Efter att ha arbetat med svensk kod för bolagsstyrning i en termin kan konstateras att det fortfarande finns aspekter angående koden som hade varit intressanta att studera vidare. De förslag till vidare forskning som uppkommit under uppsatsens gång presenteras i följande stycken.
En första aspekt som hade varit intressant att studera är vilka avvikelser företag gör som de inte rapporterar om. Denna undersökning kräver en noggrann analys av företagens bolags- styrning med hänsyn till koden för att sedan jämföra de observerade avstegen från koden med de som företagen rapporterar att de avviker från. Denna typ av undersökning skulle ge en indikation på hur väl principen följ eller förklara verkligen fungerar där företag antingen tillämpar den som tänkt eller utnyttjar omgivningens goda tro.
Vidare skulle det även vara intressant att studera de förklaringar som företagen ger vid avvikelser. Enligt Kollegiet (2015) bör en förklaring vara konkret, informativ och företags- specifik för att uppfylla sitt syfte, något som inte alltid verkar vara fallet. En undersökning som analyserar om företagen ger informativa förklaringar till avvikelserna eller om de snarare använder sig av standardformuleringar skulle även den ge en indikation på hur väl följ eller förklara-principen fungerar.
Till sist hade det även varit intressant att studera avvikelser från koden genom att analysera huruvida större förändringar i oberoende variabler har en inverkan på företagens tillämpning av koden. Ett exempel på detta hade varit att identifiera företag som genomgått stora förändringar i ägarstrukturen och därefter studera deras tillämpning av koden såväl innan som efter förändringen. Då de flesta andra förhållanden i företaget troligen är detsamma både innan och efter förändringen av exempelvis ägarstrukturen skulle denna typ av undersökning kunna säga mycket om den oberoende variabelns inverkan.
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