9 Konklusion
9.3 Förslag till fortsatt forskning
Ökningen av passiva ägare innebär en stor strukturell ägandeförändring i världsekonomin och relevansen av forskning i detta ämne kan därför anses vara hög.
Förslag till vidare forskning är framför allt att hålla koll på hur situationen utvecklas.
Tillväxttakten av passivt ägande är synnerligen intressant så prognostiseringar över tillväxten av passiva ägare är av stor relevans.
Även hur övervakningen påverkas av den stadigt sjunkande avgiftsnivån kunde vara ett intressant ämne att undersöka. Det ställs allt mera krav på övervakning, samtidigt som avgiftsnivåerna pressas neråt av konkurrensen mellan fondbolagen. Räcker pengarna till för övervakning eller tar dessa betydande ägare rollen som fripassagerare?
Ett annat intressant område vore att specifikt fokusera på de enskilda fondbolagen i De Tre Stora. Dessa företag fokuserar sina resurser på olika typer av engagemang och det skulle därför vara av intresse att se vilken ifall detta leder till några väsentliga skillnader.
Den senaste åren har också kraven på engagemang hos fondbolagen i De Tre Stora ökat.
Att undersöka ifall dessa krav lett till någon verklig förändring i såväl engagemang som prestation kunde vara betydelsefullt.
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