub for KH, ‘an exclusive KH principality in which government forces cannot enter and where KH formally acquired land use rights from the government‘. KH operates ‘extensive private prisons (holding well over 1 000 illegal detainees)’ in Jurf Al-Nasr, as well as medical rehabilitation facilities for its fighters.⁵⁸⁵ Out of the three PMU brigades affiliated with KH,⁵⁸⁶ two (brigades 46 and 47) are headquartered in Jurf Al-Nasr. Moreover, it has been noted that ‘Jurf is the hub of munitions manufacturing, storage, and testing facilities that KH operates in the rural southern arc of Baghdad‘.⁵⁸⁷ According to an Iraqi official

interviewed in 2020 by Michael Knights, a fellow at the US think tank Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), Sheikh Adnan al-Mohammadawi (Adan Yousif Jassim, Abu Ammar) was in charge of the Jurf Al-Nasr base complex.⁵⁸⁸

After the official defeat of ISIL in 2017, PMU units have continued their counterterrorism operations in the Jurf Al-Nasr area.⁵⁸⁹ In September 2021, the PMU Operations Commands announced that its forces had launched a large-scale operation to clear the Jurf Al-Nasr area of ISIL fighters.⁵⁹⁰ PMU forces have also been controlling checkpoints along the Baghdad–

Babil highway, in collaboration with Iraqi government and other forces.⁵⁹¹ ISIL

Based on locations of recorded ISIL attacks on ISF and PMU, a May 2021 report by the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy infers that ISIL fighters are mostly distributed in overlapping ‘geographical sectors’ in several governorates including Babil.⁵⁹² Within Babil governorate, Jurf Al-Nasr, with its extensive KH base, has been referred to as the prime target of ISIL attacks.⁵⁹³ The ISIL-linked news outlet Amaq claimed that the group killed or injured 104 people in Babil governorate during the year 2020, besides causing material damage to vehicles, houses and farms, electricity transmission towers and other facilities.⁵⁹⁴ However, it

581 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 5

582 National (The), ISIS bombed high-voltage power lines near Baghdad, Iraqi military claims, 19 January 2021, url

583 Rudaw, Sunni IDPs in Kurdistan accuse Shiite militias of preventing their return to Babil, 11 March 2021, url

584 FP, A Powerful Iran-Backed Militia Is Losing Influence in Iraq, 11 May 2020, url

585 Knights, M., Back into the Shadows? The Future of Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iran’s Other Proxies in Iraq, October 2020, url, p. 13

586 Smyth, P., Making Sense of Iraq's PMF Arrests, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 26 April 2019, url

587 Knights, M., Back into the Shadows? The Future of Kata'ib Hezbollah and Iran's Other Proxies in Iraq, October 2020, url, p. 13; see also Rudaw, Sunni IDPs in Kurdistan accuse Shiite militias of preventing their return to Babil, 11 March 2021, url

588 Knights, M., Back into the Shadows? The Future of Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iran’s Other Proxies in Iraq, October 2020, url, p. 10

589 Mehr News Agency, Iraq PMU thwarts terrorist attack planned for Ramadan, 12 March 2021, url

590 Mehr News Agency, Iraqi PMU launches operation against ISIL in Babil province, 12 September 2021, url

591 Mansour, R., Networks of power: The Popular Mobilization Forces and the state in Iraq, Chatham House, February 2021,url, p. 30

592 Al-Hamid, R., ISIS in Iraq: Weakened but Agile, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 18 May 2021, url

593 Wing, J., Security In Iraq Nov 1-7, 2020, Musings on Iraq [Blog], 10 November 2020, url

594 Al-Hamid, R., ISIS in Iraq: Weakened but Agile, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 18 May 2021, url

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has been observed that ISIL attacks in Babil have been rare in recent years in comparison with other parts of Iraq.⁵⁹⁵

As of September 2021, ISIL operatives were allegedly hiding in the orchards and woods around Jurf Al-Nasr⁵⁹⁶ and there have been several reports of ISIL cells or hideouts being dismantled and/or ISIL members being arrested in Babil’s north in recent months.⁵⁹⁷ Amongst others, in March 2021, PMU members reportedly ‘discovered and destroyed a number of tunnels’ belonging to ISIL fighters in the area.⁵⁹⁸